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The research sought to find out whether the decision-making institutions of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) allow for stakeholder participation 
in policy-making. It is premised on an understanding that SADC claims to provide for 
stakeholder participation in its policy-making processes. This is stated in Article 23 of 
the SADC founding treaty which speaks of the institution’s desire to open up 
democratic space and allow for inclusivity in decision-making. Furthermore, there are 
practical and operational provisions for the participation of citizens through the SADC 
National Committees (SNCs) and an agreement with the SADC Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations (CNGO). 
The research was done in 12 SADC countries, namely: Tanzania, Mauritius, 
Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Seychelles, Malawi, South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It was a qualitative study done through interviews of 
civil-society organisations (CSOs), government officials and employees of the SADC 
Secretariat. Data was collected using both primary and secondary data methods. 
Primary data was sourced from four categories of respondents, including: senior 
officials from the SADC Secretariat, senior government officials whose duties require 
interaction with civil-society institutions and senior officials from the SADC-CNGO. 
Secondary research data was sourced from documents, including records of the 
minutes of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government (Summit), the 
minutes of the SADC Council of Ministers (COM), SADC communiqués, SADC policy 
documents, civil-society policy drafts, SADC protocols, CSOs and SADC 
press releases. 
The key finding was that while in its founding documents SADC provides for 
participation of stakeholders in the policy-making processes, it is a different story in 
practice. The research revealed that the statutes of SADC, which speak of a need for 
promoting the participation of stakeholders in policy-making processes, have been 
largely ignored, as there is monopolisation of power by the SADC institution of the 
Summit. The primary institution for the participation of stakeholders in policy-making 
was identified as the SNCs, but these were found to be non-operational in most of 
the countries where the research was conducted. The reason for the inactive SNCs 
was identified as the absence of a structured framework by SADC to operationalise 
what is provided for in its statutes. The research found that if SADC is to achieve its 
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goal of enhancing stakeholder participation in its policy-making processes, it needs 
to revive and strengthen the SNCs in each member state. 
The research concludes that for SADC to ensure effective stakeholder participation 
in its decision-making processes, the first point of call is to rehabilitate, strengthen 
and resource the SNCs. The research further concludes that civil society also needs 
to strengthen its organisational capacity for effective engagement with SADC 
leadership. The limitations of representative democracy are identified as one of the 
inhibiting factors for limited participation by stakeholders in SADC policy-making 
processes, and the research proposes the application of deliberative democracy as 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) play an integral part in the governance of the 
African continent. They have the potential to make strong contributions to the development of 
the African continent. They have already and increasingly carved a space where they influence 
the decision-making processes of individual states and, as such, their influence on the 
development of the African continent cannot be underestimated. According to Mkwezalamba 
(2013:2), RECs constitute the building blocks or pillars of African integration. Currently, there 
are eight RECs that are recognised by the African Union (AU), in line with the decision of the 
July 2006, Banjul African Union Summit Decision on the Rationalisation and Harmonisation of 
Regional Economic Communities.1 
Substantial progress has been achieved by some RECs in regional integration, which has 
seen the creation of free-trade areas. There are, however, problems related to growth in most 
of the regional economic communities owing to limited political will as well as resources. 
Mkwezalamba (2013:4) argues that: 
There are several reasons explaining the mixed achievement of regional and 
continental integration in Africa. These include inadequate physical infrastructure, 
roads, railways, energy and information communication technologies; and the absence 
of national coordination mechanisms of regional and continental integration. 
He concludes that one of the key things that African countries should accept is that they each 
need to cede part of their sovereignty if the continent is to make substantial gains in 
implementing its regional and continental integration and development agenda. In that regard, 
enhancing the participation of stakeholders in the decision-making processes of the RECs 
becomes important to ensure that collective decision-making has the potential to promote 
continental development. Moyo (2007:7) argues that: 
Regional Economic Communities and civil society organisations operate under very 
difficult situations. The forces affecting implementation of projects and programmes 
are both internal and external. Internally, issues of capacity, human and financial 
resources politics, inadequate skills and other general inadequacies affect the 
                                               
1 The eight RECs are: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern, 
Africa (COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), 
Economic Community Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC). 
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effectiveness of these institutions. Externally the pressures are varied: some are 
domestic (within the continent) while others are externally driven, particularly by the 
superpowers and super financial institutions more often under the guise of 
globalisation. 
This research looks at one specific REC − the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) − and seeks to establish the nature of decision-making processes in the organisation. 
What institutional and legislative mechanisms are in place for civil-society participation, and 
how do they impact policy-making processes? The research bases its foundations on the 
declarations of Article 23 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC Treaty), which speaks of the organisation’s desire to promote civil-society participation 
in decision-making. 
SADC evolved from the Frontline States, whose objective was the political liberation of 
southern Africa. SADC was preceded by the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) in Lusaka, Zambia in April 1980, with the adoption of the Lusaka 
Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice (Lusaka Declaration). The 
formation of SADCC was the culmination of a long process of consultations by the leaders of 
Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana, working together as the Frontline States. Following 
consultations that were held between the respective ministers of foreign affairs and the 
ministers responsible for economic development, the SADCC was established at a meeting in 
Arusha, Tanzania in July 1979. On 17 August, 1992, at a summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, 
the Heads of State and Government signed the Declaration and Treaty of SADC that 
transformed the SADCC into the SADC. The focus shifted from political liberation to include 
economic integration following the independence of the rest of the southern African countries, 
except for South Africa which became independent in 1994.  
The SADC is an interstate organisation which currently has a membership of 15 states. Its 
members are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Figure 1). According to the 2013 
SADC annual report, the population size of the bloc is approximately 258 million and the GDP 
is about US$480 billion. 
The SADC Treaty of 1992 defines its vision as that of a common future within a regional 
community that will ensure economic wellbeing, improved standards of living and quality of 
life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security for the people of southern Africa. 
According to Oosthuizen (2006), this shared vision is anchored in the common values and 
principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist among the people of southern 
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Africa. The founding treaty goes on to define SADC’s mission as that of promoting sustainable 
and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient and 
productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance, and durable 
peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in 
international relations and the world economy. 
 
Figure 1: The SADC member states 
Source: SADC (www.sadc.int) 
1.1 Background 
According to its founding treaty of 1992, SADC is an international organisation under 
international law, with international rights and obligations separate from those of its member 
states and it can maintain rights though legal processes. Its founding statutes call for member 
states to respect the international character and responsibilities of SADC, its Executive 
Secretary and its staff. Staff are urged to maintain its international character and advised 
against acting on any instructions from individual member states. 
The treaty defines SADC’s operational and decision-making structures as: the Summit of 
Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Troika, the Integrated 
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Committee of Ministers, the Tribunal, the Secretariat and the SADC National Committees. 
Each of these decision-making organs consists of elected representatives from member 
states, meaning that decisions are made by these representatives on behalf of the citizens in 
their countries. This structure assumes that the representatives of each member state carry 
with them a mandate to make policy decisions on behalf of their respective governments and 
citizens. 
This arrangement has been fairly effective in the running of the affairs of SADC, given that it 
is in its infancy, but operational deficiencies have led to the perception that it fails to promote 
public accountability as it is devoid of inclusive decision-making. Moyo (2007) argues that a 
lack of inclusive decision-making within SADC is one of the reasons why the organisation has 
been viewed as an elitist club, devoid of democratic accountability to its constituency. Moyo 
(2007) further avers that the realisation of the limitations of representative democracy has led 
to the creation of avenues for stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes of 
SADC, but these remain weak and ineffective. The creation of these spaces is in line with the 
commitments made in the founding statutes of the organisation. 
The SADC Treaty Amendment of 2001, Article 1(5.2)(b), stipulates that SADC will “encourage 
the people of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop economic, social 
and cultural ties across the region and to participate fully in the implementation of the programs 
and projects of the SADC”. In terms of this amendment, SADC established the SADC National 
Committees (SNCs) as organs to facilitate the interface between the SADC Secretariat and 
stakeholders at the member-state level in 2003.  
Over and above these formal channels for expanded stakeholder participation in decision-
making, there are also informal channels, including the SADC Council of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (SADC-CNGO) which was established in 2004. The SADC-CNGO has a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the SADC Secretariat and works as a quasi-formal 
link between the SADC Secretariat and civil society. It consists of national associations of civil-
society organisations (CSOs) from each of the 15 SADC member states. It has observer status 
in the key organ of the Integrated Committee of Ministers.  
However, despite the provision of all these spaces for participation, there are many operational 
challenges which require a remodelling of the decision-making approach if it is to be inclusive 
of civil-society interests. For instance, Nzewi and Zwake (2009:41) argue that: 
The SNCs are a statutory implementation organ of SADC which provide an opportunity 
for national input in the formulation of regional policies and the co-ordination and 
implementation of these programmes at national level. A distinctive characteristic of 
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SNCs is their position as participatory multi-stakeholder policy-making and 
implementation platforms. However, available information suggests that SNCs in 
SADC countries are, in some cases, virtually non-existent, or poorly constituted, 
managed and capacitated. 
The major questions arising out of the issues raised by Nzewi and Zwake (2009) are whether 
the SNCs are meeting the basic functional requirements as prescribed in the SADC Treaty 
and, if not, what types of interventions are necessary to enable civil society to effectively 
participate in the policy-making processes of SADC? 
SADC also has a Parliamentary Forum (PF) which is, according to Oosthuizen (2006:189): 
A parliamentary consultative assembly meant to develop into a regional parliamentary 
structure. It is also meant to involve the people of the SADC in regional integration 
process, through their elected representatives. The SADC PF was formed in 1996 but 
its constitution entered into force when the 1997 Summit approved an autonomous 
institution of SADC under articles 9(2) and 10(6) of the original SADC Treaty. 
The constitution states that the SADC PF is an international organisation and may dissolve 
itself by a resolution supported by three-quarters of its members. Among some of its key 
objectives are the familiarisation of the people of the region with SADC’s aims and objectives, 
as well as the promotion of the participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
business and intellectual communities in SADC’s activities. This institution remains a forum 
with no legislative powers and, as such, has not been very useful in enhancing the participation 
of citizens in decision-making. 
According to Oosthuizen (2006), the major operational policy documents of SADC are the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for 
the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security (SIPO). They constitute the pillars and framework 
for SADC regional integration and also provide SADC’s member states with a consistent and 
comprehensive programme of long-term economic and social policies, while at the same time 
providing the SADC Secretariat and other institutions with insights on SADC-approved 
economic and social policies and priorities.  
The RISDP reaffirms the commitment of SADC’s member states to good political, economic 
and corporate governance entrenched in a culture of democracy, full participation by civil 
society, transparency and respect for the rule of law. In this context, the AU’s New Partnership 
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is embraced as a credible and relevant continental 
framework, and the RISDP as SADC’s regional expression of and vehicle for achieving the 
ideals contained therein. The RISDP emphasises that good political, economic and corporate 
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governance are prerequisites for sustainable socio-economic development and in SADC’s 
quest for poverty eradication and deeper integration levels. 
The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (the Organ) plays a vanguard role 
as part of the institutional mechanisms for promoting and maintaining peace and stability in 
the region, and the SIPO provides the institutional framework for the daily implementation of 
the organ’s objectives. The SIPO, alongside SADC’s Mutual Defence Pact of 2004, guides the 
implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The SIPO is 
divided into four main sectors, namely: Political, Defence, State Security and Public Security. 
The organisation has also revised SIPO to come up with SIPO II to ensure efficiency in the 
delivery of its goals. 
1.2 Foundations of stakeholder participation in SADC 
SADC enjoys mutually beneficial cooperation at the continental and international levels. At the 
April 2006 Consultative Conference, SADC and its International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) 
adopted the Windhoek Declaration on a New SADC/ICP Partnership (Windhoek Declaration), 
which is a framework for a new partnership between SADC and its ICPs. This declaration 
encompasses the establishment of Thematic Groups, a platform for SADC and its ICPs to 
pool resources to implement programmes in areas of common interest. 
SADC recognises the enormity of its task and acknowledges that it can best achieve its vision 
and mission if it collaborates with various stakeholders. To that end, it has attempted to provide 
for stakeholder participation in its decision-making initiatives. These initiatives are intended to 
complement the formal organs and to promote inclusive decision-making.  
The call for the establishment of complementary structures led to the creation of the SADC-
CNGO to provide an interface between civil society and the SADC Secretariat. While the 
SADC-CNGO is not a formal organ of the SADC Secretariat, it was formed as a response to 
the founding statutes of the SADC Treaty, which speak of a need for the provision of spaces 
for the participation of civil society in the decision-making processes of the organisation. 
According to Ditlhake (2012), the relationship between the Secretariat and the SADC-CNGO 
was cemented through a memorandum of understanding which gives the latter observer status 
in the Integrated Committee of Ministers and allows it to attend the meetings of SADC senior 
officials.  
The primary policy decision-making fora of SADC are the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, and the Council of Ministers, with implementation being effected by the 
Secretariat headed by the Executive Secretary. These organs, with the exclusion of the 
Secretariat, consist of elected representatives of each member state. The Summit comprises 
7 
elected heads of state, while the Council comprises ministers of foreign affairs and trade 
delegates. In the broadest sense, the SADC member states are parliamentary democracies; 
their delegates are assumed to represent national priorities in policy discussions. However, 
the extent of the effectiveness of their parliamentary and democratic processes differ and, in 
many instances, they are found wanting, hence the need for a formula to ensure that civil 
society participates in the policy-making processes. If the representative system worked 
properly and efficiently, there would be no need for emphasis on civil society’s participation. 
Further to that, SADC created the National Committees to include non-state organisations and 
civil society in SADC policy formulation processes, and to forge closer ties with the SADC-
CNGO as an important structure in promoting civil-society participation in policy decision-
making processes. The SADC National Committees (SNCs) were formally established by the 
amended SADC Treaty of 2007, which states that each member state must create a SNC 
consisting of key stakeholders including the government, the private sectors, civil society, 
NGOs, and workers’ and employers’ organisations.  
According to the minutes of the SADC Council of Ministers (COM) meeting held in Dar es 
Salaam on 23−25 August 2003, it was noted that the SADC Summit had established the SNCs 
and it was important to work on a rollout plan to operationalise them. This was too little too 
late as it was only happening 11 years later, but, be that as it may, it would be of interest to 
establish how these new structures functioned and to what extent they contributed to civil-
society participation in the policy-making processes of SADC. At the meeting, it was noted 
that the operationalisation of the SNCs would ensure that member states participate effectively 
in SADC affairs to derive maximum benefits from the process of regional integration. It was a 
way of ensuring that there would be an integrated approach that involves all key stakeholders 
in contributing to the regional bloc’s policy formulation and developmental processes. 
However, there seem to be problems in the operationalisation of the SNCs − a situation that 
has affected the effective participation of other stakeholders in SADC’s policy initiatives.  
While there are provisions for the creation of spaces for stakeholder participation in SADC 
through the SNCs, there is little evidence that they are operational. For instance, the record of 
the COM meeting held on14–15 August 2007 in Lusaka, Zambia indicates that the council 
considered the Report of the 2007 SADC National Committees’ Regional Meeting 
(SADC/CM/2/2007/3.5) and in particular noted that, at its meeting of August 2003, it directed 
the Secretariat to hold annual meetings of the SNCs to exchange experiences on best 
practices and improve their operations. 
It noted that there was a meeting of the SNCs, held on 10–11 May 2007 in Zanzibar, United 
Republic of Tanzania, which focused its deliberations on progress in the implementation of 
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the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), including the development of a 
monitoring and evaluation system, and information- and experience-sharing on best practices 
as an attempt to consolidate the SNCs in the member states and the Institutional Capacity 
Assessment Study for the SNCs. However, while strides were being made to operationalise 
the SNCs, the COM noted that substantial progress had been made in the establishment of 
the SNCs, although they were at different stages of establishment and operationalisation. At 
the same time, they further noted that despite the progress made, most SNCs suffered from 
severe capacity constraints with regards to financial and human resources which hampered 
effective implementation of the RISDP/SIPO at a national level.  
The 2007 SNCs meeting made recommendations that include, among others, the need for 
capacity building and sharing of best practices on incorporating the RISDP plans and 
programmes into national development plans. Further to that, it was noted that the sluggish 
pace in the establishment of the NSCs was a result of severe capacity constraints and, thus, 
member states were urged to build the capacities of the SNCs for the implementation of the 
RISDP/SIPO. 
What comes out clearly from the record of minutes of the COM meeting is that, despite an 
ostensible commitment to establish functional organs to facilitate the participation of civil 
society and other stakeholders in the policy-making processes of SADC, little progress has 
been made. The failure to establish functional SNCs is a case in point. For instance, despite 
the 2003 decision by the COM that the SADC Secretariat hold an annual meeting on the 
matter, only one meeting was held, four years later, and there is little to account for limited 
action on the subject during the other years. 
The slow pace in the implementation of the provisions that would widen decision-making may 
be linked to assertions that because policy-making is about power, it creates problems of 
contestation of what amounts of decision-making space should be given out and when they 
should be given out. While the SADC statutes speak of providing spaces for participation in 
its policy-making and governance processes, there seems to be a lack of political will, as well 
as institutional and operational challenges that inhibit meaningful and active engagement from 
non-state stakeholders in policy processes. Moyo (2007) sees this as a challenge arising from 
the architectural construction of SADC as an interstate organ whose decision-making 
structures are premised on the formal representation of member states.  
The policy decision-making structures of the SADC are based on government-to-government 
agreements and, while there has been a realisation and a desire to open them up for inclusive 
decision-making, challenges remain clear. These challenges have seen the SNCs fail to take 
off properly, leading to Nzewi and Zakwe (2009:47) to conclude that “in order to enhance 
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participation of civil society in decision making processes SADC member states need to live 
up to their constitutional commitments of being democratic and that a democracy needs to be 
truly representative including taking on board the civil society voice. Engaging civil society is 
neither a choice nor an option but an imperative of good governance.” This research, in 
exploring public participation as a functional requirement for the SNCs, found that while there 
have been efforts to set up the SNCs, there has been minimal success recorded in 
establishing functional entities.  
What this means is that when they are undertaken, national discussions and decisions on 
SADC’s regional programmes and policies are usually at the level of government 
functionaries, and not within the participatory parameters of the SADC Treaty provisions in 
terms of SADC national implementation. All indications are that the SNCs are still largely 
government-centric and inept, which brings into question the degree of policy influence that is 
afforded to civil society. This research has clearly shown that much attention needs to be paid 
to SADC national implementation instruments such as the SNCs. 
As already indicated, beyond the SNCs, there has been an attempt to forge closer ties with 
the SADC-CNGO which has been operationalised through the signing of a MOU. The SADC-
CNGO, while not necessarily a formal organ of the SADC Secretariat, is recognised as a 
credible conduit of views between civil society and the Secretariat. The SADC-CNGO is the 
lead apex organisation of umbrella bodies of NGOs operating in all 15 SADC member states. 
It was established in 1998 but its operations began in 2004 with a primary purpose of 
facilitating engagement between NGOs in the region and SADC. Its legitimacy lies not only in 
the mandate bestowed upon it, but also in the signed MOU with the SADC Secretariat for 
promoting constructive dialogue and engagement with civil society. 
The organisation is based in Gaborone, Botswana, where the SADC Secretariat is stationed, 
which makes the two organisations accessible to each other. The SADC-CNGO is supposed 
to get input from national associations of CSOs whose contributions should be products of 
deliberations at the country level through the SNCs. The SNCs are a formal organ of SADC 
and have been assembled to provide input at a national level in the formulation of regional 
policies and strategies, as well as to coordinate and oversee the implementation of 
programmes at national level. The committees are also responsible for initiating SADC 
projects and for issuing papers as an input into the preparation of the regional strategies. 
According to a European Union (EU) delegation report to Botswana in 2008, the statuses and 
operations of the SNCs vary considerably. Angola and Mozambique have set up robust 
structural and operational units. These are, however, largely ineffective in most of the other 
SADC countries. A common feature of the national committees in most of the member states 
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is that they are ineffective because of structural weaknesses and the lack of dedicated staff 
and funding. In most cases, they are not fully developed, and have few or no actual 
relationships with the SADC Secretariat in their day-to-day operations. They seem not to have 
business plans that are harmonised with the business plans of the SADC Secretariat.  
The coordinators of the national committees are country ministerial officers with other 
functional responsibilities. They are not functionally dedicated only to the coordination of 
SADC; hence, their SADC role appears to be part-time and ad hoc. In fact, most are based in 
ministries of foreign affairs (rather than of development planning and coordination). They 
generally lack capacity, and their roles at a country level do not seem to be clearly articulated.  
The structural deficiencies of the SNCs have inevitably paralysed the ability of the apex CSOs 
at a country level to input agreed positions to the regional organisation. This raises questions 
of how, then, the SADC-CNGO can claim to be a reliable representative of the interests of the 
citizens at the country level. This is made worse by the fact the SNCs are not properly 
functional, yet the SADC-CNGOs receive country reports from the apex organisations as if all 
is well.  
These national representations cannot be said to be fully reflective of the true composition of 
the country’s CSOs as they leave out other key stakeholders at the national level. Invariably, 
this also has weakened the position of the SADC-CNGO as a platform for civil-society policy 
deliberations. This inevitably leads to a debate on what forms of decision-making processes 
and what alternative spaces of engagement should be employed to ensure that there is 
increased participation and inclusion of other stakeholders in the decision-making processes 
of SADC. 
Over and above this, it raises questions of what framework of decision-making can be put in 
place to ensure that policy-making in the interstate organs is inclusive and, thus, deal with 
limitations presented by representative democracy.  
Democratic representation, which tends to bend to the tyranny of the many, or the powerful, 
on a majority-vote basis thus needs to be complemented by other, more inclusive forms of 
democracy which allow for more robust discussions before decisions are made. One such 
model that can be put to test is the concept of deliberative democracy which, in contrast, 
creates opportunities to explore opening of spaces for debate and engagement between those 
in power and those who are governed, based on the four tenets of equality, reciprocity, 
publicity and accountability. 
The deliberative democracy approach suggests that decisions be made after an exhaustive 
process of discussion, such that the policy outcomes are based on sufficient consensus. 
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However, deliberative democracy might not constitute an ideal type for governance, given that 
politics is about the accumulation and retention of power, and there is often a limited appetite 
and interest to share it. As a result, the real political world does not always allow for a 
“donation” of power by sharing it through provision of spaces for participation of different 
groups. Political space is contested and those who have tend it to keep it heavily protected 
using state institutions. 
Modern trends in governance seem to be tilting towards shared governance, which provides 
for inclusiveness, transparency and accountability. Masterson, Busia and Jinadu (2008:2) are 
of the view that: 
There is consensus to give civil society a de facto right to concretely participate in the 
public policy making beyond the constitutional provisions of citizenship, to ensure 
equal access to the State and enhanced participation in governance by the individual 
and by collective groups especially the historically disadvantaged and marginalised. 
This has led to the creation of several avenues to enable the participation of the citizenry in 
policy-making processes, with the understanding that such an involvement will promote 
accountability. Mafunisa (2004:490) is of the similar view that “public institutions in making 
decisions and implementing these decisions have to take into account the attitude and 
activities of the institutions constituting civil society”. This argument is buttressed by Hyden 
(1999) who posits that legitimate democratic public participation is vital because the 
authoritative decisions imposed by governments demand justification from those burdened by 
authority. This justification must appeal to evidence and arguments acceptable to reasonable 
citizens. The above argument builds on the normative foundations of works by Habermas 
(1987:364) who argues that “the facilitation of citizens’ participation in the policy-making 
organs buffers the public from state domination” and provides what he calls “effective 
restraining barriers to protect civil society from state domination”. 
The need for citizens to take an active part in the way they are governed is of serious 
importance as it allows them to control their destiny and allows the government to be 
accountable to the governed. King (2004) buttresses this idea in his argument that democracy 
is an ideal of popular sovereignty according to which legitimacy is ultimately assessed in terms 
of the judgement of those governed. The same view is developed by Sloat (2002) who argues 
that when multiple actors and institutions participate in debating, defining and achieving policy 
goals in complex political arenas, the state no longer dominates the public policy-making 
process and decisions are made by bargaining and problem-solving rather than imposition. 
Hyden (1999) elaborates on this when he speaks of how, in many countries, there has been 
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an increase in the involvement of non-state actors, with networks playing increasingly 
important roles in advocating policy and implementing public programmes. 
The capacity of political systems to provide governance in a society is, therefore, much 
affected by the structure of the institutions and the way these institutions interact with one 
other. But most importantly, inclusive decision-making is a vital pillar of democratic 
governance, as the opening of spaces for the participation of various players is important in 
providing room for different views and ideas to compete, and ultimately shaping policies in a 
manner that is satisfactory to diversity. This is expanded on by McLennan (2007) who shares 
the same view with an argument that the legitimacy of those in power depends on the extent 
to which they can use and sustain the rules of governance in relation to policy development 
and implementation. 
The above builds on blocks by Leftwich (1993) who views governance as involving deciding 
upon collective goals for the society and the mechanisms through which these goals can be 
attained. He further argues that there should be an inextricable bond in the relations of the 
state and citizens in making and implementing public policy, because formal structures are 
not the only ones involved in governance but a whole section of the citizens.  
While these arguments have, in many instances, been applied to individual states, there is 
limited literature to suggest how they can be applied to interstate organisations especially in 
the African context. Yet, these are increasingly affecting the decision-making processes of 
nation states. Nation states have evolved over the years, but the concept of interstate 
organisations is generally new to Africa. For instance, SADC, in its current form, is only 23 
years old and there has been little exploration of what forms of decision-making, beyond the 
traditional representative model, can enhance inclusive decision-making in the institution.  
The construction of SADC as an interstate organ where decision-making is limited only to 
elected government representatives inhibits greater stakeholder participation in governance. 
The participation of civil society in interstate organisations is becoming increasingly important 
as a way of expanding the contributions of stakeholders. It is also important to focus on SADC 
because institutions grow and change according to the environment. For instance, the SADC 
of today has undergone various changes to meet the changing political, economic and social 
conditions of member states since it was instituted. 
Among some of the major changes noted has been how to improve the decision-making 
processes by promoting inclusivity. The desire to promote inclusive decision-making has seen 
SADC form many institutions, key among them the SNCs, as an avenue for promoting 
increased stakeholder participation in the policy-making processes. This research seeks to 
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use the deliberative democracy framework to test the extent to which SADC has lived up to its 
commitments of inclusive decision-making in its policy-making processes. 
1.2.1 Why civil society should participate in interstate organisations 
Given that SADC, an interstate organisation, is designed through state cooperation and an 
assumption that all citizens are well-represented by the decisions of their representatives, 
there could be limited interest on why it could be important to allow for more stakeholder 
participation in its decision-making processes. 
Yet, given the bigger role that interstate organisations like SADC play and the influence they 
yield in the developmental processes of individual member states, they have become a serious 
factor in national governance and, thus, need to be scrutinised even more closely. It has 
become increasingly more necessary to decide what spaces should be created and what 
alternative forms of decision-making mechanisms should be put in place in order to allow for 
sustained inclusivity and stakeholder participation in the decision-making of interstate 
organisations.  
This section explains the importance of the participation of civil society in the decision-making 
processes of interstate organisations. It is an important section because it will assist to counter 
some arguments that there is no need for civil society to participate in interstate organisations, 
given that these are established in terms of state cooperation and thus decision-making 
processes should include just state representatives. 
Steffek and Ferretti (2009) make a strong argument for civil-society participation in 
international organisations as a way of remedying the much-lamented democratic deficit. They 
argue that it may enhance either the democratic accountability of intergovernmental 
organisations and regimes, or the epistemic quality of the rules and decisions made within 
them. Steffek and Ferretti (2009) also see this leading to enhanced transparency and, hence, 
improved accountability. 
There are two normatively important functions of civil-society participation in international 
governance. Their first argument is that participation may enhance the democratic 
accountability of international organisations, in the sense that it may help citizens to gain some 
control over international governance and to hold decision-makers publicly to account. In this 
context, CSOs act as watchdogs and creators of a public sphere. They also monitor political 
developments and act as transmitters and translators of highly specialised information, thus 
creating a link with the citizenry. They may also provide the critical counter-expertise to 
challenge international organisations and governments. Public criticism and contestation of 
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policies thus create public accountability, urging decision-makers to explain and justify their 
actions. 
Drastic developments since the 1990s have seen the democratic legitimacy of traditional forms 
of international governance being questioned. According to Zürn (2004), executive 
multilateralism (cooperation among diplomats and government-appointed experts) is identified 
with a lack of inclusiveness, participation and public accountability. 
One of the possible remedies suggested in the debate about the democratic deficit of 
international governance is the enhanced participation of civil society in international 
governmental organisations. While there has been a shift in rhetoric from traditional notions of 
representative democracy towards decentralised and participatory forms of governance that 
rely mainly on the extensive participation of organised civil society, in SADC there is little of 
that in practice. Consistent with the desire for participative decision-making, most interstate 
organisations have, in their statutes, made commitments to provide spaces for civil-society 
participation. 
SADC, being an interstate organisation, seeks to be accountable to its citizens to promote 
developmental initiatives that can transform their lives for the better. The framework for 
accountability is well-defined in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. Moyo (2007) sees this as even 
more important now, given the wave of regional integration and the need for the process to be 
people-centred. It is thus crucial to have a working formula that guarantees citizens’ voices in 
the decision-making processes of the region. This is linked to the Africa Agenda 2063, a 
celebration of 100 years since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU; now 
the AU). Africa Agenda 2063 speaks of a need for Africa to do things differently and to allow 
for increased stakeholder participation in its developmental initiatives. 
This will enable it to achieve the AU’s vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, 
driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena. Significantly, 
more action is still required on a number of fronts. 
According to Dlamini-Zuma (2014), the whole purpose of the programme is to encourage 
discussion among all stakeholders. The continent should learn effectively from the lessons of 
the past, build on the progress now underway and strategically exploit all possible 
opportunities available in the immediate and medium term. This may promote positive socio-
economic transformation within the next 50 years. Moyo (2007) argues further that the 
development of effective engagement mechanisms has become more pressing in view of the 
growing importance of regional intergovernmental bodies and regional integration processes 
15 
as tools for managing the effects of globalisation such as poverty, underdevelopment and food 
insecurity. 
This then calls for civil-society actors to develop strategies to engage governments, and work 
and collaborate with the interstate bodies, to promote interaction with the institutions and thus 
make them accountable to the citizenry. A close evaluation of the institutions will reveal that 
representative democracy alone cannot enhance the participation of stakeholders in this 
interstate organisation. Thus, alternative forms of democracy have to be explored. 
1.2.2 Institutional framework for the participation of African CSOs in policy-making 
The growth in the discourse for the participation of stakeholders in the policy-making of 
interstate organs is not limited to SADC, but is also present in other organisations like the AU. 
This is important for the research, as the continental body has a lot of influence in the decision-
making processes of the regional bodies, as argued by Mkwezalamba (2013). RECs constitute 
the building blocks or pillars of African integration. In this context, this section will discuss the 
decision-making structures and the attempts that have been made to promote inclusive 
decision-making at that level. 
It should be noted that the structure for civil society to participate in the regional bloc’s policy-
making processes is almost like that of its mother body, the AU. This is important because the 
need to promote accountability in interstate organs is not only for regional bodies but also for 
the continental body which has a huge influence on the decision-making processes of the 
regional bodies. The framework for participative decision-making in the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union (2000:6) as follows: “Guided by our common vision of a united and strong Africa 
and by the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, 
in particular, women, youth and the private sector.” 
Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act further provides for the organisation to promote principles 
and institutions, popular participation and good governance, and to promote and protect 
human rights and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights and other human rights instruments. Article 4 of the same act provides for 
“the participation of African people in the initiatives of the Union”. 
Further to that, in the AU’s Strategic Plan document (2004–2007), citizens of Africa are a 
Priority Programme 2; it advances objectives aim to ensure that the talent, resources and 
dynamism of the African people and the diaspora are fully utilised in the implementation of the 
programmes of the AU, and also to enhance the meaning and value of citizenship in Africa. 
Over and above that, it aims to establish the overall transparency and accountability of the AU 
to the African people. In that regard, it has, among some of the activities, worked on the 
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establishment of a sound framework for the enhanced participation of various stakeholders in 
the activities of the AU. It has also led to the development of the AU network and national 
commissions at the level of each member state. It also sends AU delegations to the RECs. 
The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) is the principal formal channel 
through which the voices of CSOs can be heard in the AU. It was aimed at establishing national 
and regional consultative mechanisms that would support Pan-African CSOs and networks, 
including through financial support and observer status. The council was also designed to 
ensure that there would be systematic civil-society and private-sector meetings before each 
AU summit. Figure 3 provides an overview of the key roles of ECOSOCC and how it relates 
to civil society. It is an important illustration because it provides an example of the possible 
relationship between the AU and CSOs in member states. 
 
Figure 1: Key roles of the ECOSSOC 
Adapted from the AU Commission (2006) 
The objectives of the AU, like SADC, indicate that interstate organisations can achieve more 
for the people if they enhance the participation of its citizens in decision-making processes. 
This argument is further developed by Mbogori (2008), who is of the view that the sooner the 
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civil-society sector understands these bodies and the stages they have reached in their 
evolution, the more they should be prepared to interact with them and, hopefully, infuse them 
a human face. This might show a greater desire to serve the needs of citizens of both the 
region as well as the continent. More can be achieved if there are alternative forms of 
democratic engagement that emphasise equality, reciprocity and accountability, and publicise 
the deliberations. 
Mbogori’s (2008) argument is premised on the understanding that entrenching the 
participation of citizens in the African policy agenda leads to the goal of enabling them to 
secure ownership of public institutions in a manner that ensures accountability. It strengthens 
the case for the participation of citizens in policy processes to achieve what Mbogori (2008) 
describes as the need to perceive Africans as part of a larger continental infrastructure which 
its citizens have a duty to constitute and maintain.  
He further argues that it is in the spirit of deliberative democracy to ensure that it promotes 
citizens’ participation in decision-making. He posits that organised civil society and those with 
access to resources should engage in initiatives that promote the access of the poor, 
marginalised and unorganised to be able to participate in policy decisions. But for this to be 
achieved, strong African governance institutions need to be constructed. In their absence, it 
would be difficult to achieve participative governance.  
According to Landsberg and McKay (2005), the weak institutions of governance are some of 
the major causes for the regression of development in Africa. Inevitably, the fragility of the 
governance institutions has made it difficult to provide mechanisms and structures for public 
participation in decision-making processes at the continental level, and in regional economic 
blocs and national governments. Yet, such participation can be a buffer against interstate 
bodies becoming a mere extension of governmental interests. If the engagement is discussed, 
negotiated and concluded only at the level of states, it may create problems of lack of 
accountability of the interstate organ to the citizenry. It has been observed that if citizens do 
not engage, then these institutions remain both untransformed and undemocratic. For 
instance, Landsberg and Mckay (2005:16) further argue that: 
The challenge is transformation and thus can only happen by means of critical and 
independent engagement by civil society. Such a transformation paradigm could be 
found in a deliberative policy-making approach which challenges citizens and civil 
society actors grabbing the mandate to participate and play oversight and 
representative roles in governance and decision making. 
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Some of the main reasons for advocating active citizens’ involvement in the policy-crafting 
initiatives of the continent are to ensure that there is a collective approach in addressing what 
have been termed Africa’s “big issues”. These big issues, according to Landsberg and McKay 
(2005), are concerned with reducing poverty, ensuring social development, and stopping wars 
and conflicts through the promotion of peace-building initiatives, while at the same time 
promoting free and fair trade regimes. This also calls for the promotion of human rights and 
democratic governance, as well as fostering regional integration and cooperation.  
This broader engagement is important because, in some instances, fragile state institutions 
do not always represent the broader interests of the citizenry. In the context of interstate 
organisations, this becomes even more important as it limits decision-making to narrow state 
or political interests, excluding those who might be marginalised or, in some instances, abused 
by those in positions of authority. 
The exclusive nature of the construction of interstate organisations strengthens the case for 
an inclusive, strong and viable avenue in which civil society and non-state actors can engage 
and participate in SADC policy-formulation to promote accountability and inclusive decision-
making. Landsberg and Mckay (2005) emphasise that, while civil-society engagement 
remains poor, interstate institutions and programmes are building strong policy and 
programmatic synergies and coherence amongst themselves. If civil-society actors fail to 
engage strategically, it will always be difficult to steer these institutions and programmes in 
more people-oriented directions. This makes it difficult to ensure accountability of the interstate 
organisations. 
Several models and principles for engagement for civil-society actors are proposed by 
Landsberg and Mckay (2005). They propose that civil-society actors should have the freedom 
to express their views concerning all issues of promotion of societal development, regardless 
of how the state negatively views them. They also propose that civil society can ensure that 
African technocrats and exceptionally skilled intellectuals in various developmental areas are 
part of the debates for continental transformation. At the same time, they argue for a need to 
widen and strengthen the scope of inclusion of participants from all strata of continental and 
national governments in Africa.  
Participative decision-making at all levels of SADC’s institutions may assist in accelerating 
growth and development. Yet, to achieve this, a high degree of honesty, integrity and 
accountability by both the government players and civil-society movements is required. One 
way of doing this is to create a framework that assists both government and civil-society actors 
to promote cooperation based on achieving developmental goals. Most importantly, the 
successful transformation of Africa hinges on the genuine commitment to and active 
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participation by all those involved in its policy-making processes. This calls for a framework 
for Africa’s development based on the creation of well-defined institutional structures and 
effective links between the various processes and initiatives that seek to develop it. 
1.3 Problem statement 
Whereas SADC provides for the elected representatives of member states to participate in its 
policy-formulation processes, it does not formally consider adequate consultations with other 
stakeholders, especially civil society. 
While it is factually true that elected government representatives have the full mandate to 
make policy decisions that bind all its citizens, it is folly to assume that such decisions fully 
represent interests of all the citizens all the time.  
Even though SADC declares a firm commitment to the involvement of civil society in its policy 
formulation processes through Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, there is little evidence of such 
participation. SADC is constructed as an interstate organ in which engagement with the 
institution and among member states is through elected government officials. The construction 
of SADC in this manner is based on the principles of representative democracy theory, in 
which it is assumed that the citizens are well-represented through their elected representatives 
and, as such, decisions are made on their behalf by those elected. 
The assumption is based on the understanding that democracy is the rule of the people by the 
people, that parliament is the body that mirrors the will of the entire citizenry and, therefore, 
that it is the sum of people’s hopes and aspirations.  
At the same time, it is assumed that the executive or the government is created as an 
administration agency of state affairs on behalf of the citizenry and, therefore, it is derived from 
or appointed by parliament and thus taken from the people’s choice of representatives. The 
executive, being an administrative agency of the people, is subservient to parliament which is 
the ultimate policy-making organ. 
SADC decision-making is premised on the idea that each member state is well-represented. 
This makes sense for an interstate organisation. But given the current dominance of discourse 
on inclusive decision-making and participative governance, albeit at a snail’s pace, it also 
makes provisions for the engagement of stakeholders through the SNCs and the SADC-
CNGO. However, despite the provision of these spaces for inclusive decision-making, there 
seems to be limited evidence of the effectiveness of civil-society and stakeholder participation 
in the policy-formulation processes of SADC. 
20 
This is even though the principle of inclusion is important as it ensures that the policies that 
are made are more likely to be owned and implemented with the consent and support of the 
citizens. Invariably, this can assist in accelerated regional development. However, there 
remains a glaring gap in the extent of how inclusive or participative SADC decision-making is, 
or the implications of this. This gap also extends to member states’ participation, as well as 
that of civil society through the SADC-CNGO and the SNCs. 
Furthermore, because the theories of democratic governance and inclusive policy-making are 
not always directly applicable to interstate organisations, there is a need to develop standards 
for participation and inclusion beyond representation. In this regard, this research uses 
deliberative democracy to evaluate the nature of decision-making in the SADC and the extent 
of inclusiveness. 
Deliberative democracy, with its known tenets of inclusivity, can enhance participation and 
inclusivity, and presents opportunities for the enhanced participation of citizens in decision-
making processes. The current decision-making process is based on the absolute power of 
elected representatives, while deliberative democracy decision-making would be based on 
equality of voices for all stakeholders, such that the minority view or that of the marginalised 
is taken into consideration.  
This could build on Mbogori’s (2008) assertion that the spirit of deliberative democracy 
ensures that stakeholders and interest groups participate in decision-making. He states that 
organised civil society and those with access to economic resources should engage in 
initiatives that promote the poor, the marginalised and the unorganised to have access to and 
participation in policy decisions. In the context of interstate organisations, deliberative 
democracy can promote democratic accountability and deal with the closed nature of the 
organisations which have seen them suffer from democratic deficiency.  
In short, to attain effectiveness and democratic legitimacy, there could be a need to apply the 
four tenets of deliberative democracy, namely: equality, reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability. This view is enriched by Kohler-Koch and Finke (2007:215) who argue that: 
[The] ethical foundation of deliberative democracy suggests that democratic decision 
making ideally rests on public deliberation aiming at reasoned consensus. This ideal, 
however, is based on two demanding presuppositions: first, which all citizens can 
exercise and effectively claim their communicative rights and, second, that citizens 
possess the necessary cognitive, motivational, and organisational capacities to 
engage in public deliberation. 
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Public deliberation introduces new themes and issues for political governance. It “lays siege” 
to political decision-makers by generating communicative power, and thus forces them to take 
up themes and issues that are discussed in society. Kohler-Koch and Finke (2007) conclude 
that to attain effectiveness and democratic legitimacy, institutionalised decision-making 
procedures must be linked to a functioning public sphere. The public sphere, for its part, 
depends on a specific societal infrastructure, since deliberations require a certain degree of 
organisation, which can be provided by civil society.  
While allowing for some space for participation beyond mere voting, representative democracy 
is limited in relation to its selective nature of who can and should participate. While there could 
be some space for this participation, there is a problem that, in most instances, it is nominal 
participation, because real power in policy formulation lies within a select few that control the 
state instruments of coercive power and thus limited emphasis of equality, reciprocity, publicity 
and accountability as in deliberate democracy. 
1.4 Purpose statement 
This research seeks to find means and ways in which the SADC decision-making processes 
can be inclusive by allowing for the effective and meaningful participation of civil society in a 
manner that promotes public accountability and reduces the democratic deficiency caused by 
representative democracy in the organisation.  
The research seeks to find out how deliberative democracy can promote participative decision-
making in SADC’s policy-making processes. Further to that, the research seeks to contribute 
to debates on democratic governance and decision-making in interstate organisations. 
In the process, the research might assist in developing principles for inclusive decision-
making, drawing from theories of deliberative democracy. The research seeks to contribute to 
the body of knowledge on how regional interstate organs in general, and the SADC in 
particular, can foster a culture of inclusive decision-making through enhanced stakeholder 
participation in policy-formulation.  
It also seeks to contribute theories about how improved democratic governance in the regional 
institutions can accelerate development. Over and above, it seeks to promote standards for 
the participation of civil society in the decision-making processes of interstate organisations. 
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1.5 Research questions 
1.5.1 The primary research question 
Why do civil society and stakeholders find it difficult to participate in SADC decision-making 
processes, despite statutory provisions in the SADC Treaty?  
1.5.2 The secondary and related questions 
I. Does the interstate nature of the SADC institutions limit the meaningful participation of 
civil society in policy-formulation processes?  
II. Do SADC’s democratic policy-formulation processes adequately include civil-society 
interests in the region and within member states? 
III. How are the deliberative democracy principles of equality, reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability useful in enhancing our understanding of civil-society participation in 
SADC’s decision-making processes? 
1.6 Limitations 
The key limitations of this research are related to the organisational issues of CSOs, 
particularly in their information management systems. Many of these organisations have poor 
information management systems, which makes it difficult to access vital information about 
their operations. In some instances, this is made even worse by high staff turnover, usually 
caused by poor remuneration. New staff may not be familiar with the activities of the previous 
staff because there is usually no proper handover-takeover.  
In some of the countries, limitations also emerge from state–civil-society relations. These poor 
relations create difficulties in accessing information.  
Other limitations arise from language barriers, as SADC countries have different official 
languages and not all of them are English-speaking. For example, Mozambique and Angola 
are Portuguese-speaking, while the Seychelles, Madagascar, DRC and Mauritius are French-
speaking. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines how SADC is constructed and how its framing as an interstate 
organisation affects the participation of civil society in its policy-formulation processes. What 
comes out of this chapter is that, while the construction of SADC as an interstate organisation 
means that engagement on policy issues should be on a government-to-government basis, 
that does not mean that there should be no additional spaces for the direct participation of 
other stakeholders.  
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The writer and other critics further argue that SADC itself has made this realisation and, in its 
founding statutes and legal documents, has made provisions for such participation and 
provision of space through the SNCs and the signing of a memorandum of understanding with 
the SADC-CNGO. In this regard, the writer argues that the assumption that the elected 
government officials have a mandate to represent the citizens at regional level does not mean 
there should be no other spaces for their direct participation in policy formulation.  
There are arguments that the concept of representative democracy is not enough to fully 
represent the citizens, and that there should be means and avenues for direct participation in 
policy-making. In that regard, there are arguments for use of alternative forms of democracy 
such as deliberative democracy to see if they can lead to enhanced participation of citizens in 
SADC’s policy formulation processes. The section also provides the purpose of the study 
which is to explore how citizens’ participation can enhance democratic governance through 
democratic decision-making. 
1.8 Road map to the thesis 
Chapter One of this thesis begins with an introduction to SADC as an institution and its 
decision-making organs. It then progresses to cover the foundations of stakeholder 
participation in SADC and discuss why it is important for civil society to participate in the 
decision-making processes of interstate organs. The introductory chapter also looks at the 
institutional and organisational framework for civil-society participation in SADC decision-
making processes. After interrogating these issues, the chapter outlines the key issues of the 
problem statement, the purpose statement, the primary research questions and the secondary 
research questions. It concludes with the limitations of the research.  
Chapter Two of the thesis focuses on the literature review. The review of the literature begins 
with general issues related to the importance of the participation of citizens in governance. It 
progresses to focus on democratic decision-making in established interstate organisations like 
the European Union (EU) and how they can be used as examples of improving stakeholder 
participation in decision-making in SADC. The literature then progresses to focus on the state 
of civil society and its role in democratic governance in Africa. 
Chapter Three further develops the literature review, but narrows its focus to the literature 
that constitutes the foundations of the theoretical framework of the research. The theoretical 
framework presented consists of participatory democracy, deliberative democracy and 
representative democracy, and how citizens participate in decision-making under each of 
these models.  
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Chapter Four focuses on the conceptual foundations of the research: deliberative democracy. 
It interrogates the deliberative democracy tenets of decision making, namely: publicity, 
accountability, reciprocity and equality of voice. It then interrogates the application of the 
deliberative democracy framework to the decision-making processes of interstate 
organisations. The chapter concludes with an outline of how majoritarianism is dealt with in 
the event that issues are taken to a vote, as well as the counter-arguments to the concept of 
deliberative democracy. 
Chapter Five focuses on the research methodology, beginning by outlining reasons why the 
qualitative research approach is the most appropriate. The chapter progresses to focus on the 
tenets of qualitative research, as well as how a case-study approach is applicable to the 
research. It then outlines the research instrument’s construction and application, focusing on 
the interview guide. The chapter then speaks to data collection techniques mainly anchored 
on interviewing technique and document analysis, as well as the analytical framework. It 
concludes with a focus on ethical issues and why they are important for the research. 
Chapter Six presents the research findings. The research findings are presented in three 
thematic frameworks: 
• The first thematic framework focuses on the existence and functionality of prescribed 
institutional structures for engagement in member states of SADC and the 
organisational capacity of CSOs to engage. Under this thematic framework, the key 
focus is on the state of availability of SNCs and their construction, as well as their role 
in promoting participative decision-making. It also assesses the state of functionality 
of these SNCs.  
• The second thematic framework focuses on the legislative framework for inclusive 
decision-making in SADC’s policy-making processes. Under this thematic framework, 
some of the key issues include the organisational construction of SADC-CNGOs and 
the nature of their activities that enhance inclusive decision-making. Further to that, it 
focuses on the links and synergies and nature of collaboration between SADC-CNGO 
and civil society at the national level, together with its decision-making processes and 
procedures. Additionally, it also looks at the extent of SADC-CNGO’s role in facilitating 
government–civil-society interaction and relations at country level.  
• Thematic framework three examines the actual process of decision-making with 
reference to deliberative democracy. Some of the major issues of focus under this 
thematic framework include the state of SADC-CNGO participation in SADC policy-
making, in particular the Council of Ministers. It further focuses on the extent to which 
these views are in line with the provision of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. Over and 
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above that, it deals with how state–civil-society relations affect the decision-making 
processes.  
The chapter also discusses previous research undertaken on stakeholder participation in 
SADC’s decision-making processes. It particularly focuses on the research findings of the 
Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU), the Meta Com Research Centre for 
Policy Studies in South Africa and the SADC Secretariat Capacity Development Framework 
of March 2008. 
Chapter Seven focuses on data analysis and conclusions. The conclusions are organised 
according to the existence of the prescribed institutional structures for engagement in each 
member state. It also focuses on the participation of civil society in SADC, measured against 
the deliberative democracy tenets of accountability, reciprocity, publicity and equality of voice. 
The section on equality of voice outlines how minority views are treated, as well as how 
communication can be used as a tool for enhancing inclusive decision-making.  
Chapter Eight ties up and smoothens the conclusions.  
The thesis then provides a detailed list of references. 
It also provides the following annexures: Interview Schedule A for SADC-CNGO Secretariat, 
Interview Schedule B for senior members of the SADC Secretariat, Interview Schedule C for 




Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review deals mainly with why it is important for civil society to participate in 
governance and how that improves democratic decision-making. It reviews the literature on 
Africa, in general, and SADC. Its roots are in the works of Edigheji (2004) and Mhone and 
Edigheji (2003), who argue that governance in the SADC region is characterised by 
“exclusionary democracy” wherein the ruling elite dominates the political space to the 
exclusion of other key actors like civil society. These are also the views of Matlosa (2007), 
Mozaffar (2002) and Landsberg and McKay (2004), who share the idea that greater legitimacy 
in the governance of public institutions can be achieved by opening up spaces for the 
participation of different stakeholders. 
The deliberative democracy framework (proposed as the conceptual framework for the 
analysis of SADC’s decision-making process) is not new, as it has been applied in established 
interstate organs like the European Union (EU). There is vast literature on this topic, with 
Chalmers (2000), Benhabib (1998) and Habermas (1996) arguing that the strengthening of 
participation in political processes has increasingly become the yardstick against which the 
legitimacy of the EU is measured. It provides a framework of institutional and social conditions 
that facilitates free discussion among equals by providing favourable conditions for expression 
and association. 
These writers suggest that participation using deliberation adds value by fostering mutual self-
understanding, resolving disputes and curbing the influence of nation states in policy 
production. Moravcsik (1999), Joerges and Neyer (1997), Smismans (2000) and Meyer (1999) 
have used this to explain the operations of certain EU institutions, arguing that deliberative 
democracy has been a vital cog in explaining resistance against regional integration. The 
deliberative democracy platforms were useful in engaging and explaining the views of those 
European citizens who were against integration into an economic bloc.  
However, there have been some strong debates against deliberative democracy within the 
EU. For instance, Everson (1998) and Barns, Schibeci, Davison and Shaw (2000) criticise 
deliberative democracy for what they call foreclosing the number of participants who may take 
part in the political debate or submit arguments to political institutions. They also posit that 
there has been limited regard to the sensitivity of different types of discourse or the articulation 
of different types of identity. 
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The literature on civil society and democratic governance in Africa looks at how 
democratisation in governance implies the opening up of debate, transparency in the 
management of public affairs, freedom of opinion and speech, and a separation of powers. It 
is centred mainly on the works of M’Baya (1995); Matlosa (2010); Landman (2005); Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005); Adedeji (2008); Mutasa (2008), and Masterson, Busia and 
Jinadu (2008). These works further explain the thinking that civil society has a de facto right 
to participate in public policy-making beyond the constitutional provisions of citizenship. This 
is to ensure equal access to the state and enhanced participation in governance by individuals 
and by collective groups, especially the historically disadvantaged and marginalised. 
The distinctive features of participatory, deliberative and representative democracy are 
examined in the works of Macedo (2010), Brown (2006), Fuentes-Rohwer and Charles (2001), 
Staszewski (2012) and Hirst (1988). The common denominator in the arguments of these 
authors is that the decision-making process in a deliberative democracy treats everyone as 
equal in the sense that each vote carries the same weight and, therefore, no one preference 
counts more than the other. 
On the contrary, van der Waldt (2010) suggests that representative democracy is problematic 
in policy-making as it gives too much power to the ruling party. Sometimes representative 
democracy does not allow for what Hanekom’s (1987) systems model calls the initiation of 
public policy-making derived from legislature institutions, public officials and interest groups. 
The conceptual framework proposed in this thesis is based on deliberative democracy theory 
as espoused by Talmon (1970); Ozanne, Corus and Saatcioglu (2009); Vitale (2006); 
Habermas (1984); Fishkin (1995); Geenens (2007); Gutmann and Thompson (2004); Fearon 
(2012); Staszewski (2012); Manin (1987) and Cohen (1989), who suggest that deliberative 
democracy is more likely to produce policy decisions with legitimacy than those that merely 
reflect political preferences.  
The counter-argument to this view is that deliberative democracy fails on procedure because 
of the inability to reach consensus on procedural rules that are acceptable to parties involved 
in the deliberation (Olson (2011), Hildreth (2012) and Young (2000)). On participatory 
democracy, the literature focuses on Hidreth (2012), Pateman (1970) and Bailey (2006). They 
agree that participatory democracy developed out of popular social movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s as a way of addressing inequality, injustice and exclusion based on race, class, 
gender and sexual orientation.  
The reasoning in their arguments, as presented above, is that participatory democracy sought 
to radically democratise major social institutions. However, there is a counterview outlined by 
Warren (2002) who argues that the concept of participatory democracy is based on the false 
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notion that citizens always have the time, intelligence, resources, interest and desire to 
participate in public affairs.  
The literature on deliberative democracy is not blind to the reality that there may be a need to 
use a majority vote in decision-making. Stack (2009) and Staszewski (2012) lead an argument 
that this must be preceded by an extensive deliberative process based on the four tenets of 
equality, reciprocity, publicity and accountability. The following detailed literature review 
demonstrates the importance of inclusive and democratic processes for effective decision-
making. 
The analyses of Stack (2009) and Staszewski (2012) suggest why the deliberative democracy 
theory is the most suitable for enhancing participative decision-making in SADC. 
2.2 Democracy and governance in SADC 
Matlosa (2007) acknowledges that while democratic political transition has taken place in the 
SADC region, there are still some critical challenges which require visionary leadership if the 
region is to achieve sustainable democratic consolidation. The critical challenges that he 
outlines include the need to ensure that the regional organisation moves with its people in 
finding solutions to its problems. He argues that the leadership in the region cannot stand aloof 
and pretend it knows it all. It needs to involve the stakeholders in its decision-making 
processes. 
Unfortunately, this remains a dilemma in that the region’s leadership tends to emphasise its 
role and power as derived from an electoral mandate and ignores the role of stakeholders as 
required by SADC’s statutes. This is a dilemma that requires visionary leadership and prudent 
policy initiatives for the region to ensure that the current political change lasts and is 
irreversible. Linz and Stepan (1996) propose five key prerequisites for democratic 
consolidation of the region, namely: a vibrant civil society, an active and autonomous political 
society, respect for the rule of law, and an effective and efficient state bureaucracy, as well as 
an institutionalised economic society. These dovetail with the notions of deliberative 
democracy, which emphasises active collaboration between those in government and the 
governed in decision-making processes. 
Edigheji (2004) and Mhone and Edigheji (2003) argue that democratic transition in the SADC 
region is still unfinished business beset with exogenous and endogenous challenges. They 
further argue that most SADC states have adopted free-market economic policies with dire 
consequences for socio-economic redistribution. This has resulted in governance 
characterised by exclusionary democracy where the political elite, especially the ruling elite, 
dominates the political space to the exclusion of other key actors like civil society. They are of 
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the view that the exclusionary tendency is evident in the way the political ruling elite have been 
able to stamp their unfettered hegemony over the democratic participation of citizens in 
decision-making processes. 
To develop a credible framework for the development of the region, Matlosa (2008) argues 
that SADC has crafted a credible planning mechanism in the form of the Strategic Indicative 
Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SIPO). This is an implementation 
mechanism for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. SIPO is also a planning and 
implementation strategy for the commitment of member states towards regional integration. 
Matlosa (2007) argues that SIPO defines the various areas of integration as including the 
political, defence, state and public security sectors. It then pronounces regular free and fair 
elections as important in ensuring regional integration and, to that end, the plan makes 
proposals for SADC principles for free and fair elections.  
Matlosa (2007) argues further that, within the framework of SIPO strategies, SADC has 
identified the terms for building democratic institutions and promoting human rights. Some of 
the strategies include the promotion of the principles of democracy and good governance, and 
the establishment of common electoral standards in the region, including a code of electoral 
conduct, as well as encouraging political parties to accept the outcomes of elections held in 
accordance with both AU and SADC electoral standards. It also calls for the establishment of 
a SADC electoral commission with well-defined roles and functions, as well as for the judicial 
systems of member states to be strengthened. 
Over and above that, SIPO calls for the establishment of a regional commission for the 
promotion and respect of human rights. While the region has held regular elections as part of 
its democratisation agenda, this view builds on arguments by Osaghae (2004) about the 
fallacy of electoralism in democracy as being equated to the holding of elections. This, 
however, is not to undermine the importance of elections in democratisation. Elections 
undoubtedly contribute to but are not the only ingredient for democracy. According to Mozaffar 
(2002): 
The spread of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa has endowed competitive elections 
with special significance. They have become the organised method of peaceful 
democratic transition, a salient indicator of democratic consolidation and the principal 
institutionalised means for large numbers of people to participate peacefully in forming 
and changing democratic governments afterwards. Credible elections have thus 
become a necessary albeit insufficient, source of behavioural, if not attitudinal, 
legitimacy in Africa’s emerging democracies. 
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Regular free and fair elections enhance popular participation in the governance process for 
the citizens and are part of the legitimate formation of a parliament that is representative of 
the key political stakeholders in each country. Despite regular elections, Matlosa (2007:426) 
still argues that: 
Throughout the SADC region, the trend is that the political elite and the state are the 
main agents driving the actual process of democratisation and formulation of security 
policy, thereby turning both developments into state-centric projects. This situation 
explains the exclusionary nature of the evolving liberal democracy in majority SADC 
states. The situation clearly poses a problem in that the SADC region still has to 
entrench democratic practice and culture that embraces broad participation of various 
actors especially citizens, in the whole democratic dispensation. 
He further sees this as an important reason why CSOs should be empowered and be given 
adequate room to contribute to and participate meaningfully in SADC’s policy-making 
processes. To Matlosa, this is important given that, in most SADC countries, there is a 
dominant-party syndrome which, regrettably, has led to the entrenchment of the ruling elite to 
the exclusion of other players, especially non-state actors. The dominant-party syndrome has 
seriously inhibited greater participation of citizens in governance. Odinga (1967:23) argues 
that: 
… the government can be democratic only if the masses of the people were 
associated with policy making at all levels, if the people were drawn into the running of 
the party, if national issues were discussed in the branches, at public meetings, at 
press conferences, in our newspapers, among the women and youth, if careful thought 
is given to the role of the party in relation to the administration so that civil servants 
trained in the pre-colonial attitudes could not, in the day-to-day running of the country, 
undo the best plans made by the political leadership. 
2.3 Democratic decision-making in the EU 
This section focuses on the EU as an established interstate organisation. What emerges in 
this review of the EU suggests that deliberative democracy makes sense in an interstate 
context precisely because of the need to deliberate on policy issues that cut across traditional 
national and sovereign boundaries. In this context, majoritarianism just does not always count; 
there is a need to promote consensus in decision-making and deliberative democracy is 
identified as capable of promoting that consensus. Given that this research is on deliberation 
and citizens in the policy-making processes of interstate organs, it is important to engage with 
some of the research and literature of established interstate organs institutions like the EU. 
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This is not to shy away from the local African context, but to enhance the debate by exploring 
the experiences of institutions that have walked the same journey and have documented their 
successes and failures.  
The EU’s negative and positive experiences can be useful in the construction of a more solid 
deliberative democracy engagement framework as they show how certain things are done. 
While it is accepted that there is a sea of difference between the European and African 
contexts and, as such, the experiences might not be the same, it is equally true that the 
fundamental principle of citizens’ participation is universal. The principle of the universality of 
citizens’ participation makes the literature from the EU and other regional blocs applicable to 
SADC. 
According to Chalmers (2000:127): 
The strength of participation in its political processes has increasingly become the 
yardstick against which legitimacy of the European Union is measured. Yet 
experiments in the deliberative and participatory democracy suggest that their practice 
invariably falls short of their lofty ideals. A reason is their failure to consider the 
process of communication itself. 
The case of the EU’s fragility due to poor communication with its constituency is an indication 
of how deliberative democracy can be used to strengthen organisations. This is important 
because communication is a vital pillar of inclusive decision-making. Chalmers (2000) 
proposes that a deliberative approach for EU governance should involve a process of 
justification in which the three practical tasks of the EU – polity-building, problem-solving and 
the negotiation of political community – are debated and solved around the four values of 
transformation, validity, relationality and self-government.  
Important issues for consideration in the transformation of the EU include the need for 
deliberation to express the values of transformation and, in particular, how the existing 
systems can be changed for the better. It also speaks to the requirement of validity – how the 
transformation process should be undertaken within the confines of the values needed for the 
deliberation process to be viewed as a collective process. Over and above that, it emphasises 
the need to ensure that there is rationality in the arguments, and that there is relationality and 
recognition of each individual’s singularity and mutual dependence. This is seen as a way of 
ensuring that the deliberative process makes solid provisions for self-sustenance and self-
governance. 
The glimpse into EU operations is not meant to turn this study into a comparative analysis of 
SADC and the EU. It is simply meant to expand the argument on the participation of citizens 
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in governance beyond the African continent so that some important lessons can be used for 
the local study. The issue of citizens’ participation in public institutions is important across the 
globe. For instance, in the past, the EU has promoted institutional processes that could enable 
the active participation of its people in the processes of continental governance. According to 
Chalmers (1997:127): 
The strength of participation in its political processes has increasingly become the 
yardstick against which the legitimacy of the European Union is measured. Yet 
experiments in deliberative and participatory democracy suggest that their practice 
invariably falls short of their lofty ideals. 
It is a generally agreed-upon principle in the EU that deliberative democracy is one of the 
yardsticks for evaluating the legitimacy of the Union, by its being encrypted into the draft 
constitution as one of the organising principles of the Union. Any deliberative strategy also 
requires a strategy of organisational reform, which patterns these contexts in a way that they 
both contribute effectively to the practical tasks they address and meet deliberation’s ideals. 
The value of deliberation as a political strategy lies in the possibilities it can offer for the 
organisational re-imagination of the EU. To be progressive in its approach, the EU had to set 
up a constitutional framework to guide the deliberation process. This was operationalised 
through setting up what it called the “tasks” of the Union, which gave a framework for the 
issues to be deliberated. Chalmers (1997:129) further states that: 
Three teleologies have underscored the work of the Union. It is concerned, first of all 
with polity building, the creation of a series of common political institutions and form of 
politics which transcends the Nation State. Secondly the Union is concerned with 
problem solving. Its remit is to act where there is a dimension to a problem that cannot 
be effectively resolved by Member States acting unilaterally. 
He further argues that, in this process, there is emphasis on the epistemic context of 
deliberation and what arguments count. Steffek (2010) suggests that civil-society participation 
is in many cases a democratic asset to European and global governance, because it acts as 
a professional watchdog. Civil society enhances the transparency of the political process and 
contributes to the plurality of voices present in the political process. Probably the greatest 
asset of professional CSO actors is that they are mediators, multipliers and information-
brokers. Even if they do not reach out to every citizen and are rarely cited in the mass media, 
they contribute to the creation of a transnational public sphere and to the public accountability 
of European and global governance. 
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According to Crespy (2013:86): 
Originally rooted in the norms of transparency and consultation promoted by 
international organisations, the idea of European governance was increasingly inspired 
by deliberative theories. A dialogue with European civil society (or civil dialogue) was 
institutionalised as a main device. However initially there was resistance because the 
strategy was grounded on the unclear boundaries between deliberation, participation 
and representation and therefore had a cold reception from territorial representation 
based bodies such as European Parliament and the Economic and Cultural, Social 
Committee. 
This is further expanded on by Steffek (2014), who argues that the popularity of deliberative 
democracy in the context of European governance is not an accident. First, advocates of the 
European integration project always highlighted the epistemic quality, problem-solving 
capacity and public-interest orientation of the regulatory decisions produced at the European 
level. The quality of regulatory output depends on the quality of the procedures that generate 
it, and this is where deliberation comes in. Second, in practice, it is obviously much easier to 
improve the deliberative quality of existing procedures than to redesign the entire institutional 
architecture of the EU. For friendly critics of the EU, a model of deliberative democracy, with 
its focus on procedures and the quality of decisions, is thus attractive.  
The EU has over the years been conceived to be a model of deliberative democracy. Crespy 
(2013) speaks of the decision-making processes of the EU as constructed to fulfil the 
deliberative democracy model, but, unfortunately, its engagement is primarily with elite and 
professional organisations, thus rendering the process less effective in ensuring efficiency in 
the policy-formulation processes. He argues further that paternalism looms large when 
deliberative procedures involve only members of the functional elite, shielded from public 
scrutiny.  
Buttressing the above view are those of Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin (2010) and Omelicheva 
(2009), who argue that participation by civil-society actors in international governance has 
often been promoted as a potential cure for both these ills, while still being linked to the 
paradigm of deliberative democracy. CSOs are supposed to bring citizens’ points of view into 
transnational deliberations among experts and government representatives. 
In addition, opening up deliberations to civil-society actors is expected to enhance public 
awareness of the issues at stake in European governance and also create alternative political 
options and points of view. This is what Steffek and Nanz (2008:9) call to: 
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… conceptualise civil society actors metaphorically as a form of ‘transmission belt’ that 
connects citizens to the remote venues of international and European governance; 
with lateral ramifications that point to the public sphere surrounding the governance 
institutions. The promise of participation in deliberative procedures is hence twofold: 
well-informed decisions and enhanced public scrutiny … 
Deliberative democracy has, thus, become a widely accepted ideal for reforming international 
organisations in general and the EU in particular. In this context, institutionalised deliberation 
and civil-society participation are often seen as natural friends. This is not to say that 
deliberative democracy does not have its own problems in the EU. For instance, Kohler-Koch 
(2010) argues that it would be problematic to assume that CSOs are representing citizens in 
any meaningful way. This stems from the construction that many of the civil-society groups 
active at the European level are associations of associations, rather than associations of 
citizens.  
Moreover, many CSOs, despite their names, do not have societal basis; they are expert 
organisations, run by experts and mainly targeting experts in their advocacy. They are de facto 
think tanks, not membership organisations. Quite often, the influence of intergovernmental 
organisations is also felt here. Intergovernmental organisations, particularly the EU, are 
aggregating transnational civil society into platforms, alliances and caucuses, making 
outreach easier. This has led Mahoney and Beckstrand (2011) to conclude that the EU also 
instigates the emergence of a European civil society that is friendly towards its own 
organisational goals and political purposes.  
Figures about EU funding disbursed to civil society (mainly via the EU Commission) document 
that the sheer amount of money is significant enough to alter the civil-society landscape in 
Brussels and in some member states, especially in the eastern part of Europe where local civil 
society remains underdeveloped for historical reasons. It also shows that funding goes 
predominantly to organisations that promote the political goals of community institutions.  
The deliberation process is informed by the tradition of rationality in the EU, which speaks of 
the possibilities of creating new public goods or forms of collective action. It also seeks to 
respect the principle of alignment, so that no community may impose unnecessary 
externalities on other parties. Further to that, it reconsiders existing communities and collective 
practices to include alternative interests and values. In the context of the regional bodies, 
Benhabib (1998:67) argues that deliberative democracy requires: 
… a framework of institutional and social conditions that both facilitates free discussion 
among equal decisions by providing favourable conditions for expression, association, 
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discussion and ties the authorisation to exercise public power and the exercise of it to 
such discussion by establishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and 
accountability of political power to it. 
This argument is further advanced by Dryzek (1999), who views deliberative democracy as a 
process requiring justification, whereby the individual argues his/her interests in terms of 
values and in a manner that, while it might not be accepted, counts as a good reason to all 
involved. The deliberative model thus presumes that any individual whose autonomy is 
compromised by a collective decision should have the right to participate in this debate. The 
only problem lies in what Cohen (1997:67) views as: “the condition of entry into the debate is 
recognition that the other participants have autonomous deliberative capacities that will be 
treated on an equal basis to one’s own”. This brings to the fore the importance of the 
participants involved. Also of great importance is what Stokes (1998) describes as the need 
to ensure that decisions in deliberations be taken on the basis of an argument that is commonly 
agreed to be the best.  
Elster (1998) speaks about the need to understand that bounded rationality should be 
exercised in decision-making processes, as parties need to understand that it is impossible to 
have a wholesale measure of relationships empirically and sufficiently. There is a need to 
promote that all decisions are made with sufficient consensus. This is also the view of Walzer 
(1985): that any decision must legitimate itself in terms which perceive the proceeding debate 
as providing it with a series of persuasive and autonomous reasons for action.  
In the context of the EU, Chalmers (2000:131) argues that deliberative rationality first acts to 
explain what it stands for. It serves as a principle of justification for the European community’s 
participative approaches to decision-making. This argument runs along the lines that there is 
a need for transnational political communication and political debate transcending the nation 
state. For this kind of deliberation to be more meaningful and valuable, there is a need for 
what Habermas (1996:125) posits as “ensuring that the deliberation adds value by fostering 
mutual self-understanding, resolution of disputes, curbing excesses of the nation state and 
acting as a bulwark against the destabilising consequences of globalisation”. Habermas 
(2000) sees the European community as the only regional bloc in the world which provides 
the institutional conditions that enable such debate to take place on a sufficiently stable basis. 
This is further buttressed by Chalmers (2000), who views the process of practical 
argumentation as being at the heart of EU policy and law-making. 
The argument is further enhanced by Fischer and Forester (1993:529), who are of the view 
that the distinctive and central feature of the EU policy-making activities is: 
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… a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification, the 
boundaries of problem categories, the inter subjective interpretation of common 
experiences, the conceptual framing of problems, and the definitions of ideas that 
guide the ways people create the shared meanings which motivate them. 
Deliberative democracy is also seen by Harlow (1996:161) as a regulative ideal: “It is both a 
principle through which holders of political power justify the exercise of that power and a more 
general principle in political justification.” Deliberative rationality not only provides partial 
legitimation for the EU, but also imposes a telos to which the EU must aspire. According to 
Moravcsik (1999), because of its structured nature that allows for deliberation, EU policy 
studies have been highly influential in policy production for the regional body. Joerges and 
Neyer (1997) have used this to explain the operation of most EU institutions. Deliberative 
democracy, as argued by Smismans (2000), has been a vital cog in explanations of the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). Meyer (1999) provides useful 
explanations about resistance against regional integration.  
There have been some strong debates against deliberative democracy within the EU. For 
instance, Everson (1998:36) criticises it for what he calls “foreclosing the number of 
participants who may take part in the political debate or submit arguments to political 
institutions”. Concurring with this argument is Barns, Schibeci, Davison and Shaw (2000) who 
states that there has been limited regard to the sensitivity of different types of discourse or the 
articulation of different types of identity. The EU has evolved to provide transparent spaces in 
its deliberative processes. According to Regulation 1049/2001/EC of the European Parliament 
and the Council, the Commission makes available a public register not only for the documents 
drawn up by them, but also the documents received by them. As a result, the parties that make 
their submissions to the EU Commission can see other submissions and comment on them. 
The EU Commission paper broadens its modus operandi by setting minimum standards for 
consultation. These standards require that all necessary information should be provided in any 
consultative process and that all respondents should have access this information. The 
information should provide a summary of the context, scope and objectives of the consultation, 
setting out issues that are up for discussion and those considered to be particularly important, 
such as the contact details and explanations of the Commission’s process for dealing with 
contributions. 
The processes should ensure that there is adequate awareness, a single point for consultation 
established on the internet and sufficient time for responses provided. This should be normally 
six weeks for written responses and 20 working days for meetings. Over and above that, the 
receipt of contributions should be acknowledged and the results of open consultation should 
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be displayed on websites. Where consultations are restricted to a limited number of parties, 
there is also a requirement to ensure equitable treatment and adequate coverage. The 
Commission should ensure that it consults those affected by the policy, those involved in its 
implementation or bodies whose stated objectives give them a “direct interest” in the policy. 
According to Chalmers (2000:157), the Commission has proposed criteria which suggest that 
it will not approach public consultations in a sectoral manner: 
In deciding whom to consult, it will therefore consider the wide impact of the policy, the 
need for specific expertise, whether there is need to involve non-organised interests, 
the track record of participants, and finally the need for a proper balance between the 
representatives of large and small organisations, social and economic actors, wider 
constituencies and specific target groups and the EU and non-EU organisations. It is 
also important to deal with the question of non-participation of other citizens. 
Chalmers’ argument is that, notwithstanding the size of the public sphere, what does one do 
with the situation where citizens or interests, for whatever reason, do not participate in the 
policy-making process, but are still subsequently antagonised by its outcomes. He concludes 
that it would be a grave mistake to assume that those who do not vote are universally and 
continually disinterested. It could be possible that they might indeed have political interests 
but see little benefit from participating directly in the processes. This is an important issue 
because attempts should be made to probe all interested parties, as Chalmers (2000) puts it, 
and that, notwithstanding this, greater deliberation in the EU public sphere still has two wider 
benefits. 
The first is that it facilitates communication. Policy-making is the moment when the 
battleground for ideas is at its most intense. It imposes processes of justification on those 
communities driving legislation. This justificatory process can enlarge the latter’s 
understanding of the problem. As a process of interaction between different communities, it 
also publicises and politicises the process, as other groupings are made aware of the 
impending norms to which they are subject and acquaint themselves with the potentialities 
and limits of those norms.  
Secondly, it is argued that, in the process of classic deliberation, there is limited provision of 
institutional conditions because the element of mutual accountability is lost in the quest for the 
most appropriate answer. In the process, arguments become entrenched to a point of being 
hegemonic and, thus, there is no room for acceptance of any counter-arguments. To that end, 
Chalmers (2000) speaks of the need to ensure that the right answer should justify itself firstly, 
that it is not unnecessarily intuitive and that it does not extend the reach of inappropriate 
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hegemonies. This calls for the individual governments to sufficiently protect their citizens 
against majoritarian bias and excessive intrusion. 
2.4 Civil society and democratic governance in Africa 
According to M’Baya (1995), democratisation in governance implies opening up to debate, 
transparency in the management of public affairs, freedom of opinion and speech, and a 
separation of powers. Democratisation develops a spirit of emulation and competitiveness, 
and also liberates the creative potential of a people. It is useful in putting solid checks and 
balances against any abuse of centralisation of thought, power and wealth. It stimulates self-
control and economic vibrancy, as well as social progress, which enables citizens to take 
charge of their own destiny. M’Baya (1995) sees the success of the new African states as 
resting on restructuring their political relations with civil society in order to restore the creative 
potential of society. Among some of the useful ingredients for achieving of this are increased 
dialogue with civil society as well as democratisation of thought and power. He also calls for 
decentralisation of the decision-making process to allow for the participation of the various 
strata involved. M’Baya (1995:78) argues that, for Africa to achieve sustainable economic 
growth, it must embrace the participation of citizens in policy-making. He states that: 
Democratisation in Africa must be effectively translated in economic, political and 
socio-cultural power. At the level of action oriented programme planning and 
particularly at the level of implementation, the participation of the population and their 
various grassroots communities, organisations and associations is crucial for the 
economic and social development enterprise to be successful. 
Matlosa (2010) expands on this insinuation with an argument that democratic governance can 
be examined from mainly minimalist and liberal perspectives. On the one hand, he views the 
minimalist approach to democracy as that which locates it in relation to values and principles 
of political contestation as well as participation. On the other hand, the liberal perspective is 
viewed by Landman (2005:20) as the: 
Notion of participation presupposes political control of the citizens over people who 
govern on their behalf. This notion captures the idea of popular sovereignty which 
presumes the protection of the right to vote as well as the existence of universal 
suffrage. 
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) refer to this perspective as procedural or electoral 
democracy. At a second level, Matlosa (2010) sees democracy as going beyond mere 
procedural notions and moving on to the promotion and protection of political rights and civil 
liberties. In that regard, Matlosa (2010) argues that: 
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The liberal notion of democracy transcends procedural democracy and extends its 
essence beyond just contestation and participation to include the protection and 
promotion of political rights and civil liberties. It includes constraint over leaders and 
representation of citizens, the rule of law, property, and minority rights. 
Haynes (2001) elaborates on this notion by calling it the “premium on the institutional 
dimensions of democracy” in that it calls for strengthening of institutions to compel the public 
officials to account for their actions. At a third level, Matlosa (2010) views democracy from a 
socio-structuralist dimension in which it goes beyond both proceduralist/electoralist and 
institutionalist dimensions.  
According to Saul (2005), in contrast to the proceduralist and institutionalist dimensions of 
democracy, the socialist structural definition of democracy places a premium on social and 
economic rights and social power relations in society. Matlosa (2010:125) concludes that: 
a useful approach to our understanding of democracy in Africa is to have in mind these 
three epistemological dimensions ideations, namely that (a) at a very minimum level 
democracy is simply just procedural and limited to elections, (b) at slightly higher level, 
the institutional dimensions of democracy have emphasised its liberal form with 
emphasis on civil and political rights, and (c) another relatively higher ideational level, 
socio structuralist perspective of democracy conceives of the system in its socio-
economic characteristics and the concomitant social configuration of power. 
While many African countries have embraced and achieved multi-party democracies, the 
extent to which they allow for the active participation of their citizens in decision-making 
beyond voting remains an issue for extensive debate. According to Adebayo (2008:248), 
“there can be no good governance without a deep-rooted culture of popular participation”. 
Popular participation is the empowerment of people to involve themselves in creating 
democratic institutions that allow for their participation in decision-making and in designing 
policies and programmes that serve the interests of all. It brings about a new synthesis of the 
fundamental objectives of political, economic, environmental and social change. 
Since governments, by nature, give priority to the interests of those who control power, 
enhanced popular participation that is just, sustainable and inclusive may assist in making 
sure that communities that promote democratic decision-making may emerge. Adebayo 
(2008), however, warns that there should be vigilance in the participation process, as it is not 
an event but a process which, in most instances, is inhibited by vested political interests which 
can create obstacles to control the process towards their own ends. Mutasa (2008) is of the 
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view that the growth of the state in Africa without a vibrant civil society is inimical to democracy 
and thwarts the possibility of a responsible and accountable system of governance. 
The importance of the participation of citizens in decision-making processes is limited not only 
to nation states; it is also increasingly becoming important even in continental, regional and 
intergovernmental institutions. The full enjoyment of democracy and human rights requires the 
existence of an entrenched and vibrant civil society. M’Baya (1995:77) buttresses this 
argument with a view that: 
The new development model not only requires that such collective participation 
structures should exist, but that they, as partners with the state and business, should 
have a say in the development of Africa. This is all the more important as participatory 
human investment, the valorisation and utilisation of human skills and resources must 
have at least the same importance as capital in the new development paradigm. 
Popular participation implies the mass involvement of people in social processes, including 
the political and economic realms. It shows that people participate either directly or indirectly 
to influence decisions that affect their life chances. The African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation (1990:6) states that: 
Popular participation is, in essence, the empowerment of the people to effectively 
involve themselves in creating structures and in designing policies and programmes 
that serve the interests of all as well as to effectively contribute to the development 
process and share equitably its benefits. 
Discourse on the role of civil-society participation in governance and public policy-making 
processes has gathered momentum in recent years. The discourse builds on the provision of 
spaces for citizens’ participation by important regional, continental and international agencies. 
Masterson, Busia and Jinadu (2008:2) are of the view that: 
There is consensus to give civil society a de facto right to concretely participate in the 
public policy making beyond the constitutional provisions of citizenship, to ensure 
equal access to the State and enhanced participation in governance by the individual 
and by collective groups especially the historically disadvantaged and marginalised. 
As result, a number of avenues have been created to enable the enhancement of the citizenry 
in policy-making processes with the understanding that such involvement will promote 
accountability that, in turn, will accelerate development. According to Jerome (2010:13): 
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Governance has emerged as the key issue in development discourse and practice with 
a wide recognition that without good governance the progress of development can be 
compromised. Poor governance holds back and distorts the process of development 
and has a disproportionate impact on the poorer. 
In the context of Africa, Jerome (2010) further argues that while the term “governance” remains 
subject to debate as a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional concept, there is little challenge 
about what good governance is. In that regard, Jerome (2010) argues that good governance 
covers sustainable development, human security, political stability and high economic 
performance, as well as accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration.  
The argument goes further to speak of good governance as a prerequisite for development; it 
can be better entrenched by the active and meaningful participation of citizens in the 
governance and policy-making processes. There are, however, some dissenting voices like 
Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) that do not see good governance as a prerequisite for 
development. While this is an important debate, it is not the intention of this research to wade 
into that territory. For now, this research relies on the widely recognised view that inclusive, 
democratic decision-making is an important ingredient in the development of interstate 
organisations. 
The recognition of the importance of participation is what led the then-Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), at its 1990 Arusha Conference, to adopt the African Charter for Popular 
Participation in Development and Transformation. Adebayo (2004:302) sees the output of that 
conference as “the African Magna Carta ... the Charter, therefore was the voice of the people; 
it well and truly led the drive for democracy in Africa”. This charter set up participation by 
citizens as the vital cog in the acceleration of development in Africa. It clearly and 
unequivocally called for the increased role of popular participation in African development and 
linked its intrinsic value to better governance in Africa, entrenching democracy, accountability, 
economic justice and development for transformation. 
This is what Jinadu (2010) argues was the resuscitation of a theory of governance grounded 
in the social contract between the state and civil society, based on the works of John Locke. 
This argument builds from a similar one by Nyong’o (cited in LeBas (2002)) who states that 
the charter explicitly makes the imperative a necessity to establish a monitoring mechanism 
for civil society to institutionalise relations with the government in every country. This has the 
effect of assisting African systems with the restructuring of the relations between the state and 
society, through strengthening the capacity of civil society to impact policy reforms and 
creating accountability systems of governance. 
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Engagement between the state and civil society has its own complications. For instance, 
Masterson (2010) speaks of the complications of the engagement between the state and civil 
society because he sees the latter as much more complicated. For example, he argues that, 
in both the developed and underdeveloped states, civil society continues to be accepted as a 
significant factor in the determination and driving of governance policies. Yet, the term “civil 
society” remains nebulous.  
Masterson (2010) further speaks of the gap which remains unexamined – that of the field of 
relations between civil society and the state in the context of institutional governance. His view 
is that, as the democratic space opens, there is evidence that CSOs in African states have 
undergone rapid and profound transitions in their interactions and engagements with key 
policy-making actors, such as governments and other state institutions, on policy-making and 
governance issues. This is more profoundly articulated in the ways these CSOs have moved 
to expand their engagements with interstate organisations like the AU, the Pan-African 
Parliament (PAP) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 
Regrettably, even with all these spaces provided, there are some states that have remained 
closed by not providing space for civil-society participation in governance or decision-making 
processes. This denial has been the cause of tense relations between the government and 
civil society. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1998:2) argues that: 
The deliberate denial of citizenship and the right of citizens to participate in the political 
governance of their country’s affairs proved catalytic in the numerous Africa states in 
galvanising civil groups’ organisations to mobilise and advocate for democratic 
reforms. 
In some cases, the denial of rights and liberties has left the civil-society movement with little 
recourse besides direct confrontation with the state and, in many instances, through violent 
protests which, unfortunately, have met with a state crackdown, often using the state 
apparatus to silence dissent.  
This is more pronounced in some SADC states which have intensified attempts to dismantle 
and silence the voices of civil society and deliberately excluded them from any form of 
participation in the governance and policy-making processes. Teshome-Bahiru (2009a:82) 
buttresses the view of the exclusion of civil society in policy-making, arguing that: 
In the early years of independence, in many African countries, the distinction between 
civil society (trade unions, religious groups, students’ unions, and human rights 
organisations) and state became blurred. Gradually, the new African rulers who came 
from middle class began to distance themselves from the civil society and started to 
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rule their subjects in the same way as white colonial white rulers used to rule their 
colonies. As soon as they took political power the nationalist leaders who emerged 
from the civil society favoured one party state and government and in the process 
transformed themselves into authoritarian rulers. 
Nzewi and Zakwe (2009:44) are of the view that: 
Civil society participation in SADC has a fragmented, loosely organised framework. In 
its true manifestation, civil society is not a monolithic construction of interests and 
goals. Thus, where some civil society interest groups see opportunities for 
engagement, others view these opportunities as being too close to government. 
Although it is impossible for SADC or any government to deal with all civil society 
interests, there has to be justifiable criteria for inclusion and exclusion in SADC 
participatory decision making structures. So far in SADC, both at the regional and 
member state level, this has not happened, and there is no formalised comprehensive 
SADC participatory framework which takes into consideration all the possible avenues 
for public participation in SADC. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described the literature that constitutes the building blocks for the theoretical and 
conceptual framework of this research. It analysed the existing literature on the state of civil 
society in Africa and why it is important. It also narrowed its focus to the southern African 
region to ensure that it also brings to light existing research and literature on the issue of civil 
society in the region. The following chapter looks in-depth at the theoretical framework of the 
research and uses the literature provided in this chapter to build a solid case about the key 
concepts that constitute the theoretical foundations of the research and how they are meant 




Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three presents the theoretical framework for the research, which is anchored on 
decision-making theories. As such, this chapter presents key decision-making theories, 
namely: participatory democracy theory, deliberative democracy theory and representative 
democracy theory. It interrogates how each hypothesis functions in promoting inclusive 
decision-making in interstate organisations and the extent to which it allows for inclusive 
stakeholder participation. 
This chapter analyses the application of each of the three theories to the decision-making 
processes of the SADC region and what that means for stakeholder participation. These 
theories help to explain the democratic situation in SADC. The current policy-making 
processes in SADC are based on representative democracy, which gives substantial policy-
making power to elected representatives from member states. Participatory democracy theory 
indicates how, even in a representative democracy, there could be some participation, albeit 
in limited amounts. Deliberative democracy indicates that there could be improved democratic 
governance and the infusion of democratic decision-making mechanisms in the SADC region 
through the provision of more spaces for the active and meaningful participation of citizens in 
policy-making. 
3.2 Representative democracy 
Proponents of representative democracy such as Macedo (2010) are of the view that majority 
rule is straightforward and superficially compelling, because when society makes collective 
decisions, citizens who would be legally bound by a specific decision (or their politically 
accountable representatives) should have the opportunity to vote, and the side with the most 
commanding votes should win.  
This contention is based on an assumption buttressed by Brown (2006), who argues that the 
decision-making process has the ability to treat everyone as equal in the sense that each vote 
should carry the same weight and, therefore, no-one’s preferences should count more than 
anyone else’s. Furthermore, majority rule is equally viewed as increasing free will, preference, 
satisfaction and the extent to which citizens could be said to consent to governmental 
authority, because, by definition, more people are getting what they want than would be the 
case under any other decision-making procedure. Brown (2006) further argues that the 
government is a very big institution which makes many policy decisions for and on behalf of a 
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plurality of citizens with diverse interests and, as such, whatever policy decision is taken 
reflects that diversity.  
Heterogeneity could be even a bigger problem in SADC because of its institutional 
construction as an interstate organ with bureaucratic decision-making structures. Fuentes-
Rohwer and Charles (2001) note that, since the government makes so many decisions on a 
wide variety of issues, each citizen would belong to both majorities and minorities. The same 
argument is advanced by Staszewski (2012:862), who is of the view that: 
Majority rule is thought to be the most democratic procedure for making collective 
decisions in a pluralistic society that is characterised by persistent political 
disagreements because if there is no agreement on political matters there can be an 
agreement to abide by the results of a majority vote. 
Representative democracy theory views the power and authority of government as derived 
from the mandate acquired from voters in an election. It is a very important tool for deriving a 
mandate because, in voting candidates into government, citizens have given them 
unquestionable legitimacy to exercise constitutional power on their behalf. A similar view is 
shared by Hirst (1988), who interprets representative democracy as a powerful tool for 
legitimating the actions of a government that no serious politicians, even those who just lost 
recent elections, would question.  
Democracy is an unquestionable good and representative democracy is identified with 
democracy. However, as good as it may be, an in-depth enquiry into representative 
democracy points to some very unhealthy outcomes – because, in some instances, electoral 
victory (especially in a first-past-the-post electoral system) is used as a tool by governments 
to entrench their authority by denying others a space for divergent views and as a way to 
escape from the legitimacy of public accountability. This contention is what Hirst (1988) calls 
the abuse of electoral victory by using it as a means of stifling other claims to political 
competition and public accountability. 
This research advocates a departure from an overreliance on representative democracy as 
the most suitable way of promoting public accountability by a government. It is a legitimate 
enquiry which acknowledges the positive aspects of representative democracy as explained 
above, but which sees it as insufficient in promoting inclusive decision-making and, thus, calls 
for alternative forms of democracy which could enhance stakeholder participation in the policy-
making processes of the SADC community.  
One of the founding fathers of American democracy, Abraham Lincoln (1789) saw 
representative democracy as “a government of the people, by the people, for the people”. This 
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is viewed by some as a mere political cliché, because it is held as a stretch of the imagination 
that people could rule themselves. As classical elite theory argues, there is always a group of 
people at the top of the social stratum and who are thus in charge. Hirst (1988) argues that, 
in a representative democracy, political authority is presented as delegated power brought into 
existence by the expressed will of the people. This means that sovereign power ultimately 
resides in the people and that form of government gives expression to the will of the people. 
The assumption is that parliament, because of its delegated power from the people and its 
legitimacy, would be duly representative of the people’s will. 
Subsequently, the legislature gives some of its delegated powers to administrative agencies 
of the government to implement government policy and enforce laws. It ensures that the 
judiciary is active for it to interpret laws. Simply put, the assumption is that the sovereign will 
of the people is held in trust by the legislature, that it is faithfully and sincerely executed through 
the government, and that, in so doing, there are no wilful violations of basic liberties or any 
infringements of the rights of citizens as provided for in the law. There is seemingly an 
assumption that there would be universal application of the laws equally to all people and that 
the rights which each citizen possesses as an individual would be protected and not violated. 
Similarly, if there is an implementation of policies in collision with the rights of persons, it is 
assumed the government would be called to account by the legislature. 
This approach assumes that representation guarantees that parliament, as the body that 
represents the direct interests of the people, would always make decisions in the citizens’ best 
interests. The essence of making the executive answerable to parliament is to ensure that its 
delegated authority is not abused and that it is exercised by the people through parliament. 
Representative democracy identifies two types of decision-making procedures: one for 
electing political personnel and the other for setting up policies or laws. It explains that, in 
choosing one, people also choose the other; yet, it is parliament that makes the laws and the 
government that makes the policies, and not the people. Again, while representing the people, 
parliament would not necessarily be the people. The assumption that citizens choose public 
officials based on an understanding of the policies and stances they represent is highly 
contested. In the process of voting, it is difficult to tell whether voters are influenced by policy 
choices. In many instances, they might be driven by the charisma of the candidates and might 
not have paid attention to any specific policy promises or parties. Voters choose and identify 
with parties and party leaders, and are usually ill-informed about policy proposals. Simply put, 
in many instances, voters do not understand where the representative democracy game would 
take them. As important as an election might be, successful candidates – and therefore the 
representatives of the people – might not always represent the true will of the people. 
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The thinking that there is impartiality in a representative democracy set-up and that the policies 
that are developed cannot infringe on the will of the people is debatable. While it is a generally 
acceptable assumption that what parliament does is to pass general laws and that the 
executive is more than an important agency of enforcement of those laws, several critics 
question that assumption. Hirst (1988) avers that, far from being a servitor of the legislature, 
the government is the initiator of legislation; legal requirements necessary for policy 
programmes are brought to the legislature and are carried by means of party discipline. The 
government inevitably becomes a party government. There is no pure form of representation, 
just packages of political mechanisms and voting systems. Representative democracy has the 
limited value of enabling some of the leading decision-making personnel in the state to be 
changed periodically. 
Representative democracy is used as a way of shielding the government from public scrutiny 
and accountability. This makes the government accountable and responsive to public debate. 
Public pressure may help to make the process of policy formulation and execution more 
consistent and effective. There is no dispute that in a representative democracy there are 
some levels of engagement between citizens and their elected officials, but the ultimate power 
of decision-making rests with elected government officials. Political elites in control of the 
coercive instruments of state power have the ultimate say on what policy decisions could be 
initiated, because, as nationally elected leaders, the president and other government officials 
are assumed to reflect the preferences of the majority electorate and are, therefore, politically 
accountable to the whole national constituency. However, in practice, this is not the case 
because representative democracy seems to ignore the views of minorities. 
Representative democracy as an inclusive policy-making model has left many questions as to 
how it has been able to promote inclusive policy-making and democratic decision-making in 
the SADC region. Its inability to effectively promote the inclusiveness of divergent views has 
led to some conclusions that it may not be the best form of democratic decision-making 
because of its exclusive nature. For instance, Staszewski (2012) argues that representative 
democracy is a poor means to the wrong end from the standpoint of democracy. He states 
that, even if there were a desire to have policy decisions reflect the pre-political preferences 
of people, relying on elected officials to control the discretionary policy choices of the regional 
body would not be plausible and could not be expected to produce the best policy proposals. 
While some proponents of representative democracy would argue that the political model 
suggests that interstate agencies should be able to justify their policy decisions with an array 
of political reasons, the implementation of this theory would have normatively unattractive 
consequences that even the strongest proponents of an enhanced role of representative 
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democracy in regional policy-making would sensibly resist. Majoritarian rule, which 
characterises representative democracy, is not necessarily the most inclusive form of 
democracy. Some of the criticism against representative democracy theory relates to its being 
merely a procedural theory, with Gutmann and Thompson (2004) arguing that, as a purely 
procedural theory, representative democracy places no substantive limits on the permissible 
contents of majority decisions and that there are no obligations to consider the interests or 
perspectives of minorities in making decisions under this procedure. They further view it as 
suggesting that “numerical might” makes right, but at the same time it fails to explain how the 
minority could plausibly be understood to have consented to the coercive decisions of the 
majority under these conditions. 
What further exacerbates the problem is the fact that there are many groups within society 
that systematically lose on issues of great importance to the whims of the majority if decision-
making is based on numerical superiority. Macedo (2010) notes that while majority rule could 
reliably measure preferences when there are only two options, nearly every important issue 
of public policy could be resolved in a wide variety of ways. In the context of SADC, it could 
be of greater use to look beyond merely aggregate democracy and beyond powers of elected 
officials in deciding policy issues. Ultimately, this would lead to the creation of viable alternative 
models for entry into the process by citizens through civil advocacy. This is important because 
representative democracy which relies on the tyranny of the majority might not be the best 
option for democratic decision-making. Such a view is reflected in Eskridge, Frickey and 
Garrett (2001), who argue that social choice theory has demonstrated in some circumstances 
that majority rule may not resolve the choice between three or more mutually exclusive 
alternatives that are voted on. 
Accordingly, the outcome of majority voting in law-making bodies is frequently the result of the 
way in which the decision-making process is structured, rather than the true policy preferences 
of a majority vote. To illustrate that majority rule is not always right, Staszewski (2012:63) 
gives an illustration of a group of five strangers in a train cabin arguing about what to do 
regarding smoking, given that three of them are smokers while two are not. One of the two 
non-smokers has asthma and exposure to smoke could lead him to serious illness or even 
death. While they are arguing, one of the non-smokers notes that he saw a cabin exclusively 
for smoking. If the decision of what to do is based on a vote, the non-smokers are likely to 
lose, but with deliberations, it would be easy to reach a conclusion that takes care of the 
interests of both sides. Macedo (2010:16) further argues that “we should stop talking about 
majoritarianism as a plausible characterisation of a political system that we would recommend 
and that legitimate democracies would respect minority rights and promote fair and inclusive 
deliberation”. He notes that representative democracy traits become a tyranny of the majority. 
49 
Staszewski (2012) weighs in, arguing that contrary to conventional wisdom, elected 
representatives are not politically accountable to voters for their specific policy decisions.  
An informed electorate should possess knowledge of government decisions and preferences 
about their desirability, as well as the ability to identify who is responsible for policy choices 
and can vote based on that information at the next general election. Yet, in actual practice, 
political science literature on voter knowledge and decision-making calls into question whether 
any of these conditions are regularly met. According to Schacter (2006), the electorate does 
not have pre-existing or fixed preferences on any of the issues that are brought to its attention, 
and public opinion could potentially be “crafted” by public officials and other elites for their own 
purposes. As such, even in a deliberative democracy, there could be voting. Staszewski 
(2012:877) argues that certain majoritarian preferences may be considered when reasoned 
deliberation fails to settle an issue. He states: 
I suggest that deliberative democracy does coherently carry certain majoritarian 
preferences in some circumstances. The key question as always under deliberative 
democratic theory is whether the reasons for policy decisions could reasonably be 
accepted by free and equal citizens with competing perspectives.  
3.3 Participatory democracy 
The concept of participatory democracy arose out of a desire to protect and guarantee human, 
civil and political rights. According to Hildreth (2012:299): 
Participatory democracy developed out of popular social movements in the 1960s and 
1970s. These movements sought to address inequality, injustice and exclusion based 
on race, class, gender, creed and sexual orientation. They also sought to radically 
democratise major social institutions. 
Participatory democracy has been broadly viewed as consisting of three core elements, as 
identified by Pateman (1970). At the first level is a call and desire to see the maximum 
participation of all citizens in self-governance across all sectors of society, but with family, 
workplace, social life and government being key among the sectors. At the second level is a 
claim that participatory approaches and the experiences thereof assist in transforming 
individuals into active and responsible citizens. It is thus argued that, through participation, it 
is possible to create a political community capable of transforming private individuals into free 
citizens, and partial and private interests into public good. At a third level is an assumption, 
advanced by participatory theorists, the expansion of democratic participation and the 
subsequent transformation of individuals leads to the sweeping goal of social transformation. 
Social transformation is viewed by authors such as Pateman (1970) as framed in a virtuous 
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spiral that creates a political community composed of active citizens who demand more 
democratic institutions, which in turn offer further opportunities for participation, with the hope 
that this creates a self-sustaining system that maximises participation. 
Participatory democracy has not just been used in actual verbal engagements; it has also 
been used extensively in democracy. According to Bailey (2006:197): 
Government and other public bodies have started to experiment with using dialogue to 
inform science and technology-based policy. Although these early experiences should 
be used to inform the approach to future dialogue exercises, enabling government to 
continually improve its practice, we have been struck in the cases that we have been 
exploited by the lack of learning from experiences within organisations. 
Ensuring that there is information-sharing is vital in the education of participants about the 
happenings of the public sphere. There is also a need to ensure that the design meets 
democratic ideals that could assist in the promotion of community cohesion. A well-designed 
participatory process may contribute to social cohesion in both small and large communities. 
It could smooth tensions between those closely involved in issues and those who may have 
conflicting objectives, and it could create a more general feeling of community involvement. 
At the same time, the approach should be practicable, because full participation can be very 
costly and time-consuming, requiring complex logistics. 
One may need to consider not just direct costs, but also opportunity costs. At the same time, 
participation could increase the quality of decision-making processes essentially because it 
brings more to bear on issues. Stakeholder and public perception of issues could widen and 
enrich perceptions that may drive authorities’ thinking. More debate could lead to greater 
clarity on issues and the process could become more innovative with broader framing. 
There is, however, a view that the influence of participatory democracy appears limited. Some 
authors, like Manin (1987), who were always sympathetic to the cause of participatory 
democracy have since accepted that its influence has subsided; they now speak of it in the 
past tense as they view the idea as having emerged from the political discourse of the 1960s 
and subsided with it. According to Hildreth (2012:296): 
While early deliberative theorists paid careful attention to the relationship between 
participatory democracy and deliberative democracy, participatory accounts are now 
only rarely mentioned in the literature. Deliberative democratic theory seemingly has 
moved beyond, even forgotten, participatory democracy. 
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There is no definitive quarrel between participatory democracy and deliberative democracy 
theorists, as the latter view the former as having shortcomings in terms of inclusion.  
Warren (2002) is one such critic who argues that participatory democracy often seems beset 
by a fuzzy utopianism that fails to confront the limitations of the complexity, size and scale of 
advanced industrial societies. He argues that the deliberative democracy notion presents itself 
as a more realistic alternative to the participatory theory and argues that the concept of 
participatory democracy is based on the false notion that citizens always have the time, 
intelligence, resources, interest and desire to participate in public affairs. 
Hildreth (2012) expresses the view that community, participation and citizenship are all 
related, but he fails to provide the umbilical link between the three factors. In that vein, he 
views participatory democracy as failing to account for the complexity, size and scale of 
modern society, the diversity of interests and views, and how the accommodation of each 
differs all the time. Thus, Dryzek (1992:109) speaks of the need to acknowledge social 
complexity within various deliberative approaches, calling for the identification and expansion 
of multiple fora of deliberation, instead of participatory theorists’ calls for the total 
transformation of society. Rather, the deliberative democracy approach hopes to expand the 
quality and quantity of deliberation.  
The goal is to improve the legitimacy and authority of democratic will formation. In the end, 
Prachett (1999) sums it up with an argument there is nothing particularly new about public 
participation as a supplement to representative democracy. Officials solicit public comment, 
hold public hearings and issue public reports on their activities, but the promise of deliberative 
democracy hinges on more than public consultation. Deliberative democrats believe that 
ordinary people ought not only to be consulted, but also to have a hand in actual decision-
making. Ryfe (2002) thus views deliberative democracy as the simplest way of opening the 
policy-making process to greater citizen input. Further to this, Ryfe (2002) argues that while 
deliberative democracy is difficult and fragile, it is not impossible to achieve. 
Deliberative democracy emphasises reaching consensus as important to the deliberation 
process. The goal of deliberative democracy is to reach understanding for all parties. For 
Habermas (1996), consensus is not important for the sake of agreement, but because it 
signifies the construction of valid norms. It is, however, important that the early works on 
deliberative democracy – which have come to be known as “type one deliberation” and are 
represented in the works of Habermas and Benhabib (1996) – are basically idealistic, as they 
are asking for the impossible in thinking that the actual deliberation process is capable of 
fulfilling proposed rigorous norms. 
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The new contemporary deliberative democracy theorists, such as Dryzek (2000), Gutmann 
and Thompson (2004), and Young (2000), have challenged type one deliberation and come 
up with “type two deliberation”, which expands the types of discourse to include, among many 
other things, rhetoric, storytelling, testimony and bargaining. This approach is more useful as 
it provides a more practical course and deals effectively with institutional constraints on 
deliberation. 
Important differences between deliberative democracy and participatory democracy can be 
outlined as follows: while the latter emphasises the democratic transformation of individuals 
and their institutions, the former emphasises the interaction of citizens with their institutions in 
a manner that stresses democratic justification and reason. Hildreth (2012:299) speaks of: 
Both participatory and deliberative theorists positioning themselves as alternatives to 
minimalist, aggregate theories of democracy. Against conceptions that reduce 
democratic decision making to the tallying of votes or bargaining for power among 
interest groups, both call for expanded citizen participation in private public life.  
This is also the view of Dryzek (2000), who emphasises that the expansion of the role of 
citizens could make democracy more robust, involve more stakeholders, and allow for 
decisions that are legitimate and accepted by all. Further to that, it allows for the development 
of decisions that are authentic and identify with the interests, hopes and aspirations of citizens. 
To a lesser extent, it does not recognise the need to protect social, environmental and 
economic rights. 
Habermas (1990) speaks of the importance of the formation of a conscious, active citizenry 
as an essential ingredient in the consolidating citizens’ access to governance and 
strengthening their role in decision-making processes. Participatory democrats view it as 
emphasising the need to construct forms of direct democracy that can function alongside the 
representative system. This, however, is not to push for participatory democracy to substitute 
the indirect system with a direct one. Vitale (2006) argues that it creates new spheres of 
discussion and political deliberation that eliminate, or at least reduce, serious problems of 
legitimacy raised by representative institutions, such as the distance between representatives 
and the represented, and the lack of transparency and public accountability at the highest 
level. He further argues that the theory of participation is a subjective relationship that is 
constructed around the central assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be 
considered in isolation from one another.  
Vitale (2006) is of the view that there must be interaction and dialogue among individuals as 
well as among institutions. Simply put, the model of participatory democracy advocates for a 
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direct and indirect exercise of democracy through broad-based discussion and dialogue that 
results in decisive rather than mere consultative solutions. Yet, as Vitale (2006:752) argues: 
The harmonic coexistence also depends on reforming the traditional mechanisms of 
political representation, making elected representatives more accountable to the 
represented and the internal structures of the political parties more participatory and 
democratic. 
There is also a need to ensure that the deliberation process takes into account and tries to 
provide answers to some of the questions asked by authors such as Reykowski (2006): 
• Are ordinary people able to solve important ideological and moral controversies by 
means of deliberation? 
• What are the effects of deliberation? 
• What factors may facilitate this process? 
These are important questions, particularly given that the idea of deliberative democracy is 
solidly rooted in what are sometimes questionable assumptions that meaningful participation 
in deliberation is a common characteristic of citizens’ advanced democracies. There is also a 
need to insulate deliberative democracy from the manipulative powers of powerful government 
and business operatives. According to Stout (2010), there is a need to work against situations 
in which multinational companies utilise participatory practices in a manner that is meant to 
co-opt indigenous people, as opposed to empowering them.  
Stout (2010:35) further argues: 
Because policy decisions remain off the table, participation appears to serve no other 
purpose than providing rhetorical legitimacy to powerful cooperation and their host 
governments. While extremely polemic, the stringent warning of this argument is that 
sometimes no participation is more honest than hollow participation that conceals 
actual purposes. Such transparency is an important factor of democratic governance. 
3.4 Deliberative democracy 
The deliberative democracy theory is traceable to the early works of French philosopher Jean-
Jacques Rousseau who, in his Discourse on inequality in 1755, argued that the state should 
be directed by the general will towards the common good. He argued that the general will is 
based on common interest, while the will of all founded on private interests is the aggregate 
of common interest. The argument advanced stipulates that the common interest allows 
society to exist while the contrary will tear it apart. Rousseau (1772) rejected the contention 
because of what he argued is the need to safeguard popular sovereignty by not transferring it 
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to representatives who would develop oligarchic special interests that do not promote the 
development of the masses. 
Talmon (1970) concurs with Rousseau (1772) in his argument that the pure general will of the 
people cannot be relegated to the assembly or mere parliamentary majority. He further argues 
that the general will in the real sense is where the true general will resides, even if that will 
happens to be expressed by numerical majority. He indicates that the true measure of 
democracy is the amount of involvement of those who elected the parliamentarians in making 
decisions that affect their lives. Talmon (1970) calls it the philosophical fountainhead of 
totalitarian democracy in that it liberates people from their individuality and loyalties to allow 
the deliberation to direct them to the common will. This would help develop a society with a 
vision shared by all. This is only possible if all citizens are given a voice to state their views on 
how they want the society to advance forward. This is the essence of deliberative democracy. 
According to Ozanne, Corus and Saatcioglu (2009), the idea that the popular majority vote 
does not count as democratic until certain egalitarian prerequisites are satisfied stems from 
great philosophers such as Rousseau, Aristotle, the Jacobins and John Dewey through to 
contemporary theorists such as Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, Jürgen Habermas, John 
Dryzek and Iris Young. The participation of citizens in policy-making processes using the 
deliberative democracy framework has become an important tool in public discourse and in 
settling issues in the public policy arena. Deliberative democracy is viewed as a very useful 
tool in reaching decisions that gain the respect of and are accepted by parties involved in the 
discourse. The recognition of deliberative democracy as a tool for reaching constructive 
decisions has given it credibility and acceptance in many communities. 
Vitale (2006) contends that deliberative democracy has assumed a central role in debates 
regarding important democratic practices and situations in complex contemporary societies. 
His view is a result of the ability of the concept to acknowledge citizens as main actors in the 
political process and to further acknowledge their important role in political deliberation and 
policy-making. In answering questions about what kind of democracy communities should 
build, and what limits and possibilities should be constructed for participation and public 
deliberation, the concept of deliberative democracy provides a solid base in defining spaces 
and avenues for the active and positive participation of citizens in policy decision-making 
processes. 
The concept of modern-day deliberative democracy is rooted in the writings of Habermas. In 
his discourse theory, Habermas (1984) constructs the concept of democracy from a 
procedural dimension. He argues that democratic legitimacy requires that the process of 
political decision-making occur in a broad public discussion in which all participants can debate 
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various issues in a careful and reasonable fashion. He further argues that decisions can only 
be made after the process of discussion has taken place and there is sufficient consensus on 
both procedure and content. As such, the socially integrated force, which can no longer be 
drawn solely from sources of communicative action, must develop through widely diversified 
and more-or-less autonomous public spheres, as well as through procedures and democratic 
opinion within a constitutional framework. 
In addition, this force should be able to hold its own against two other mechanisms of social 
integration: money and administrative power. This view is further developed by Fishkin 
(1995:41) who argues:  
We can put the ideal speech situation at one extreme of an imaginary continuum and 
then imagine various forms of incompleteness compared to the ideal as we think about 
more realistic forms of deliberation. When arguments offered by some participants go 
unanswered by others, when information that would be required to understand the 
force of claim in absent debate, or some citizenry is unwilling or unable to weigh some 
of their arguments in debate here, the process is less deliberative because it is 
incomplete in the manner specified. 
In a practical context, a great deal of incompleteness must be tolerated. When improving 
deliberation is discussed, this is not a matter of improving the completeness of the debate and 
public engagement or perfecting it, because that would be virtually impossible under realistic 
conditions. 
The deliberative theory of democracy, as presented by Habermas (1984) and applicable to 
the debate about the participation of civil society in SADC’s policy formulation, reconstructs 
what could be said to be the normative approach, which emphasises the epistemic facets of 
decision-making. Gutmann and Thompson (2004) expand on this notion, arguing that students 
of deliberative democracy should not worry about sincerity or truthfulness, but rather about 
the actual arguments and motives behind these arguments. To these authors, the key is that 
deliberators present their arguments in such a way that they are accessible to the relevant 
audience, respond to reasonable arguments presented by opponents and manifest an 
inclination to change their views or cooperate with opponents when appropriate. 
However, Geenens (2007:355) presents a variation to the approach by Habermas(1984) by 
focusing on the procedural aspects of democracy, which he states are as follows:  
The model is unable to take into account other valuable aspects of democracy, this 
being shown in reference to two concrete phenomena from political reality, majority 
voting and the problem of the dissenter. In each case, the deliberative model inevitably 
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fails to account for several normatively desirable features of democracy, such as 
formal political equality and proper respect for the judgement of citizens. 
While there could be substance in his argument, it cannot be correct in its entirety because 
there are various tenets of democratic engagement and none of them have the same values. 
As such, it would be asking for too much to assume that Habermas’ model of democracy 
should incorporate what could be universally inclusive tenets of democracy. 
Deliberative democracy emphasises the interactions of citizens and their institutions in 
decision-making. The deliberative ideal of democracy starts from the premise that political 
preferences will conflict and that the purpose of democratic institutions should be to resolve 
differences. In dealing with the issues, the majoritarian approach is rejected, as there is need 
for what Miller (1992) calls the desire to find common ground to transform initial policy 
preferences, which may be based on diverse interests, into issues of commonality. This 
argument dovetails into the marrow of the research on the participation of civil society in SADC 
policy initiatives, as it seeks to first answer the question of how SADC civil society could 
improve the interface with the regional institution and how the engagement is based on mutual 
synthesis of divergent views in order to find a convergence of views and ideas. 
In expanding his argument, Miller (1992) further outlines that, in a deliberative democracy, the 
pattern of opinion (the extent to which opinions on the issue correlate or fail to correlate with 
opinions of others) should become public knowledge as different speakers argue for and 
against various composite proposals on the table. It would then be difficult to make a public 
argument against the disaggregation of decisions where the original choice was multi-
dimensional. His view builds on that of Dummet (1984), who earlier had argued that the 
important issue is about whether to please as many as people as possible or to please 
everyone collectively as much as possible. His view is that it is important to move with the 
majority view as it represents wider interests, but that should not be done with complete 
disregard of other views. The aggregate outcome of deliberative democracy is a revelation 
about what issue is at stake and if, indeed, it was not obvious from the very onset. 
However, what should be made clear is that the deliberation process does not require the 
paddocking of citizens into a single deliberative body, as they may represent very different 
interests. This is what Miller (1992:67) calls: 
The mistake of thinking that the deliberative ideal requires us to treat the citizens of 
any nation state as a single deliberating body. Although it is a requirement of 
democracy that every citizen should have the opportunity to participate in collective 
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decision making in some way, this requirement can be met in a system embodying a 
high degree of pluralism. 
Miller (1992) further argues that this approach assists in the shifting of democratic practice 
towards the deliberative ideal, encouraging people not to merely express their political 
opinions through polls, referendums and the like, but to form their opinions through debates 
in public settings. 
According to Gutmann and Thompson (2004), the moral of the deliberative democracy theory 
is inevitably a part of democratic discourse and that democratic deliberation does a better job 
of dealing with moral deliberation under a procedural or constitutional democracy. From a 
deliberative perspective, a citizen offers reasons to support the adoption of some law or policy 
that are acceptable to others who, in turn, are motivated to find reasons for their preferred 
policies that are acceptable by others. They call this the theory of reciprocity. This argument 
is buttressed by Worley (2009:462), who asserts that: 
… an important implication of the reciprocity principle is that deliberation is the process 
of mutual reason giving among suitably motivated citizens and should take place not 
only in the privacy of citizens’ homes or in their solitary reflections, but also in public 
political forums. Reasoned consensus about the laws and policies required by justice 
or by common good in the normative ideal that deliberative democratic processes 
should approximate as closely as possible because the advantages of deliberative 
democracy are realised in actual social interactions, not hypothetical thought 
experiments. 
The idea is also shared by Olson (2011), who argues that deliberative democracy emphasises 
norms of quality and reciprocity in political arguments as the basis for working against 
marginalisation and exclusion. In the deliberative democracy school of thought, there are 
strong arguments for deliberation among citizens to justify laws and institutions to which 
citizens are subjected. In summary, decisions made through deliberative democracy are likely 
to bring about changes that are more legitimate, fairer and more stable. This is what Falk 
(1990) argues is providing models, inspiration and guidance in the essential work of world-
order redesign. 
Ozanne, Corus and Saatcioglu (2009) speak of how the use of deliberative democracy as an 
effective way of improving decision-making has changed form over the years. For instance, 
as already explained, beginning with Aristotle and continuing with John Stuart Mill, the models 
of deliberative democracy being advocated were elitist; only a privileged group of educated 
citizens were allowed to participate. Later, scholars like Dewey (1927) revolutionised the 
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concept and came up with proposals that cautioned against the dangers of selective 
deliberation and advocated that citizens’ involvement be fostered. Dewey (1927) argues that 
the best social policy occurs when experts and citizens engage in ongoing dialogue in public 
spheres. 
Democracy works poorly when individuals make judgements in isolation, lack empathy for 
other perspectives and fail to act on issues that matter to them. Dewey (1927) was of the view 
the public can rise to the occasion if there are social structural changes to improve methods 
of public discussion and if there is public education in skills of democracy. The same view is 
shared by Sniderman et al. (1991, cited in Turner (2003)) who argues that there is evidence 
that education increases the sophistication of political reasoning. This led Turner (2003:201) 
to conclude that “in general, increasing one’s cognitive capacity through education makes it 
easier to process relevant information effectively”. 
The effectiveness of regional civic organisations depends on their capacity to mobilise their 
constituencies around issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries, which in turn is a function of 
their perceived legitimacy as a force in regional issues management. Lewis (1998:496) argues 
that: 
Central community-based problem solving is the creation of free spaces, public places 
in the community in which people are able to learn a new respect, a deeper and more 
assertive group identity, public skills and values of cooperation and civic virtue, 
settings between private lives and large scale institutions with are relatively open and 
participatory character. 
In order to achieve this, active teams that work on identifying problem issues in a progressive 
manner are needed. Lewis (1998) speaks of what he calls “citizens’ leagues” or regional 
organisations which: 
Are citizen-based organisations that are non-partisan, independent, and open to all 
citizens that identify a broad spectrum of timely community issues and design and 
guide the implementation of the objective strategies that are consistent with a vision of 
community governance and that build community consensus and trust. 
The approach suggested is like the one utilised in the policy development process, in which 
broad-based meetings are convened to deal with the following issues as outlined by Lewis 
(1998): that, among other things, critical issues and problems that affect the community should 
be identified, and researched, studied and deliberated, in a manner that identifies alternative 
solutions as well as proposals and recommendations for policy actions. These should 
influence appropriate policy-makers to act on recommendations. 
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It should, however, be noted that the citizens’ deliberation structures do not replace the 
government, but play a complementary role. Citizens’ leagues do not replace existing 
governance structures, but instead provide an arena for citizens to address their concerns in 
a shared, deliberative fashion, the outcomes of which could be shared with elected officials, 
not as individual citizen preferences, but as a coherent and thoughtful citizens’ voice. They 
also enable citizens to mobilise and act, not individually, but in concert and collectively on 
solutions that have emerged from a common quest. 
This approach assists in linking local national discourse to regional and international 
discourse, where a platform is provided in which politics of the community interact with politics 
of the country so that they could be put into a new context of wider possibilities for 
accommodation and creativity. The same view is shared by Ojha (2009), who argues that in 
the search for democratisation, civic engagement is increasingly seen as an integral pillar; yet, 
there is still limited understanding of how it works in practice and in various contexts. He further 
argues that the term “civic engagement” has been frequently used in discourses of 
democratisation without the epistemological interrogation of how it is enacted in practice. Be 
that as it may, he argues that, even with this premise, there is no doubt that the involvement 
of citizens in governance can be more effective than liberal or individual approaches. Despite 
the emphasis on deliberation and civil society engagement, there is limited dialogue between 
such conceptual developments and the empirical context of civic engagement and policy 
decision-making. 
In the deliberation process, decision-making is made in the context of a strong political 
community because it is aimed at influencing livelihoods of the specific communities. 
According to Chalmers (2003:186), any decision taken should be taken on behalf of and over 
some political community. He further argues that: 
It is the fact that a decision is a collective decision that gives it a public rather than a 
private dimension. This political community must, moreover, be effective in nature in 
that it expresses and establishes feelings of cross allegiance and mutual recognition 
between its members. 
Coupled with the need to take the importance of the political community into consideration is 
the requirement of a political decision that is couched in terms of public reason. It is what 
Chalmers (2000:187) calls the requirement that a political decision be couched in terms of 
public reason, so that it takes on board generalisable rather than private interests. He asserts 
that: 
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In the process outlined this happens through parties having to couch their arguments 
and measures, first, against how it contributes to any process of polity building, 
problem solving or enlargement of the political community. It would have evaluated 
against how far it meets the set conditions. 
Also of great importance are the requirements of authorisation and accountability, which speak 
to the idea that representation suggests finality, in that any self-governing political process 
must have mechanisms of authorisation and accountability. In this regard, there is a need for 
the creation of governance models that allow for final authority to be vested in all processes 
in the political community which have the greatest collective ownership.  
Vitale (2006:746) argues further that “deliberative democracy has assumed a central role in 
the debate about deepening democratic practices in the complex contemporary societies by 
acknowledging the citizens as the main actors in the political process”. The contemporary 
normative approaches to deliberation by Habermas that were explained in the opening 
sections of this chapter are based on a procedural dimension that is grounded in discourse 
theory and political deliberation. This approach advocates that democratic legitimacy requires 
the process of political decision-making to occur in a framework of broad public discussion, in 
which all participants are able to debate the various issues in a careful and reasonable 
manner. 
According to the logic of Habermasian reasoning, discourse and democracy are two sides of 
the same coin mediated by the law and, once legally instituted, the discourse principle is 
transformed into the principle of democracy. His arguments are further developed to anchor 
thinking that decisions would be better off for the development of communities if there was 
understanding that political power should be extracted from the communicative power of 
citizens. This is what is referred to as the “procedural theory”, which measures the legitimacy 
of judicial norms in terms of the rationality of the democratic process of political legitimacy. 
Habermas is of the view that the socially integrating force of solidarity, which can no longer be 
drawn solely from sources of communicative action, must develop through widely diversified 
and autonomous public spheres, as well as through procedures of democratic opinion within 
a constitutional framework. 
Expanding on the Habermasian theories, Geenens (2007:19) speaks of different approaches 
to deliberative democracy models, with Habermas offering not just a possible model or an 
attractive ideal of democracy, but rather an ideal that democratised citizens might 
subsequently try to realise. Habermas does this by systematically reconstructing the intuitive 
self-understanding of democratic societies, namely the principles and ideas that citizens 
themselves consider to be the normative underpinnings of democratic practice. He further 
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argues that the deliberative account of democracy is fundamentally incomplete, mainly 
because of its failure to clearly articulate how to deal with dissent. 
This failure to provide clearly for how dissenting views are accommodated in the bigger matrix 
means that it does not exhaust the projected content of the normative idea of democracy. 
Geenens (2007) poses the question as to whether deliberative democracy could provide a 
complete and desirable interpretation of the idea of democracy having practical implications, 
as it is often ingeniously upheld as an ideal that ought to be realised with its influence clearly 
visible, for instance, in shaping new procedures. Invariably, reducing democracy to a strictly 
epistemic ideal at the expense of other equally important aspects of democratic legitimacy 
could easily lead to technocratic consequences. This suggests that, while the basic tenets of 
deliberative democracy are generally identical, the conclusion that Geenens (2007) reaches 
is that deliberative democracy is not a unified theory and could be compared to a construction 
site where many architects are simultaneously at work. 
However, Chalmers (2000) firmly stands by the view that deliberative democracy is the only 
strategy that expresses a series of political ideals which are particularly germane in the 
modern world. To that end, he further asserts deliberative democracy as a form of collective 
self-overcoming in which the argumentation process is used to find and create new ways of 
improving and justifying processes. Rorty (1989:9) sums it up as: 
… a method to describe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a 
pattern of linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby 
causing them to look for appropriate new forms of non-linguistic behaviour, for 
example the adoption of new social institutions. 
Deliberation is thus conceived of as a highly strategic form of communication, with Chalmers 
(2000) describing it as an autonomous form that exercises systematic and reflective control 
over its environment. He, thus, views deliberative processes as invariably involving a series 
of strategic issues, which include evaluation of the improvement of processes of the regulation, 
the coordination strategies for collective action, and emphasis on interdependencies and 
solidarities between the participants and strategies of interpretation that seek to secure 
commonality and consensus of interpretation of processes among participants. 
Chalmers (2003:142) expands his view by highlighting that: 
It is insufficient for deliberation merely to have strategies about goals; it must also set 
strategies for the means for realising these goals. This involves paying attention to the 
contexts of deliberation in order to ensure that there is nothing deterministic in this 
process. Certain outcomes cannot be secured simply through configuring the settings 
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in which deliberation takes place; it would seem to be a constitutional task of the first 
order to set out what is legitimate to the debate and what is not. 
This process, while it might appear to curtail free speech, enhances the constitutional 
parameters for the participation of citizens in the governance processes. In all the arguments 
about deliberation, it is of great importance to understand that institutions and the way they 
are organised play an important role in influencing the deliberation process. For instance, 
Chalmers (2000) views this as the performative, epistemic and institutional dimensions of 
deliberation, which interact with and affect the performance of each other.  
The choice of goal will affect and be affected by the institutional settings in which deliberation 
takes place and the types most suited to the realisation of goals, and which types of knowledge 
are valuable for the attainment of specific goals. Chalmers (2003) further emphasises the 
importance of linking democratic processes to political institutions and how they relate with 
civic activism. Emmott (1997:143) speaks of the importance of the promotion of civic activism 
centring on activities that promote politics of the common good. He states that: 
Its distinctive contribution lies in its considering this good neither to be a universal ideal 
nor something that can be reduced to collective sentiment. Instead, it crystallises in 
those decisions which both recognisably reflect the collective will and are informed by 
public reason and debate. 
This vision, according to Pettit (1997), is only achievable if institution-building is emphasised 
as an integral part of the deliberative discourse. The discourse leads to a conclusion by 
Michelman (1998:143) that where there is no fixed common good, decision-making is made 
through reasoned debate within political institutions. He views the nexus between ethos and 
participatory political institution-building as being central to the ways in which participation in 
these institutions secures self-government, in that it is only through free and equal participation 
by individuals in the public sphere that any kind of collective authorship over binding acts can 
be established. Participation of citizens in governance is transformative; Brumfitt and Hall 
(1993) suggest that, through participation in political processes, individuals move from being 
private citizens to self-oriented beings who are publicly minded and move toward common 
goals and interests and collective values with fellow citizens. 
3.5 Cosmopolitan democracy 
In addition to participative, representative and participatory democracy, cosmopolitan 
democracy can buttress the importance of the participation of civil society in interstate 
organisations. Cosmopolitan democracy is a theory that applies democratic norms and values 
to the transnational and global sphere. The main argument is that global governance is 
63 
possible and needed. It is based on the premise that decisions are made by those affected, 
avoiding a single hierarchical authority. Archibugi (2004) explains it as an ambitious project, 
the aim of which is to achieve a world order based on the rule of law and democracy. This 
concept originated from the end of the Cold War, after the victory of Western liberal states 
inspired hope that international relations could be guided by the ideals of democracy. 
Archibugi and Held (1995) suggest that cosmopolitan democracy was aimed at building a 
world order to promote democracy on three levels: inside nations, among nations and towards 
global democracy. In addition, they note the premises of democracy which include the 
following: that democracy is an unfinished journey and an endless journey, that every country 
has its own democracy based on its history and that it should be initiated internally within a 
state to succeed. However, some scholars have argued that this concept may be affected by 
factors such as political power, self-interest of governments and geopolitical interests. 
Archibugi (2004) identifies three schools of thought that explain the possibility of cosmopolitan 
democracy: realists, communitarians and the school which suggests that international 
democracy can be achieved if state democracy is achieved. Realists such as Morgenthau 
(1993) argue that states are mostly driven by national interests; hence, cosmopolitan 
democracy is impossible. Realists believe that states can never be controlled by 
intergovernmental institutions because they are sovereign entities. International law is by 
nature unenforceable and obedience to it is consent-based, meaning that states adhere to the 
dictates of international law on their own will. An example is the exit of Zimbabwe from the 
Commonwealth, as well as the planned exit of Britain from the EU as their own interests 
became threatened. Inclusiveness has been an issue at the top of the agenda at the UN as 
smaller powers have lately argued that the institution is not democratic in structure, as only 
five big powers are permanent members with veto power, even though the institution has 
grown since 1945 in terms of membership. 
This structure thwarts citizen participation, as the respective heads of state and government 
(who they would have voted for through a representative democracy) are powerless in these 
institutions. However, some scholars have criticised this view saying that it overlooks the need 
of states for cooperation. Chingono and Nakana (2008) argue that countries should belong to 
a regional group to increase their clout and ensure security. They go further to say that the 
regional integration discourse assumes that neighbouring countries that have similar 
economic, socio-political and security problems may benefit from integrating their economies 
because this creates a situation of mutual interdependence and development. 
Communitarians argue that democracy would be easily applicable to relatively homogenous 
communities. The concept of cosmopolitan democracy may also assist to buttress the 
importance of participative decision-making in interstate organisations. The concept focuses 
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on the ways of expanding global governance by looking at regulating worldwide political 
relations through the participation of stakeholders in decision-making. 
According to Archibugi (2004), the notion of globalisation might be understood simply as a 
phenomenon affecting the internal regimes of various states, but it could as well be taken as 
a new way of understanding and regulating worldwide political relations. It should be noted 
that democracy cannot be understood only in terms of the majority principle; instead, how 
different individuals are affected by a given decision should also be considered. It is important 
to understand that, along with its internal dimension, a state is also characterised by being a 
member of the international community.  
As such, in decision-making processes, citizen participation assumes serious importance, 
given the realisation that processes within intergovernmental organisations are often 
characterised by the absenteeism of civil society, thereby reducing the democratic 
representivity of these fora, diminishing their contributions and impacts to that of “toy 
telephones”, and limiting their roles to purely decorative ones. Archibugi (2004) further argues 
that, except for the EU, substantial evidence suggests that the absence of active regional 
parliaments has hindered the participation of citizens in interstate organisations. This could be 
the situation with the case of SADC, which still has no regional parliament.  
The closest that SADC has to a regional parliament is the SADC Parliamentary Forum, which 
is just an advisory forum and not a legislative parliament. The importance of regional 
institutions lies in the fact that issues that slip through at the state level can be dealt with at 
the regional level. In many cases, the regional level might emerge as the most appropriate 
level of governance. Most importantly, regional networks and organisations can also become 
important in promoting stability in areas where states have been incapable, on the one hand, 
of preserving legitimised force within their borders and, on the other, of maintaining peaceful 
relations with their neighbours.  
There is no doubt that mechanisms should be put in place to enhance the participation of 
citizens in decision-making. The concept of cosmopolitan democracy also identifies with the 
tenets of deliberative democracy, as they both relate to the enhanced participation of citizens 
in decision-making. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined three decision-making theories and models that inform the current 
set-up of the SADC region and how there could be improvements in adopting a new approach. 
The current approach, characterised as participatory democracy and representative 
democracy, is viewed as limiting stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes 
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of interstate organisations like SADC. In this regard and desirous to strengthen and enhance 
the participation of stakeholders in the decision-making processes of SADC, this thesis 
attempts to test the deliberative democracy framework.  
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Chapter 4: Conceptual framework 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four presents the conceptual framework for the research. The conceptual framework 
is based on deliberative democracy, particularly its four tenets of equality, reciprocity, publicity 
and accountability, which are elaborately explained in this chapter. Deliberative democracy 
emphasises the accountability of public officials by subjecting policy and governance 
decisions to public participation. 
The chapter looks at the conceptual framework for engagement between civil society and 
SADC. It also focuses on the obligation of public officials in interstate organisations to engage 
in reasoned deliberation on which courses of action would promote the public good. This 
conceptual framework is important as at it is guided by the belief that elected officials in 
interstate organisations must engage in decision-making processes that consider all relevant 
interests and perspectives, while at the same time conforming to specific relevant arguments. 
While government representatives to interstate organisations should be given credit for 
justifying their policy decisions, given that their power is derived from election results and the 
theory of representative democracy, this may be viewed as promoting politics of exclusion. 
This argument is more pronounced in Staszewski (2012:852), who argues that: 
Policy making in a democracy is not, and should not try to be, purely majoritarian and 
even if we wanted policy decisions to reflect the pre-political preferences of the people, 
relying on elected officials to control the discretionary policy choices of the 
administrative agencies could produce a contested outcome. 
According to Watts (2009), not only is the role of political reason in decision-making a matter 
of great practical importance and sharp legal disagreements, but this is an issue which goes 
to the very heart of what distinguishes leading contemporary theories of legitimacy in the state. 
This argument is further enriched by McNollgast (2008), who is of the view that the central 
idea is that if agencies were following the preferences of elected officials who are politically 
accountable to voters, the agency’s policy decisions would be democratically legitimate 
because they would presumably reflect the will of the people and achieve the consent of the 
governed. 
While representative democracy is important as it focuses on the ability of elected officials to 
supervise and control the discretionary policy choices of regulatory agencies as the basis for 
democratic legitimacy, it is not sufficient to ensure inclusive decision-making, especially in 
interstate institutions. The problem with the representative democracy theory is that it is based 
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on the winner-take-all concept. It does not help SADC’s commitment to inclusive policy-
making. Brown (2006) argues that the representative democracy or political control model is 
based upon the majoritarian or pluralistic conception of democracy, which reflects a belief in 
the hegemony of popular control of governmental decisions. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) 
join the argument, describing the representative democracy model as exemplifying an 
aggregative view of democracy, whereby the primary role of the government is merely to 
ascertain and implement the pre-political preferences of citizens in the form of numerical 
majorities or other forms of coercive influence. 
The elitist approach (in which the power of decision-making seems to reside only in the elected 
political elites) creates a perception, whether right or wrong, that SADC is a club of elites 
whose policy decisions are designed to satisfy the interests of the elected officials and not 
citizens. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that elected officials should provide reasoned 
explanations for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal citizens 
with fundamentally competing perspectives. In the decision-making process of SADC, there 
could be a need to retreat from the elitism which characterises the current set-up and work on 
adopting policy decisions on the basis of open discussion. Staszewski (2012), in concurrence 
with this view, argues that decisions adopted pursuant to these criteria are democratically 
legitimate because each interest and perspective is treated with equal respect, and arbitrary 
decision-making is prohibited.  
The importance of this approach is that it helps to cushion citizens from arbitrary government 
action on policy-making and governance. The research contends that participatory democracy 
is too limited an approach, as it does not speak on important issues, such as the promotion of 
equality of voices and how to deal with minority views in participation. This research contends 
that a deliberative democracy theory approach provides a more effective means to a more 
attractive end from the standpoint of democracy. It provides for greater legitimacy based on 
theories that seek to eliminate arbitrary governmental action and reach the best decision on 
merit, considering the available information and fundamental differences of opinion. 
In the selection of the deliberative democracy conceptual framework, the researcher is not 
dismissing the argument that there is some engagement in the representative democracy set-
up. However, the previous arguments have shown that engagement in deliberative democracy 
tends to have more legitimate outcomes based on the concept’s key tenets of equality, 
reciprocity, information and accountability. 
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4.2 Deliberative democracy as a framework for policy decisions 
The research sought to find ways of enhancing people’s participation in SADC’s decision-
making processes and identified deliberative democracy as a suitable conceptual framework 
for participative decision-making in the region. The deliberative democracy conceptual 
framework evolves from a theoretical framework that is based on a realisation that current 
state affairs, as represented by representative democracy, have glaring shortcomings in 
providing spaces for the direct participation of SADC citizens in policy-making processes. The 
reasons for its weaknesses all border on its rigid construction, which gives too much power 
for decision-making to elected government representatives and too little to citizens.  
On the other hand, the deliberative democracy conceptual framework is suitable for this study 
because of its ability to allow for inclusivity and respect for a diversity of views on decision-
making. O'Doherty and Davidson (2010) argue that deliberative democracy emphasises 
democracy as government by discussion and, specifically, rational deliberation by a process 
of reason, giving citizens a chance to speak about matters of common good. The policies 
formulated and produced under a deliberative democracy process are likely to be solid and 
acceptable to most citizens. Fischer (2003) sees deliberative democracy as an important 
theory of public administration because it provides a bridge between democratic theory and 
concrete policy practices. 
4.3 The tenets of deliberative policy decision-making 
The deliberative democracy conceptual framework is based on the four tenets of equality, 
reciprocity, publicity and accountability. All four tenets are important components capable of 
enhancing inclusive decision-making in SADC’s policy-making processes. Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004) argue that deliberative democracy asks citizens and their representatives 
to provide and appeal to principles that individuals trying to find fair terms of cooperation would 
secure and not unreasonably reject. It does not matter whether the reasons are procedural or 
substantive; they should be acceptable by free and equal persons seeking fair terms of 
cooperation. To that end, Gutmann and Thompson (2004:7) summarise the major four tenets 
of deliberative democracy, which also form the cornerstone of the research on the 
democratisation of SADC, as: 
… a form of government in which free and equal citizens and their representatives 
justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are 
binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in future … 
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4.3.1 Communication and publicity 
The reasons given in the deliberation process should be accessible to all citizens addressed. 
This means that deliberation should be in public places, and the content and procedural issues 
should be open – the deliberation process cannot even begin if those being targeted cannot 
understand the content and procedural issues. The assertion that communication, publicity 
and the media are mechanisms of vertical accountability is supported in the democratisation 
literature by the likes of Diamond (1999), who argues that the horizontal mechanisms of the 
state are complemented by additional mechanisms of vertical accountability, such as publicity 
in a strong media.  
This argument is expanded on by Coronel (2003), who argues that when legislatures, 
judiciaries and other oversight bodies are powerless against the mighty or are themselves 
corruptible, a strong culture of communication in the media becomes the only viable tool for 
enhancing accountability, as well as for enforcing checks and balances against the abuse of 
power. She expands the argument further to describe this role of the media as a “heroic” one, 
exposing the excesses of presidents, prime ministers, legislators and magistrates, despite the 
risks. The media is also seen as serving as a transmitter between governors and the governed, 
and as an arena for public debate that leads to more intelligent policy- and decision-making. 
Coronel (2003) concludes that, in modern democracies, there is an expectation that the media 
will help to build a civic culture and a tradition of discussion and debate which was not possible 
during the period of authoritarian rule. 
In the context of the SADC regional grouping, a more vibrant media with influence on the 
communication lines between stakeholders and their elected representatives has a greater 
chance of enhancing collective decision-making than an approach which is exclusively 
available to elected representatives. These arguments are advanced by Ogbondah (1994) 
who is of the view that open communication lines that allow for investigation and the 
unearthing of embezzlement within the ruling bourgeois class are an important element in 
stemming corruption, which has been identified as one of the reasons for the failure of 
communication for development programmes in Africa. This leads Farrington, Moss and Rew 
(1998) to argue that pervasive corruption, mismanagement and spoliation by African leaders 
are among the main reasons for failure of development programmes in Africa.  
The argument, therefore, is that a free press and open communication could be a weapon that 
might enhance interaction between the government and stakeholders, and thus increase 
participative decision-making. Ogbondah (1994) blames the disappointing level of 
development in Africa on the fact that its political leaders mismanage and embezzle resources 
that should have been used to improve the level of modernisation as well as the overall social 
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and material wellbeing of the people, but he argues that a free and independent African media 
can assist in the development of the political economy of the sub-Saharan region. This could 
be done by exposing the corruption, graft, ineptitude, bribery, mismanagement and outright 
embezzlement of resources meant for national development by those trusted with the conduct 
of public affairs. 
This argument is developed further by Voltmer (2006), who is of the view that a viable 
democracy requires more than the implementation of key institutions of government, but 
rather, that an accountable and efficient government is embedded in a complex web of 
interdependent conditions that require considerable time and effort to develop. He notes that, 
in the context of apparent problems and frequent setbacks, scholars and policymakers alike 
have become aware of the crucial role of the media in the processes of democratisation and 
consolidation. But, equally like political institutions, Voltmer (2006) notes that the media in 
many new democracies often seem to lack the qualities that would qualify them to play a key 
role in promoting accountability and inclusive politics.  
Regrettably, the media and the communication systems of SADC and its subsidiary 
organisations continue to be criticised for remaining too close to the political power-holders to 
be able to act as effective watchdogs; political reporting is regarded as too opinionated to 
provide balanced gatekeeping, and commercial pressures on news coverage often encourage 
an overemphasis on the trivial and popular at the expense of serious and sustained attention 
to international affairs and complex issues on the policy agenda.  
Norris and Odugbenin (2008) observe that the challenges plaguing all democracies include 
expanding and deepening opportunities for inclusive public participation in civil society; 
ensuring the responsiveness, transparency and accountability of government institutions, and 
strengthening the overarching framework of fundamental freedoms and internationally agreed-
upon standards of human rights. In this context, they see a free press as a sector of civil 
society which could empower people to make better choices by providing them with more 
timely and accurate information.  
For governance, a two‐way flow of information is the central conduit connecting citizens and 
the state. Without transparency about the performance of the government and the policies 
offered by parties and candidates contending for elected office, and without alternative 
sources of information about this process, the act of casting a vote becomes meaningless, as 
elected officials and parties cannot be held to account (Norris & Odugbenin, 2008). The 
independent news media have been regarded as particularly important for promoting 
government transparency and accountability, especially by highlighting cases of corruption 
and misconduct.  
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Elected leaders also require accurate news about public concerns to be responsive to social 
needs and development challenges. Subsequently, Norris and Odugbenin (2008:8) argue:  
… that countries with both widespread media access and an independent free press 
have been found to experience lower corruption, greater administrative efficiency, 
higher political stability and more effective rule of law, as well as better developmental 
outcomes, such as lower infant mortality rates and greater literacy. The democratic 
public sphere helps to promote governance which is accountable to citizens and, 
based on this normative vision, observes the following characteristics of a democratic 
public sphere.  
Norris and Odugbenin (2008) further argue that a pluralistic communications system functions 
when the news media are independent from state control, official censorship and legal 
restrictions, and they reflect diverse perspectives, social sectors, interests and political 
persuasions. This system should guarantee constitutionally or legally guaranteed civil liberties 
and political rights, especially the fundamental freedoms of expression, opinion, information 
and assembly, as well as open and transparent governance. Further to this, it should enhance 
the rich and robust participation of civil society, functioning within multiple organisations and 
diverse associations, and facilitating unrestricted deliberation, cooperation and collaboration 
on issues of common concern.  
The notion of deliberative democracy and the public sphere advocates that the core 
responsibilities of communication should be understood to involve, at a minimum, their 
individual and collective roles as watchdogs, agenda‐setters and gatekeepers. Norris and 
Odugbenin (2008) argue that, as watchdogs, the news media have a responsibility to help 
guard the public interest, ensuring that powerful decision‐makers are accountable by 
highlighting cases of malfeasance, misadministration and corruption, and thereby 
strengthening the transparency and effectiveness of governance. This represents the classic 
notion of the news media as the fourth estate, counter‐balancing the power of the executive, 
legislature and judiciary branches.  
Norris and Odugbenin (2008) strengthen their arguments with further views that, as “agenda‐
setters”, the news media have a responsibility to raise awareness of pervasive social 
problems, helping to inform governing officials about social needs and the international 
community about development challenges. Further to this, they argue that, as “gatekeepers”, 
the news media have a responsibility to reflect and incorporate the plurality of viewpoints and 
political persuasions in reporting, to maximise the diversity of perspectives and arguments 
heard in rational public deliberations and to enrich the public sphere.  
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A similar view is expressed by Rickard (2011), arguing that the media and communication 
channels have an obligation to help to maintain a constitutional democracy in close contact 
with citizens. The media should use its power and freedom in defence of judicial independence 
and the respective constitution by playing the roles of watchdogs, agenda-setters and 
gatekeepers. Beardsworth (2011) further argues that this role is vital for the reform agendas 
of democratic governments that are responsive to social needs, inclusive and accountable to 
citizens. 
According to Lowenstein (1970), a completely free press is one in which newspapers, 
periodicals, news agencies, books, radio and television have absolute independence and 
critical ability, except for minimal libel and obscenity laws. This is also the view of Lederman, 
Loayza and Soares (2005) when analysing the effects of democracy, parliamentary systems 
and the freedom of the press on corruption. Their results confirm the general assumption that 
a free press inhibits corruption and promotes accountability. Gunther and Mughan (2000) call 
mass media the “connective tissue” of democracy. O’Neil (1998) writes that, without the 
freedom of communication that mass media provide, the foundation of democratic rule is 
undermined.  
Curran (2002) distinguishes between the classic liberal perspective on media freedom and the 
radical democratic perspective. The classic liberal perspective focuses on the freedom of the 
media to publish or broadcast. The radical democratic perspective focuses on how mass 
communications could mediate conflict and competition between social groups in society in 
an equitable way. Weaver (1977) distinguishes three components of press freedom: the 
relative absence of government restraints on the media, the relative absence of non-
governmental restraints, and conditions that ensure information freedom and the 
dissemination of diverse ideas and opinions to large audiences. Within the classic liberal 
perspective, according to Curran (2002), is a strand arguing that the media should serve to 
protect the individual from abuses of the state. Within the radical democratic perspective, he 
continues, is a strand that argues that the media should seek to redress imbalances in society. 
The three core political functions of the news media system are as a civic forum, a mobilising 
agent and a watchdog. Based on this, Curran (2002) develops more specific benchmarks that 
could be used to audit the performance of the news media system in any democracy. This is 
based on the Schumpeterian tradition that defines representative or liberal democracy in terms 
of three dimensions: pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions of 
government power; participation among citizens in the selection of parties and representatives 
through free, fair and periodic elections, and civil and political liberties to speak, publish, 
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assemble and organise, as necessary conditions to ensure effective competition and 
participation. 
Other scholars who support the notion that the mass media constitute the backbone of 
democracy include Fog (2004), who argues that they identify problems in society and serve 
as a medium for deliberation, they supply the political information that voters base their 
decisions on, and they serve as watchdogs that societies rely on for uncovering errors and 
wrongdoings by those who have power. Caparini (2010) views a free and independent news 
media as a key element in democracies, where they play a vital political role in keeping 
governments and citizens aware of and in contact with one another. One of the basic 
assumptions of democracy is that power rests with the people and that those who are 
entrusted with public governance must remain closely in tune with the views and preferences 
of ordinary citizens. 
According to democratic theory, the media functions as a bridge or transmission belt between 
society and those who govern. Caparini (2010) argues that the mass media are closely linked 
to the political system and the public sphere; they play a dual role of representing and forming 
political opinion. On the one hand, mass media communicate information that individuals use 
to make informed decisions and political choices. On the other hand, politicians rely on the 
media to present their positions, take stock of public opinion and interact with the public. 
Media, therefore, form a fundamental interconnective tissue between society and the 
government, communicating information, intentions, concerns, priorities and reactions to 
policies. Caparini (2010) further argues that social and political theorists recognise that 
preconditions for the establishment and preservation of democratic governance include 
freedom of expression for individuals and groups with divergent views.  
The basic doctrine of democracy holds that, through the airing of divergent views, citizens will 
be able to choose the most commendable and credible ideas, and that society will thus 
advance. In the realm of media theory and policy, this concept has manifested in the idea that 
media plurality (as in multiple media outlets) is a primary element in providing the opportunity 
for diverse voices to be heard and for ideas to be circulated. 
An effective and independent media acts as a government watchdog by subjecting the actions 
of the government to public scrutiny and, thereby, holding governments to account for their 
policies and management of the public sphere. Investigative journalists may expose 
corruption, wrongdoing and misuse of public office in the government. At the most basic level, 
Caparini (2010) argues, the media in a democratic society should publish available, 
comprehensive and reliable information about political and social processes at work, to enable 
the average citizen to make educated decisions and thereby participate in the political process. 
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This information and public discussion and debate provided by the media is supposed to make 
it possible for citizens to see and understand what is going on in politics and society, and to 
evaluate their own positions on political processes by comparing them to other views and 
opinions. 
The preceding views lead to arguments by Dahl (1973:191), who states that for many it is very 
difficult to understand what is meant by the concept of democracy. Keane (1991:168) defines 
democracy as a concept that “comprises procedures for arriving at collective decisions in a 
way which secures the fullest possible and qualitatively best participation of interested parties”. 
Dahl (1973:112) is of the view that “each citizen ought to have adequate and equal 
opportunities for discovering and validating the choice on a matter to be decided that would 
best serve the citizens’ interests”. He further argues that throughout the process of making 
binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate and equal opportunity to express their 
preferences.  
According to the liberal theory, one of the primary roles of the media in a democratic country 
is to act as a watchdog (Curran, 2002:217). Contemporary democratic theory appreciates that 
the watchdog role ensures that the government is held accountable for all its actions. It is 
argued that the government cannot be held accountable if citizens are ill-informed about the 
actions of officials and institutions. This role, therefore, requires the media to act as guardians 
of the public interest, warning the citizens against those who are doing them harm. Thus, 
according to Curran (2002:217): 
For the media to perform this role effectively, it must be independent of the 
government and of all other pressures that might influence its operation. It is feared 
that once the media is subject to state regulation, it becomes difficult to fulfil the 
watchdog role. 
The watchdog role requires that the media not only monitor the full range of state activities, 
but also fearlessly expose the abuses of those in power. Additionally, the media must ensure 
that the government and politicians do not abuse the power granted to them or exceed their 
mandates. Curran (2002) posits that the watchdog role overrides all the other important 
functions of the media and that, despite various criticisms, the watchdog role is still considered 
in most of the literature to be an important role for media in any democracy.  
Contemporary democratic theory appreciates the media’s role in ensuring that governments 
are held accountable. In both new and old democracies, the notion of the media as watchdog 
and not merely a passive recorder of events is widely accepted. Coronel (2003) argues that 
governments cannot be held accountable if citizens are ill-informed about the actions of 
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officials and institutions; the “watchdog press”, as the guardian of the public interest, warns 
citizens against those who are doing them harm. Sen (1994) also outlines the need for 
“transparency guarantees” such as a free press and the free flow of information. Sen (1994) 
sees the media as a watchdog against not just corruption, but also disaster, further arguing 
that there has never been a famine in a functioning multi-party democracy with regular, 
credible elections, healthy opposition parties and an unfettered media.  
Sen (1994) is of the view that a free press, together with the practice of democracy and political 
opposition, acts as an early warning system by broadcasting information which could positively 
contribute to the prevention of famine. Sen (1994) argues that historically famines have been 
associated with one-party states, such as North Korea in the past few decades; with military 
dictatorships, such as Ethiopia, or with colonial arrangements such as in pre-independence 
India and Ireland. It is this researcher’s conclusion – in conjunction with Sanjukta’s (2012) 
argument – that an independent media acts as an anchor for many facets of a society and 
supports its fundamental workings, by upholding the ruling party or exposing its vices; bringing 
out the positives and negatives of industry; making citizens’ voices audible to decision-makers, 
and, most importantly, revealing and spreading economic and other information. 
A free media is shown to promote economic development by solving principal–agent problems 
through the free flow of information, thus improving public policy implementation. In the context 
of the SADC community and its relations with stakeholders for improved stakeholder 
participation in decision-making, it is paramount that there are clear lines of communication 
between different players, anchored on a strong and vibrant media capable of promoting 
diversity and inclusive deliberations. 
4.3.2 Accountability 
The concept of accountability in deliberative democracy aims to produce a decision that is 
binding for some period and, as such, participants should take the process seriously and not 
just as an academic discussion. The nature of deliberation should be such that it produces 
results that influence how the government makes public-policy decisions that respond to 
needs of the citizenry, as well as their hopes and aspirations, and thus be accountable to 
them. According to Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2005), accountability ensures that the actions 
and decisions taken by public officials are subject to oversight, to guarantee that government 
initiatives meet stated objectives and respond to the needs of communities that are meant to 
be benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reduction. 
Such observations are underlined by Bovens (2007), who describes accountability as a 
relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and 
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to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor 
may face consequences. Bovens (2007) further views accountability as having three 
indispensable components. The first one is that the actor should be obliged to inform the forum 
about his/her conduct. The second one is that the forum should have an opportunity to debate 
this conduct with the state, as well as an opportunity for the actor to explain and justify his/her 
conduct during the debate. The third one is that both parties should know the forum is able 
not only to pass judgment, but also to present the actor with certain consequences.  
According to Mulgan (2003), accountability is a relationship of social interaction and exchange 
involving complementary rights on the part of the account-holder and obligations on the part 
of the account-holder. He stresses a few defining features. Firstly, it is external, which means 
that the account is given to some other person or body outside the person or body being held 
accountable. Secondly, it involves social interaction and exchange. Lastly, it implies some 
rights of authority. Sirker (2006), on the other hand, refers to accountability as the obligation 
of power-holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions in both conduct and 
performance. However, to Paul (1992), accountability means holding individuals and 
organisations responsible for their performance, which is measured as objectively as possible. 
Bovens (2007) expands his views on accountability by describing it as a broad concept that 
embraces a myriad of values such as responsibility, equity, efficiency, democracy, integrity, 
responsiveness and transparency, all of which are considered important values in the modern-
day social and political context. On the other hand, Beckmann (2000:8) points out that 
accountability follows the exercise of power, use of resources and implementation of policy, 
inextricably linking the concept to democratic management and other related concepts such 
as participation, decentralisation, empowerment and transparency. Bovens (2005:16) argues 
that: 
In contemporary political and scholarly discourse accountability often serves as an 
conceptual umbrella that covers various other distinct concepts and used as a 
synonym for many loosely defined political meanings such as transparency, good 
governance, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, and 
integrity. 
Expanding on the same subject, Mulgan (2003) argues that the term accountability has come 
to stand as a general term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to 
their public. Government officials and bureaucrats, notes Malena, Forster and Singh (2004), 
are accountable for their conduct and performance. This includes being held accountable for 
obeying the law, not abusing their powers, and serving the public interest in an efficient, 
effective and fair manner.  
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There are different forms of accountability, with Koppell (2005) presenting five different 
dimensions of accountability – transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and 
responsiveness – that are each ideographs and umbrella concepts themselves. However, this 
approach, which creates broad assumptions of accountability concepts, creates problems. 
Bovens (2005) argues that such broad conceptualisations make it impossible to establish 
empirically whether an organisation is accountable, because each of the various elements 
needs extensive operationalisation itself and because the various elements cannot be 
measured along the same scale. Some dimensions, such as transparency, are instrumental 
for accountability, but are not constitutive of accountability; others, such as responsiveness, 
are more evaluative than analytical.  
A more realistic approach is presented by Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2005), who provide two 
distinct stages for the concept of accountability, namely: answerability and enforcement. On 
the one hand, they argue that answerability refers to the obligation of the government, its 
agencies and its public officials to provide information about their decisions and actions, and 
to justify them to the public and those institutions of accountability tasked with providing 
oversight. On the other hand, Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2005) argue that enforcement agents, 
the public or the institution responsible for accountability could sanction the offending party or 
remedy the contravening behaviour. As such, different institutions of accountability might be 
responsible for either or both stages.  
Apart from enforcement and answerability, Schedler (1999) suggests a third way of controlling 
the use of political and other powers by managers: monitoring and evaluation. These are 
important to the policy- and decision-making processes. 
4.3.2.1 Types of accountability 
There are various types of accountability, including public, political, administrative, 
bureaucratic, legal and constitutional, fiscal, performance, social, and moral. Stapenhurst and 
O’Brien (2005) distinguish between horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal 
accountability is the capacity of state institutions such as the judiciary and legislature to check 
abuses by other public agencies and branches of the government, or the requirement for 
agencies to report sideways. Vertical accountability is the means through which citizens, mass 
media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good performance on officials. Bovens 
(2005) argues that these types of accountability could be formal or informal, internal or 
external, individual or collective, and could work vertically, horizontally or diagonally.  
The key type of accountability that is relevant to the present study is public accountability. 
Bovens (2005) is of the view that the need for the state to be accountable to its citizens stems 
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from the social contract that citizens share with the state. In a democracy, Bovens (2005) 
argues, this contract is operationalised when citizens elect a government and invest elected 
representatives with the power to govern them. The government is under obligation to perform 
its duties of governance in a manner that takes citizens’ interests to heart.  
Elections are considered to be one of the main mechanisms to ensure that the government 
respects this contract; yet, they are not an end, but a means to an end. Størm (1997) 
emphasises political accountability as an important type of public accountability within 
democracies. He argues that it signifies the real arena where accountability is exercised along 
the chain of principal–agent relationships, with voters delegating their sovereignty to popular 
representatives who, in turn, delegate most of their authority to a cabinet of ministers. Ministers 
subsequently delegate most of their authority to civil servants or to various, more-or-less 
independent administrative bodies (Bovens, 2005). According to Lindberg (2009), when 
decision-making power is transferred from a principal (the citizens) to an agent (the 
government), there must be a mechanism in place for holding the agent to account for its 
decisions and, if necessary, for imposing sanctions, ultimately by removing the agent from 
power.  
Another form of accountability that is gathering currency is some type of social accountability. 
As Malena, Forster and Singh (2004) point out, and as a growing body of evidence shows, 
social accountability efforts on the part of citizens and civil-society organisations could serve 
to create new, effective vertical mechanisms of accountability and to strengthen existing 
horizontal ones. If properly practiced, it could lead to improved governance, improved public-
service delivery and enhanced development effectiveness. Desai (2009) is of the view that 
social accountability is the responsibility of public officials, who must justify their conduct and 
performance to citizens using accountability mechanisms. It is also the responsibility of 
citizens to extract accountability from public officials. Figure 3 indicates how Boyens (2005), 
links the concept of accountability to rights and duty-bearers. 
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Figure 2: Accountability, rights and duty-bearers 
Source: Bovens, 2007, p. 43 
4.3.2.2 The importance of accountability 
Social accountability is viewed by Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2005) as an approach towards 
building accountability that relies on civic engagement whereby ordinary citizens and/or civil-
society organisations participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Political 
accountability has been defined as the obligation of both political and public officials in 
governments to be held accountable for their actions to the citizens (Schedler, 1999; Bratton 
& Logan, 2006), serving the dual purpose of ensuring that representatives do not abuse power 
and enabling governments to function effectively and efficiently. It also refers to the processes 
and mechanisms that are in place to ensure that those in decision-making positions adhere to 
the principles of democracy and good governance, with answerability and enforceability being 
identified as the two fundamental constituents of political accountability.  
Malena, Forster and Singh (2004) link several concepts and agendas to social accountability 
mechanisms, arguing that they have a key role to play in improving governance and deepening 
democracy. Governance, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(1997), refers to the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the 
management of a country's public affairs at all levels. It incorporates complex mechanisms, 
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate 
their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Malena, Forster and Singh 
(2004) link social accountability to governance, empowerment and the effectiveness of 










involvement of citizens in exerting accountability from their elected representatives and 
leaders, which has strong potential to contribute to poverty reduction through more pro-poor 
policy design, improved service delivery and empowerment (Malena, Forster & Singh, 2004). 
 
Figure 3: Social accountability 
Source: Bovens, 2007, p. 48 
In many cases, citizens, communities and CSOs do not merely participate in social 
accountability activities; they initiate and control them. By monitoring government 
performance, demanding and enhancing transparency, and exposing government failures and 
misdeeds, social accountability mechanisms become powerful tools against corruption. 
Indeed, it has been argued by some that the only true safeguard against public-sector 
corruption is the active and ongoing societal monitoring of government actions and the 
evolution of more open and participatory anti-corruption institutions. 
However, Odhiambo-Mbai (2008) sees it differently, arguing that it is not always true that 
democratisation is equal to accountability or that accountability is in turn equal to good 
governance. He cites the case of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa after decades of the 
restoration of multi-partyism. Evidence on the ground indicates that widespread abuse of 
public office by public officials is still largely the norm. Schedler (1999) speaks about systems 
of accountability that are internal to the state as “horizontal” mechanisms of accountability. 
These include political mechanisms like constitutional constraints, separation of powers, the 







Fiscal mechanisms include formal systems of auditing and financial accounting, while 
administrative mechanisms refer to hierarchical reporting, norms of public sector probity, 
public service codes of conduct, rules and procedures regarding transparency, and public 
oversight. Legal mechanisms include corruption control agencies, ombudsmen and the 
judiciary (Malena, Forster & Singh 2004; Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). It is important to understand 
that these are important tenets that could enhance the participation of the quality of decision-
making processes at SADC level through the involvement of different stakeholders.  
4.3.3 Equality of voice 
The deliberative democracy framework speaks of a need to respect diversity or treat all views 
presented equally. It envisages that the process should be dynamic, allow for the respect of 
diversity and ensure equality of voice. Even where the minority voice does not carry the day, 
it should be taken into serious consideration, because although deliberation aims at a 
justifiable decision, it does not presuppose that the decision at hand will, in fact, be justified, 
let alone that the justification today will suffice for the indefinite future.  
Arguments for the principle of equality in the deliberative democracy context are based on a 
framework that speaks of making authoritative and enforceable collective decisions aimed at 
providing guidance on how rights and opportunities could be made with the same level of 
respect for all citizens. Cohen (1996:50) argues that “in democratic society, members are 
conceived of as free and equal citizens”. A principle of equality of voice and democracy 
presents norms that are suited to persons thus conceived. It articulates values that apply to 
the democratic arrangements for making binding, authoritative and enforceable decisions, and 
it aims to provide guidance about the appropriate design of such arrangements. Cohen (1989) 
further argues that the principle of equality applies to the framework for making authoritative 
and enforceable collective decisions and specifies, inter alia, the system of rights and 
opportunities for free and equal members to influence decisions with which they are expected 
to comply and which are made in their name. Most importantly, it is framed in a manner that 
ensures members can legitimately make demands on the highest level of authoritative 
collective decision-making.  
Equal opportunities to influence decisions at the same level, without resorting to weighting of 
votes, is what Rawls (1993) calls the “fair value of political liberty”, which condemns inequality 
in opportunities for holding office and influencing political decisions by influencing the 
outcomes of elections and decision-making. It should, however, be noted that equality of voice 
is not a requirement of authoritative systems of collective decision-making. Decisions should 
also be substantially just, according to some reasonable conception of justice, and effective 
at advancing the general welfare of citizens.  
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The principle of equality of voice – as Rawls (1993) puts it – is that people who are equally 
motivated and equally able to play a role in influencing binding collective decisions ought to 
have equal chances to exercise such decisions. Rawls (1993) concludes that the conception 
of equal opportunities for all is relevant in decision-making processes because the voice of 
the majority is not always correct – the majority could be wrong. That is why it is important to 
rationalise and reach decisions on the bases of inclusion and respect of all the views that have 
been presented. 
According to Karpowitz, Raphael and Hammond (2009), the struggle to balance the voices of 
lay citizens and the voices of experts and the elite has always been a feature of deliberative 
democracy. Deliberation fulfils its special claims to democratic legitimacy when, in making 
decisions, participants focus on how well they justify their views to one another, rather than 
on participants’ authority, status, numbers, muscle or money. The decisions that result from 
this process of deliberation are fairer, more legitimate and less arbitrary. These decisions are 
also most likely to be wiser, because they allow a broad range of perspectives and information 
to be pooled together.  
When making decisions using the deliberative process, dealing with minority views is 
important. The deliberative process, while pushing for consensus in decision-making, does 
not coerce minority views. Deliberation makes people open-minded and willing to listen to 
minority views, resolving conflict properly and leaving deliberators feeling that everyone 
received a fair hearing. Karpowitz, Raphael and Hammond (2009:579) argue that: 
At any given time and place there are identifiable groups that are more identifiable to 
organise, articulate, mobilise, and integrate into policy discussions. They may be 
formally excluded from aspects of political systems because they are denied voting 
rights or legal standing in administrative arena or may lack resources for effective 
organising and action. Such groups typically exert demonstrably less influence on 
institutional and public policy-making through organised lobbying, campaign, 
contributions and major methods affecting policy. 
Respecting minority views helps to broaden the range of voices and views in the wider public 
sphere. 
4.3.4 Reciprocity 
Reciprocity emphasises that deliberation should allow for mutually respected decision-making. 
Each party that is engaged in the deliberative process should be guided by the spirit of 
reciprocity, and be ready and willing to engage and share their views openly in a manner that 
allows for the free flow of ideas from different parties. 
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The deliberative democracy tenet of reciprocity is premised on the understanding that citizens 
owe one another justifications for decisions. Deliberative democracy takes reciprocity more 
seriously than do any other theories and makes it the core of its democratic principles. 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) are of the view that the principle of reciprocity implies that the 
capacity to make critical judgments is a prerequisite for making reciprocal claims, while 
denying citizens’ space to engage in ideas is not consistent with the principle of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity recognises that citizens owe one another mutually justifiable reasons for laws and 
policies that they would impose on one another. 
Reciprocity is a process of seeking not just any other reason but mutually justifiable reasons 
and reaching mutually binding decisions based on those reasons. In this regard, reciprocity is 
more than just discussion; it is both substantive and procedural. The importance of the 
deliberative democracy tenet of reciprocity is that it allows citizens to show respect to one 
another by recognising their obligations to justify to one another, in terms that permit 
reasonable disagreements, the laws and policies that govern their public life. 
The principle guiding deliberative democracy reciprocity is that citizens and their elected 
representatives seek to give one another mutually acceptable reasons for the laws and 
policies they adopt. The underlying emphasis is a desire to justify policies to people who would 
be bound by them. In this regard, reciprocity sets standards or criteria for assessing decision-
making on the strength of justifications that are accessible, moral, respectful and revisable. 
Invariably, reciprocity requires reasons that can be justified to all parties who are motivated to 
find fair terms and social cooperation. It further allows for accommodation based on mutual 
respect, encouraging cooperation on fair terms. The importance of accommodation in policy-
making is that it allows citizens to promote policies where their principles converge, even 
though these policies would be lower in their list of political preferences under other 
circumstances. It also requires more than simply agreeing to disagree; it encourages each 
side to have a favourable attitude towards and constructive interaction with the side that it 
disagrees with. This keeps open the possibility of a different, more accommodating solution in 
the future. 
4.4 Application of the deliberative democracy conceptual framework  
This research assumes that a proper application of the deliberative democracy conceptual 
framework in the decision-making processes in SADC would enhance inclusive and collective 
decision-making, which would go a long way in the democratisation of the institution. Gutmann 
and Thompson (1996) see it as an essential component in the promotion of collective decision-
making which produces legitimate and acceptable decisions while, at the same time, 
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encouraging public-spirited perspectives on public issues. Further to that, it could enable 
SADC to promote mutually respected decision-making processes which would allow it to 
correct its mistakes on governance policy-making or any related issues in a manner that 
improves its democracy credentials and collective decision-making. 
This research assumes that applying deliberative democracy to SADC’s decision-making 
processes would likely produce policy decisions with greater legitimacy and a better chance 
of promoting statutory goals than policy decisions that merely reflect political preferences. 
Bassette (1980) argues that, in a deliberative democracy context, decisions should reflect 
preferences that emerge from a process of reasoned deliberation rather than the pre-political 
preferences of most citizens or the strength of competing interests and pressure. 
This means that participants in the policy-making process should engage in a procedure of 
deliberation and debate, where they exchange information, arguments and ideas about the 
best course of action under the circumstances. In a deliberative democracy set-up, there is 
more willingness by participants to be open-minded and allow for a free flow of ideas. This 
could assist SADC, especially given that some member states could be characterised by poor 
relations between citizens and the government. 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) see this emphasis on participation as a positive phenomenon. 
Participants should be open-minded and willing to revise their pre-existing views and 
preferences based on new information and arguments, while any empirical claims that underlie 
their positions should be based on the best-value information and reliable methods of inquiry. 
It is also important for the participants in the deliberative democracy process not to be 
persuaded by their naked personal preferences (“this is what I want”) or by self-interest 
arguments (“this is good for me”). Both public officials and citizens are expected to provide 
rational explanations for their positions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal 
citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives, and to explain how the proposed course 
of action would promote the public good. 
Over and above that, there is a need to ensure that the deliberative process is generally 
transparent to the public and that the justifications which officials offer for decisions are publicly 
accessible. This openness and transparency provides citizens and other public officials with 
an opportunity to discuss, evaluate and criticise specific decisions. 
For instance, Staszewski (2012:886), argues that: 
… the key distinction between the majoritarian or pluralistic theories of democratic 
governance and more deliberative alternatives is that while the former theories focus 
on making decisions that accord with the prevailing distribution of political power, the 
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later theories emphasise the importance of having mutually respectful discussions of 
the merits of issues and ensuring that everyone’s interests and perspectives are taken 
into account in decision making. 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) also argue on the same trajectory, speaking of how they view 
representative democracy theories as more focused on procedural issues, while deliberative 
democracy theories are concerned with both procedural and substantive issues, thus 
strengthening the validity of policy choices. Fearon (2012) also sees deliberative democratic 
theories as having several major advantages over majoritarian or pluralistic conceptions of 
democratic governance. He argues that policy decisions that are adopted pursuant to the 
requirements of deliberative democratic theory are more likely to be effective than policy 
decisions that deviate from (or are considered exempt from) these standards. The way the 
process is designed eliminates individualism and emphasises the collective. Elster (1998) 
speaks of the deliberative democracy process as capable of eliminating self-interest and 
limiting self-interested proposals. Manin (1987) views the capacity to help participants to 
ascertain their own preferences on the best course of action under the circumstances as one 
of the biggest strengths of deliberative democracy theories. 
With the application of the deliberative democracy model to SADC’s policy-making processes, 
there would be a strong possibility of inclusive democratic decision-making which could be the 
basis of accelerated regional development. Staszewski (2012:88) observes that: 
A deliberative process can be expected to yield more justifiable decisions on the merits 
because the deliberation process is by definition focussed on the substantive merits of 
the decision. This is not necessarily true of decision making procedures that merely 
aggregate the pre-political preferences of voters, elected representatives or interest. 
There are, however, some suggestions that deliberative democracy seeks to find one answer 
when, in social science interpretations, there can be no single answer. Gutmann and 
Thompson (1996) quash this accusation, arguing that securing this benefit does not require a 
single correct answer to controversial policy questions; it depends on a belief in a well-
informed decision-maker’s ability to reasonably conclude that some policy decisions are more 
justifiable than others on a fairly regular basis. 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996) expand their arguments with an assertion that policy 
decisions made and adopted pursuant to the requirements of deliberative democracy theory 
are likely to be more legitimate than policy decisions that deviate from these standards. This 
is true from the perspective of majority rule because the deliberative process provides most 
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policy-makers with the information and competing perspectives they need to ascertain 
preferences on the best resolutions to specific policy issues. 
The research assumes that if SADC policy formulation processes are based on deliberative 
democracy, they are more likely to assist in building consensus on solutions. Further to that, 
it assumes that even where such consensus is not reached, elected officials will most likely 
have good reasons for choosing their courses of action over available alternatives to make 
legitimate policy decisions. Manin (1987) stresses the point that deliberative democracy 
theories require that a decision-making process adequately consider the interests and 
perspective of minorities. Cohen (1989) buttresses this, arguing that the deliberative 
democracy process is most likely to bring about substantive outcomes that are the object of a 
free and reasoned agreement of equals, and the resulting policy decisions could be 
understood as collective choices that are presumably legitimate from the standpoint of 
minorities. Contributing to the same debate, Staszewski (2012:889) speaks of deliberative 
democracy as a very good theory because of what he terms: 
… a theory that requires public officials to consider the interests and perspectives of 
minorities will clearly have greater democratic legitimacy from the minority’s point of 
view than a theory that assumes that all citizens have provided their blanket consent to 
the governed by the unfiltered preferences of a majority, irrespective of the substantive 
merits of those decisions. 
One other consideration, which makes the deliberative democracy conceptual framework 
more useful in the drive to enhance participative decision-making processes at SADC, is that 
it allows for the policy process to be monitored by citizens. This is an important element of the 
policy-making cycle which also assists in promoting collective decision-making and inclusivity. 
On the same point, Downs (1957) sees deliberative democratic theories as easier to monitor 
and enforce in practice than the majoritarian or representative democracy competitors. The 
advocates of majoritarian or pluralistic theories tend to envision a political market that operates 
with an “invisible hand”, like an economic market. Their view derives from an idea that elected 
officials are elected to power based on the demand of certain policy programmes and their 
ability to convince the electorate that they have the capacity to deliver. If they fail to deliver, 
the assumption is that voters will vote them out in the next election and choose a new set of 
leaders likely to represent them better by delivering on their policy promises. 
Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett (2001) argue that, in the real world of politics, that is not the 
case and that periodic elections are not dependable mechanisms for ensuring that public 
officials implement the will of the people on most policy matters. In a representative 
democracy, any attempt to try to enforce the elected officials to implement their promises is a 
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daunting task. On the other hand, in a deliberative democracy set-up, there is room for 
competing arguments and acceptance of diversity.  
Staszewski (2012) speaks of deliberative democracy theories as dependent upon public 
officials and citizens to participate in the deliberative process, to represent competing points 
of view, and to evaluate and potentially criticise policy decisions and their proffered 
justifications, as well as to potentially seek political and legal reform. He further argues that 
deliberative democracy theories allow for openness – a prerequisite for successful policy-
making. He indicates that this system can work only if the policy-making process is accessible 
and transparent, and if public officials provide reasoned explanations for their policy decisions. 
The deliberative democracy process also has self-correction mechanisms. Gutmann and 
Thompson (2004) argue that while there are no guarantees that all set deliberation conditions 
will be met, the deliberative democratic theory stands a much more realistic chance of 
succeeding on its own terms, and being able to identify and rectify its own shortcomings in 
practice, than its majoritarian or pluralistic counterparts. This argument is expanded by 
Staszewski (2012:893), who states “that deliberative democracy theory recognises that 
political preferences and priorities have a legitimate role to play in policy-making in many 
situations, but only when certain conditions are met”.  
Over and above its commitment to exhaustive deliberation in decision-making the deliberative 
democracy theory does not rigidly stick to this and ignores that there could be a need for voting 
at some stage.  
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) express a view contrary to that of critics of deliberative theory, 
namely that voting is essential to theories of democratic governance to mark closure of an 
episode of reasoned debate and to minimise any remaining disagreements after each 
participant has expressed their views on the merits of the relevant proposals, ultimately 
resulting in political action with potentially significant consequences.  
Thus, the deliberative democracy process should be more accurately understood as a give-
and-take public argument aimed at making a decision that will guide future action and that is 
justifiable to the people bound by it, because where policy decisions must be made, theories 
of deliberative democracy should dovetail with voting. The question then becomes: why 
embark on voting, which is majoritarian, when making some decisions under the conceptual 




4.5 Managing majoritarianism 
While deliberative democratic theorists do not necessarily believe that majority rule is required 
by democracy, they do recognise that abiding by the results of a majority vote is an appropriate 
decision-making procedure in many situations. The difference is that while theories of 
representative democracy understand majority vote as the sum-total aggregation of 
preferences or the weighing of competing interest-group pressures as the only legitimate goals 
of policy-making, deliberative democracy theories view a majority vote or deference to public 
opinion as a closure device. Staszewski (2012) thus argues that while majoritarianism and 
pluralism are purely procedural theories of democracy, which are typically silent on the 
evidence, arguments and claims that are considered before a vote is taken, deliberative 
democratic theory recognises the need to attend to the content of a policy dispute in order to 
assess the justifiability of both the means of reaching a resolution and the resolution itself, 
such that, at the end of it all, the majority may decide, but only after an exhaustive process of 
deliberation. 
Deliberative democracy does embrace the results of majoritarianism if they come after 
exhaustive deliberation that fails to reach consensus and a vote is needed as a closure 
mechanism. Stack (2009) argues that deliberative democratic theory maintains that an 
adequate deliberative process must precede the assessment of, or reliance upon, majoritarian 
preferences of public opinion in making authoritative policy decisions in the context of 
administrative rule-making. At the same time, the voting may not violate any fundamental 
rights or liberties as determined by the principles of deliberative theory. Most importantly, the 
decision may not be arbitrary or capricious on the merits, meaning that participants in the 
deliberative process must consider the interests and perspectives of everyone who would be 
affected by the decision, and it must be justified by arguments and evidence presented and 
supported by reasoned explanations. 
One other positive notch for deliberative democracy is its flexible external review mechanisms, 
such as a judiciary review, which tend to emphasise the provisional nature of most policy 
choices in a democracy. This is particularly important in SADC, as there is emphasis on the 
self-evaluation of member states using the AU-designed African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM). The mechanism encourages member states to conduct a self-evaluation of their 
governance that involves all key stakeholders. 
The primary benefits of providing more space for deliberation in SADC are that it will make the 
administrative process more transparent and that it has the potential to improve the alignment 
between the organisation, its member states, decision-making and public opinion, and the 
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philosophies and priorities of the existing political leadership, without sacrificing the quality or 
legitimacy of SADC policy choices. 
4.6 The counter-arguments 
While deliberative democracy is the conceptual framework for this study, the researcher is not 
restricted to thinking that it is pure and therefore devoid of any shortcomings. Deliberative 
democracy, like all theories, has its critics. For instance, Olson (2011) argues that while two 
of the most widely advertised advantages of deliberative democracy are its abilities to 
accommodate the diversity of democratic citizens and to renegotiate preferences and values 
through shared modes of political argumentation, thus spanning a wide range of social and 
cultural differences, it does not take into cognisance the highly demanding time requirements 
on people. 
It also fails to make a serious assessment of citizens and how the contextual environment 
affects their ability to engage effectively in deliberation. Olson (2011) argues that an 
assessment of citizens’ capabilities could be used as a critical leverage against the existing 
democracy, highlighting the ways in which people and polities fall short when compared with 
the ideal of deliberative citizens and contexts. However, in the real world of politics and policy 
formulation, only a few citizens are enlightened enough to have a thorough understanding of 
the demands of deliberation, especially the normative arguments, and how they could be used 
to improve the existing democracy. 
The deliberative democracy theory has also been limited by its emphasis on the issue of 
equality; some critics have identified this as its own weakness because of a failure to address 
the societal inequalities arising from class differences. Olson (2011:528) argues that: 
On the issue of equality it should be noted that citizens often correspond to their social 
differences from one another and this affects their ability to engage. The situation is 
profoundly disturbing in liberal democratic theory imagination which is structured on a 
belief that all people are created equal. If people are unequal in their specifically 
democratic capacities, and inequalities follow the lines of social difference, deliberative 
democracy may privilege some kinds of people above others, reproducing social 
differences rather than blunting their effects. 
These accusations have led to a view that deliberative democracy perpetuates power 
differences and inequality, rather than thematising them as topics of common concern. 
Compounding this is the accusation that deliberative democracy fails to stipulate principle 
issues of equality and inclusion that would condemn social differentiation. This has given its 
critics a field day as they argue that the theory looks at society in absolute terms without taking 
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into consideration class differences and how they influence participation in governance issues. 
Olson (2011:544) concludes that deliberative democracy strategy is silent about the kinds of 
normative claims that should count in the public sphere. It does not try to discern implicit norms 
of political practice. Rather, it emphasises politics while leaving normativity up to the people 
involved. He views deliberative democracy as having glaring shortcomings, arguing that: 
Deliberation limits reveal important insights about its relation to politics in the broader 
sense these limits imply the need for other avenues of political action. Deliberative 
politics cannot stand alone it must be seen as a broader palette of political possibilities. 
It is important for deliberative theorists to have a better account of the complex social 
texture of the deliberative interaction. It should not just be crisscrossed by 
presuppositions of all kinds but rather should focus towards universalised forms of 
practice towards differentiating assessments of fellow citizens. These countervailing 
tendencies reveal tensions within deliberation itself. 
Further counter-arguments are that deliberative democracy seems to ignore political 
processes and emphasises citizen participation when the political environment depends on 
relations between citizens and the elected representatives that directly affect the policy-
making processes. 
The extent to which deliberative democracy promotes the equality of voice and inclusion of all 
people in deliberation, without taking into consideration the different social strata they come 
from and how this affects their ability to engage, is another key weakness of the theory. 
Further, there is a view that it is an inadequate and harmful account of how citizens go about 
understanding their fellows in public deliberation and that it privileges a form of communication 
by Habermas only. Olson (2011:545) argues:  
Our notions of who is qualified to speak and how valuable their contributions are reflect 
deep currents of power and disadvantage in society as a whole. If deliberative 
democracy is going to live up to its advertised potential as emancipatory, equalising 
solution to these problems, it must avoid perpetuating them at the same time. This 
requires deliberative theorists to acknowledge the limits of deliberation and forge 
connections with other political modalities without backing away from their own 
distinctive claims about the promise of a linguistic turn in political practice. 
Young (2000:12) argues that deliberative democracy fails on three accounts, starting with what 
she calls its exclusive nature which produces structural inequalities and that it is inattentive to 
issues of discursive power. She argues that by engaging with what she calls the “dominant 
institutions”, deliberative democracy limits alternatives, thus replicating structural inequalities 
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under the guise of democratic engagement. Hildreth (2012:304) is of the view that 
“constructing deliberation as a discussion of legislation or policy implementation allows 
participants to tinker with margins of the policy, but precludes investigating the root cause of 
the problems”. This view is shared by Young (2000). She views the problem not as the inability 
to reach consensus, but as the inability to set up procedural rules that are acceptable to all 
parties. She also views the deliberative process as inattentive to important issues of decisive 
power. She speaks of deliberative democracy as only focusing on the need for agreement to 
give policies legitimacy; it does not theorise what the conditions for achieving legitimacy. Part 
of this shortcoming is related to whether the institutions themselves allow for internal 
transformation and, most importantly, the deliberative structures. Young (2000) contends that 
policies often fail to make a meaningful justification or to account for how to deal with structures 
of deliberation which are inherent within the conditions of the deliberation process. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the foundations of deliberative democracy and the main actors in 
policy-making processes. It has covered the state and civil society in policy-making in Africa. 
Further to that, it has explored facets of the concept of deliberative democracy and its 
importance in policy-making. 
In reviewing the literature, a discovery was made that while there are volumes of literature 
regarding deliberative democracy in general, there is little on how civil society could use this 
concept to enhance its participation in the policy-making processes of interstate organs like 
SADC. This is a considerable gap, especially in how civil-society players could collaborate 
with national governments to make meaningful contributions to the policy-making processes 
of interstate organs like SADC. At face value, it may seem impossible to see how the concept 
of deliberative democracy could be used to promote enhanced civil society and regional bloc 
relations in decision-making. However, the conclusion is that there is a gap that, if filled, could 
enhance people-centred policy-making within interstate organisations.  
Most importantly, this research is projected to add new dimensions to the literature on citizens’ 
loss of faith in the institutions, processes and actors associated with conventional 
representative democracy. The use of the deliberative democracy approach would provide a 
literature that strengthens the rebuilding of public focus, interest and confidence in redesigning 
politics through the design and implementation of modes of citizen engagement with a clear 
element of citizens’ participation, but within the boundaries and without usurping powers 
conferred on citizens’ representatives through representative democracy. It has created trends 
in studies of deliberative democracy, the focus of which is the micro-political community level. 
This has inevitably created a large gap in the literature, as there is limited engagement about 
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deliberative democracy at macro-level institutions. Finders and Curry (2008) share the same 
view in their argument that there is a strong need to shift from micro-political experiments 
towards the use of deliberative forms of participation at the macro-political level, so that 
deliberative democracy mechanisms are used as the basis for considering the root of a 
political system. 
Fishkin (1991) and Dryzek (2000) further argue that the trend, until recently, has been to focus 
primarily on local and community politics, in the process disregarding development and trends 
at the national level and beyond. Johnston, Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte (1996) reinforces this 
argument, arguing that it is exactly such reasons that make the analysis of experiments with 
deliberative democracy at the national level and in relationship to “mega political” debates or 
the “mega political orientation” of a polity (namely, those concerning the nature of a polity’s 
constitution and the distribution of powers) more relevant within a wider discussion concerning 
the evolution of modes of participation and the nature of democracy. 
A political analysis that focuses on deliberative democracy in relationship to “mega politics’’ is 
important in providing a new body of literature that adds a new veneer to our understanding 
of inclusive politics, strategic-game playing and potential veto power. The present work would 
thus be useful at a very opportune time to provide new literature on how deliberative 
democracy could be used to promote relations and common approaches to policy-making at 
interstate organs like SADC. 
This work should also fill in a gap in the literature regarding how deliberative democracy could 
be adopted and used in the transformation of interstate institutions, rather than simply an 
aggregation of preferences. Most importantly, this work should add new dimensions to the 
literature and help to fill in the gap regarding how deliberative democracy could be used by 
citizens in demanding a redistribution of power within representative democracies in a way 
that strengthens and increases citizens’ influence over specific policy decisions. The research 
seeks to outline a potential link to how deliberative democracy can assist in opening up spaces 
for citizens to participate. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five describes the methodology that was used in conducting the research on civil-
society participation in SADC policy formulation and processes. The research was conducted 
using the qualitative research method. The design of the research is moulded around a case 
study. Data was collected using individual interviews. The research instrument used was an 
interview schedule with guiding questions. The reasons for the selection of the qualitative 
research method, a case study design and data collection using interviews are explained in 
detail in the pages that follow. 
The research uses both primary and secondary data. The primary data was collected from 
four categories of respondents, namely: senior officials from the SADC Secretariat, senior 
government officials whose duties require interaction with civil SADC institutions and senior 
officials from the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (CNGO). In total, three 
officials were interviewed from the SADC-CNGO, three senior officials from the SADC 
Secretariat, one government official from each of the ministries of foreign affairs of Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, South Africa and Malawi, and 26 respondents from different civil-society 
organisations from various countries that are members of SADC. Interviews were conducted 
from a total of 12 SADC member states, namely: Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, 
the Seychelles, Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Tanzania. 
An average of two civil-society organisations from each of the 12 countries were interviewed. 
The organisations interviewed represent the apex civil-society organisation and at least one 
other civil-society organisation. This was done deliberately to find a holistic picture as 
represented by the apex organisation, which is the link of civil society at country level with the 
SADC-CNGO and the organisations at country level themselves. In total, 34 respondents were 
interviewed, representing a healthy mix of different stakeholders who were able to give a clear 
and holistic picture for the study. All the respondents were high-quality informants with a wide 
and deep understanding of SADC as an interstate organisation, civil society in the region and 
the operations of governments in relation to the issues at hand. The choice to conduct 
research in 12 out of the 15 SADC member states assisted in providing a comprehensive 
picture of the situation at hand, as the sample represents 75% of the organisation’s member 
states. The research took note of the unique language differences of the SADC member 
states, as the sample included Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone countries.  
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The research sourced data from secondary sources to complement the primary research data, 
which was sourced through document analysis. The documents that were analysed included 
records of minutes of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, minutes of the 
SADC Council of Ministers, SADC communiqués, SADC policy documents, civil-society policy 
drafts, SADC protocols, civil-society organisation press releases, SADC press releases, 
SADC yearly reports and the government yearly reports, among others. Most of this data was 
sourced from the SADC library in Gaborone, Botswana, while other documents were sourced 
from the website of the organisation. 
Other secondary material -– on the activities of civil society – was sourced from the SADC-
CNGO offices in Botswana, as well as its website. Other material, particularly on the activities 
of civil society at the country level, was acquired from offices and through interactions with 
different civil-society organisations at the country level. 
The sources of data for the research covered all spaces adequately to ensure the credibility 
and validity of the research. Using such a large pool of stakeholders who play different roles 
in the institutional settings of SADC and civil society, together with complementary documents, 
gives credibility and comprehensiveness to the issue under scrutiny. 
5.2 Reasons for the qualitative approach 
For the purposes of the proposed research, the researcher chose to carry out a descriptive 
qualitative research design in the hope of finding out respondents’ perceptions of and 
experiences in dealing with both media and the government in the areas of accountability, 
governance and democracy. According to Snape and Spencer (2003), qualitative research 
studies a subject in its normal surroundings and tries to interpret it, as well as to give it 
meaning. 
Burns and Grove (2009) argue that qualitative research is a systematic, subjective approach 
to describing life experiences and giving them meaning. Qualitative studies allow researchers 
to explore behaviours, perspectives, feelings and experiences in depth, quality and complexity 
of a situation through a holistic framework. This research sought to undertake an in-depth 
investigation into the participation of civil society in SADC policy formulation. Furthermore, it 
sought to unravel the nature of the bureaucratic relations between SADC as an interstate 
organ and organised civil society, in relation to the processes of policy formulation, as well as 
how inclusive and participative decision-making could be enhanced. The research further 
sought to ascertain whether SADC is true to its commitment in its founding statutes that it 
would be an organisation that would include its citizens in governance. 
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The research thus explores whether spaces are provided by SADC for civil-society players to 
meaningfully participate in decision-making processes. It further attempts to examine whether 
civil society participates in these processes, and whether the participation is meaningful or just 
ceremonial. In the end, it sought to ascertain whether the organisational construction of SADC 
relates to institutional and statutory provisions for stakeholder participation in decision-making 
processes. It enquires into the state of functionality of the said institutions and why they might 
limit the participation of stakeholders in the decision-making processes of SADC, despite a 
firm commitment by the organisation in Article 23 of its founding treaty – which states that 
there should be participation of citizens. 
The research seeks to establish the nature of the relations between SADC as an interstate 
organisation and civil-society organisations, so that there could be inclusive decision-making 
in the policy-making processes of the regional body. The research is about the ways in which 
society has increased interaction between interstate organs and civil society, which could 
assist in inclusive decision-making and promote sustainable development that ensures 
improvements in the livelihoods of the citizenry. 
To achieve its objectives, the research made use of inductive reasoning and analysis, the 
results of which could be best and most easily uncovered through the use of qualitative 
research as compared to quantitative research. The quantitative research methodology mainly 
concerns itself with hardcore scientific facts, while qualitative research probes deeper to 
determine how societal relations influence certain issues. Smith, Bekker and Cheater (2011) 
argue that qualitative methods are ideal for exploring topics where little is known, making 
sense of complex situations, gaining new insights into phenomena, constructing themes to 
explain phenomena and, ultimately, gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomena.  
In the context of civil-society participation in SADC policy, this study sought to dig deeper and 
identify untold issues regarding the policy processes of the regional body, especially with 
regards to the topical issues of stakeholder participation in SADC’s decision-making 
processes. 
5.3 Tenets of qualitative enquiry 
According to Fossey, Harvey, McDermont and Davidson (2002), qualitative research has its 
origins within diverse disciplines including anthropology, sociology and psychology, and in all 
instances, it is concerned with the interpretation of subjective meaning, description of social 
context and the privileging of lay knowledge. The study sought to dig deeper into the subject 
matter, which is one key tenet of qualitative research. In their description of the ability of 
qualitative research to probe an issue, Nuttall, Shankar, Beverland and Hooper (2011) 
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describe it as a deeper, often contextual, emotional understanding of people’s motivations and 
desires, that assumes that people do not always act in accordance within the principles of 
rational self-interest; hence, they do not always know why they behave the way they do. This 
approach makes sense and meaning out of the experiences of SADC citizens and SADC as 
an institution regarding issues of inclusive decision-making. The other key tenet of qualitative 
research that informed this study was its capacity to dig deeper into an understanding of 
human relations and how people interact with their institutions – in this case, how citizens 
interact with SADC as an institution and how the organisation, in turn, allows for inclusivity in 
its decision-making processes. 
Using these key tenets of qualitative research, this research uncovered the policy decision-
making processes of SADC, especially how SADC’s construction as an interstate organisation 
affects its ability to enable sound stakeholder participation in decision-making processes. Over 
and above this, it utilised qualitative enquiry to test how the application of alternative forms of 
democracy based on deliberation could improve the working relations of SADC and allow for 
inclusive policy-making.  
The above is consistent with arguments by Horowitz and Child (2012), who state that 
qualitative methods, when carefully and sensitively applied, can help to understand beliefs 
and behaviours within a community. This argument is enhanced by Williams, South, Yanchar, 
Wilson and Allen (2011), who are of the view that this is an interpretative understanding of the 
designs of society that provides interpretive and negotiated accounts of society’s 
transformation based on participant involvement. This approach helps in the understanding of 
society from what Shanna, Daly and Bodner (2012) call “design lenses”, which is important as 
it assists in interrogating critical variations of how individuals relate to societal institutions. This 
is a key focus of this study that sought to unravel the intricacies of the relations between SADC 
as a regional body and civil society, especially how its accountability could be improved 
through inclusive policy formulation processes. 
The choice of qualitative research was informed by a logic popularised by Frankel and Devers 
(2000), who are of the strong view that, in most cases, inductive and qualitative research 
describes meanings before developing explanations. They are of the view that qualitative 
research designs are often emergent and flexible, and because inductive reasoning is 
emphasised, what researchers learn in earlier stages of the research substantially affects 
subsequent stages of the research process. In this way, a qualitative research process is 
nonlinear and non-sequential; it makes several changes in search of the social reality. 
Neuman (2011) argues that qualitative research uses the language of cases and contexts, 
employs bricolage, and examines social-reality processes and cases in context, as well as 
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interpretations or the creation of meaning in specific settings which look at life from multiple 
points of view and explain how people construct identities. He further argues that instead of 
converting people’s lives into variables or numbers, qualitative researchers borrow ideas from 
the people they study and place them within the context of a natural setting. 
This framework by Neuman (2011) has been important for this study in that it suited the 
research purpose of finding ways of enhancing the participation of civil society in the decision-
making processes of SADC. Furthermore, the framework assisted in determining whether the 
reasons for participation (or the lack of it) is due to different influences of the contextual 
environment in line with what Neuman (2011) calls “multiple reality”, derived from the 
qualitative researcher’s emphasis on the understanding of different social contexts to have a 
wider understanding of the social world. Creswell (2009), in early works, argued that, in 
qualitative research, the intent is to explore a complex set of factors surrounding the central 
phenomenon and to present the varied perspectives or meanings that participants hold. 
This is crucial given that the ways people view the world are different and, as such, even in 
the context of this research, different perspectives can only emerge through the use of a 
flexible methodology such as qualitative research. The approach was also guided by 
Merriam’s (2002) view that the key to understanding qualitative research is to play with the 
idea that socially constructed reality and an individual’s understanding of the world is seriously 
influenced by their interactions with that world and as defined by peculiarities of their 
communities. She further argues that the world or reality is not a fixed, single, agreed-upon or 
measurable phenomenon, but has multiple constructions and interpretations that are in flux 
and change over time. 
It is thus in the qualitative researcher’s interest to have a wider understanding and derive 
meaning from interpretations of these at a specific time and in context, and how it influences 
events in society. This conforms to the framework by Peshkin (1988), who argues that, in 
many instances, qualitative researchers undertake a study because of the lack of a theory or 
because an existing theory has failed to adequately explain phenomena they use inductive 
reasoning where they gather data and build concepts or theories, rather than deductive 
reasoning where they derive postulates or hypotheses to be tested as in positivist research. 
The idea behind this research has been to produce an informed, rich and sustainable 
description of decision-making processes in SADC, insofar as they relate to inclusivity and the 
participation of different stakeholders. In that regard and consistent with the said desire, the 
results of the research are well-described in words and quotes, among other things, so that 
the whole situation is well-understood. This dovetails with Peshkin’s (1988) assertion that the 
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product of qualitative research is richly descriptive words and other images, rather than 
numbers, in describing what researchers have learnt about the phenomenon. 
Research in which quotes and excerpts are necessary tools used to enhance the descriptive 
nature of qualitative research is usually referred to as “thick” description. Davidson, Stayner, 
Lambert, Smith and Sledge (1997) argue that central to good qualitative research is whether 
the research participants’ subjective meanings, actions and social contexts are articulated as 
understood and illuminated by them. This qualitative enquiry also takes note of important 
assertions by Fossey, Harvey, McDermont and Davidson (2002) that participants’ 
perspectives should be authentically represented in the research process and that 
interpretations, derived from information gathered from the different civil-society, government 
and SADC Secretariat respondents, pass the test of authenticity.  
Further to that, and true to the guidance by Fossey, Harvey, McDermont and Davidson (2002), 
the researcher pays attention to qualitative research tenets described as the need for 
congruence between the perspectives (or paradigm) that inform the research questions and 
the research method. Most importantly, the researcher makes sure that the study is not 
methodologically ambiguous by taking into consideration ethical issues, particularly whether 
the subjective meanings, actions and social contexts of those being researched are illuminated 
and respected faithfully. 
This was also partly achieved by making sure that the research is practical in terms of 
technique, unit of analysis and geographical spread. To that end, the research was confined 
to SADC as an institution and the SADC-CNGO, as well as 24 apex national civil-society 
organisations from 12 selected SADC countries and four government representatives from 
four member states.  
5.4 Case study analysis 
This research uses SADC as an institution to interrogate its decision-making processes and 
how it allows for stakeholder participation. SADC is constructed as an international 
organisation and decision-making is limited to the elected representatives of each member 
state. The assumption is that, by being elected, representatives have an unquestionable 
mandate to make decisions on behalf of their citizens, even without consulting them. However, 
the same institution makes commitments in its statutes for enabling stakeholder participation 
in its decision-making processes.  
The real question that arises is the extent of the actual participation of stakeholders in these 
decision-making processes. In this regard and to understand its decision-making processes, 
the research treats the institution as a case study and uses the deliberative democracy 
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framework as a measure of how stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes 
of the organisation could be enhanced. It is important to look at how, as a case study approach, 
it relates to the greater methodology of qualitative research approaches. Badenhorst (2008) 
describes a case study as a collection of detailed information about a case. As a case study, 
the research will look intensively at something and draw conclusions only about that specific 
group in that context – in this case, SADC and the institutions that link with it on the subject 
matter. 
This study is an organisational case study which is informed by bureaucracies, institutions, 
organisational structure and performance change. The above explanation is consistent with 
the intentions and approaches of this research. It may, however, be important to start with a 
historical review of the case study approach – how it relates to the qualitative methodology. 
Qualitative case studies can be traced to sociologist Robert Part at the University of Chicago 
(in the USA) in 1920 who coined the term “scientific or in-depth reporting”, which was about 
describing local events in a way that pointed to major social trends. In a case study approach, 
as described by Badenhorst (2008), researchers are not looking for universal or generalisable 
truths, nor are they looking for cause–effect relations. Instead, the emphasis is on exploration 
and description. 
In the case study, Badenhorst (2008) argues further, there is a clinical examination of the 
interplay of all variables to provide a complete understanding of an event that is usually 
referred to as a thick description of the entity being evaluated, the circumstances of the people 
involved and the nature of the community. According to Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991), the 
case study is the most appropriate methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is 
needed. Yin (1993) identifies case studies as explanatory and descriptive, and Tellis (1997b) 
is of the view that case study research is not sampling research. It is research that maximises 
what could be learnt in the period available. 
Case studies are an important approach because of their ability probe deeper and give a 
thoroughly informed understanding of the case at hand. Case studies are effective informants 
in the formulation and implementation of public policy. This case study explains issues 
explicitly by outlining research practice based on notions of purpose, place, process and 
product. This approach dovetails with Tellis’s (1997b) argument that case studies are a multi-
perspective analysis, meaning that the researcher considers not just the voice and perspective 
of the actors, but also the relevant groups of actors and the interactions between them. He 
argues that they give a voice to the voiceless and powerless. This is exactly the interest of this 
research – to explore how the voice of SADC citizens, through civil society, could be further 
included in the decision-making processes of policy formulation. On the other hand, the 
100 
research also applies Stake’s (1995) proposal that the case study approach should be a more 
intuitive approach, empirically grounded and not based on generalisations. 
The research paid maximum attention to what Yin (1994) calls construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability. Furthermore, this case study approach was conducted 
in line with what Schwandt (1997) calls the inquirer’s contextual attempt to answer the “how” 
and “why” questions. In the light of the relations between SADC and civil society, the case 
study approach will help to contextualise the research and craft it in a manner that allows for 
a design to investigate the rich complexities of social phenomena and the social environment 
in which they are situated. In the end, it produces the thick contextual description of the current 
set-up in SADC as it relates with civil society and how it affects its decision-making processes. 
Further to that, it provides a contextual description of how the situation could be enhanced 
through the application of deliberative democracy and how this new approach could improve 
the accountability of the interstate organisation through enhanced decision-making processes. 
The research dovetails with what Stake (1998) describes as the potential to be a force in 
public-policy settings and to improve the reflection of human experience. The previous 
arguments outline and locate the research within the participation of civil society in SADC 
policy formulation and as an organisational case study seeking to compile a thick description 
of how the interstate organisation could improve its accountability through participative and 
inclusive decision-making. 
5.5 Research instruments 
5.5.1 The interview guide 
Data for this qualitative study was collected using a research questionnaire administered 
through face-to-face interviews and video interviews using Skype. Semi-structured interviews 
were held with interviewees using an interview schedule with guiding questions. Each 
interview schedule anchored on the four key tenets of deliberative democracy, which are 
equality, reciprocity, accountability and publicity. The interview guides are provided at the end 
of this document as annexures one to four. Additional data was collected through document 
analysis. 
The process of developing the interview schedule took some time and included quality testing 
by the academics at the Wits School of Governance (Johannesburg, South Africa) during the 
panel defence of short and long proposals. Once the interview schedule was sharpened and 
ready for use in the field, it was subjected to a pilot test. The process of pilot testing was 
important, as it assisted the researcher to get a feel for the nature of questions, their ability to 
elicit the required information from respondents and the ways in which respondents might 
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react to them. This process allowed for the questions to be modified, if need be, before the 
actual fieldwork was conducted. There is substantial literature in this regard, with Hunt, Chan 
and Mehta (2011) arguing that, before beginning the first interviews, the researcher should 
prepare for the exchanges by developing an interview guide.  
Three organisations in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe were used to pilot test the interview schedule, 
and this assisted the researcher to modify and eliminate some of the questions so as to enable 
the conducting of smooth fieldwork. For instance, the number of questions that were asked 
were reduced in all categories, as it became clear that some of them were repetitive and that 
this made the interview process too long, thus affecting the concentration of respondents. The 
modification of the research instrument dovetails with arguments by Munhall (2007), who 
states that evaluating the experience of a practice interview and receiving feedback from the 
interviewee can improve the quality of the questions and support the art of listening. 
The interview guide comprised different questions for various groups constructed around 
specific thematic areas. The questions for civil society at the country level were aimed at 
guiding the strength of civil-society organisations and how that affected their ability to engage. 
They were constructed to assess the organisational strengths of these organisations, to find 
out whether their ability (or inability) to participate effectively in the policy-making processes 
of SADC also had something to do with their internal strengths or weaknesses. 
The questions for government officials that deal with SADC-related matters were aimed at 
their understandings of roles and responsibilities as provided by statutes with regards to the 
promotion of participation of different stakeholders. The questions were also intended to find 
out about the government framework for engaging with civil society on matters related to the 
regional organisation, particularly the facilitation of interactions as provided for by the SADC 
Treaty. They were also aimed at measuring the state of functionality of the SNCs as the official 
institutions for engagement between government and civil society. The questions also looked 
at the state–civil society relations and how they affected inclusive decision-making at SADC. 
The questions for the SADC Secretariat were aimed at finding out the legal framework for the 
participation of civil society in decision-making. They were also aimed at finding out the 
organisational construction of SADC and how it influences decision-making at different levels. 
The questions were also intended to find out the Secretariat’s vision and the development 
framework for the participation of the citizens in decision-making, particularly focusing on the 
SNCs. 
The questions for the SADC-CNGO Secretary were designed to find out about the 
engagement mechanisms and strategies of the organisation, and how they facilitate 
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participative decision-making at the national and regional levels. They focused on issues that 
are peculiar to civil-society organisations in the promotion of inclusive decision-making at 
SADC. They also focused on the decision-making processes in the organisation and how they 
affect their ability to engage. 
All the respondents were high-quality informants with understanding of SADC as an interstate 
organisation, civil society in the region and the operations of governments in relation to the 
issues at hand. The choice of conducting research in 12 out of the 15 SADC member states 
assisted in giving a comprehensive picture of the situation at hand, as it represented 75% of 
the member states. The research also took note of the language differences of the SADC 
member states, and covered the Francophone, Anglophone and the Lusophone countries, 
and how they affected various member states’ interactions with SADC. 
5.6 Data collection techniques 
5.6.1 The interviewing process 
Primary data was mainly collected using interviews. During the interview process, careful 
attention was paid to how the interviews were handled. The approach to the interviews was 
modelled around the framework by Vivar (2007), who defines interviews as verbal interactions 
between researcher and participants to acquire valid and reliable information appropriate to 
the research questions. In that regard, questions may be structured, unstructured or semi-
structured. 
During the interview process, the researcher paid special attention to the types of questions 
to ask in different contextual environments, because understanding the context is important 
for getting the best results. The researcher paid attention to where the interview was 
conducted, since the responses of an interviewee can be influenced by the immediate 
environment. This approach builds on that of Neuman (2011), who recognises this important 
aspect of interviewing in his argument that the space and context of an interview are very 
important. For instance, a conversation in a private office may not attract the same responses 
if conducted in a public place. 
Furthermore, interviews were conducted in an environment in which the interviewee was 
comfortable. That arrangement feeds into assertions by DiCicco‐Bloom and Crabtree (2006), 
who view an in-depth interview as a personal encounter in which open and direct verbal 
questions are used to elicit detailed narratives and stories. One other important issue that was 
given special attention by the researcher was due diligence and care in the interview process. 
As Given (2008) observes, the interviewer’s skill is arguably the most important component of 
the interview process and can make the difference between high-quality and mediocre data. 
103 
She further argues that, in addition to standard interviewing skills, the interviewer must be able 
to keep participants focused on the specific moments of the event. According to Britten (1995), 
it is important to consider prompts and cues that are normally part of the interpersonal 
discourse, but which are often unnoticed. The duration of the research is also very important. 
The researcher kept interviews to a reasonable length and level to avoid fatigue and burnout 
in respondents. This approach is also recommended by Britten (1995), who argues that the 
duration of the interview should be sufficiently long to allow for silences and to avoid the need 
to hurry participants’ responses. Pauses and silence can be part of the interview. It is thus 
important that, in the interview process, the researcher exercises restraint and avoids rushing 
to fill them, because silence allows participants to collect their thoughts and to reflect on 
questions and experiences. Munhall (2007) suggests that researchers should attend to long 
pauses and reflect upon whether they might signal a struggle to find words. Equally important 
is the need to have a clear message and avoid the use of complicated jargon during interviews. 
The interviewer should verify the meanings of terms used and not assume that participants 
fully understand the questions asked. 
During the interviewing process, the researcher ensured that responses were recorded 
properly. This was done through use of efficient recorders and taking of field notes. Proper 
recording in the field is important, as Rubin and Rubin (2005) argue, since maintaining high-
quality tape recordings can prevent difficulties later in the research process. Excessive 
background noise, weak batteries, the placement of the recorder and other issues are all 
factors influencing the quality of recorded interviews. Because of advancements in technology, 
some digital recorders are efficient but could also be complicated; for that reason, the 
researcher undertook adequate practice on how to use them prior to the research. To avoid 
power failure, the researcher carried backup energy batteries into the field.  
The researcher also took field notes which were written up after every interview, so that the 
interview environment was well-recorded for reference during the analysis process. This is 
consistent with Bernard’s (2002) argument that researchers ought to write methodological field 
notes to chart their growth as an instrument for data collection, in addition to descriptive and 
analytical field notes. Charmaz (2006) advances a similar argument that writing field notes 
after each interview provides an opportunity to reflect on and chronicle the interviewing 
process. Fossey, Harvey, McDermont and Davidson (2002) use a similar line of reasoning 
that field notes describe not only the researchers’ experiences and observations, but also his 
reflections and interpretations. 
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5.7 Document analysis 
The research acquired data from secondary sources to complement the primary research 
data. Secondary data was acquired from document analysis. The documents analysed 
included a record of minutes of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, minutes 
of the SADC Council of Ministers, SADC communiqués, SADC policy documents, civil society 
policy drafts, the SADC protocols, civil-society organisation press releases, SADC press 
releases, SADC yearly reports and the government yearly reports, among other papers. Most 
of these documents were sourced from the SADC library in Gaborone, Botswana, while other 
documents were from the website of the organisation. Other secondary material was acquired 
from the SADC-CNGO offices in Botswana, as well as its website. Other material, particularly 
on the activities of civil society at the country level, was acquired from offices and interactions 
with different civil-society organisations at the country level. 
Document analysis, according to Creswell (2009), consists of public documents such as the 
minutes of meetings and newspapers, as well as private documents such as journals and 
diaries. He argues that document analysis enables a researcher to obtain the language and 
words of participants which can be accessed at a time convenient to the researcher and, thus, 
are an unobstructed source of information. Documents contain data which are thoughtful in 
that participants have given attention to compiling them. Most importantly, as written evidence, 
these documents save a researcher the time and expense of transcribing. 
In the data analysis process, the researcher paid close attention to some obstructive issues 
related to data analysis. These obstructions are what Creswell (2009) outlines as the danger 
of individuals who lack a sound understanding of their institutions and thus use records out of 
perspective. Documents present the researcher with difficulties to walk in a thick fortress in 
search of information, even in some areas that may be taken as “top secret” and therefore not 
for sharing with the public. Furthermore, there could be problems associated with privileged 
and protected information which may be subject to privacy laws in a specific country, yet is 
very important for the research. There are additional challenges relating to the authenticity of 
some source documents. 
Having taken into consideration the above positive and obstructive issues of document 
analysis, this research on the participation of civil society in SADC policy formulation 
processes made use of the following documents: records of minutes of the SADC Summit of 
Heads of State and Government, minutes of the SADC Council of Ministers, SADC 
communiqués, policy documents, civil society policy position papers, SADC protocols and 
civil-society organisation press releases, as well SADC press releases and yearly reports, and 
government yearly reports, among other resources. Most of these documents were readily 
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available on the SADC website, the SADC-CNGO website and the SADC library at its 
headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. 
5.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis is a crucial stage in the research process. In the context of the participation of 
civil society in SADC policy formulation, the data from the field was carefully analysed to 
ensure that it adequately answered the research questions. Data was analysed against the 
four tenets of deliberative democracy, namely: equality, reciprocity, accountability and 
publicity. Special attention was taken into consideration in line with what Fossey, Harvey, 
McDermont and Davidson (2002) describe as the need to ensure that the information gathered 
is recorded in a manner that enables the researcher to analyse the data, while concurrently 
allowing him to describe subjective meaning and social context from the data. In the analysis 
process, the researcher ensured that described qualitative data was well-reviewed, 
synthesised and interpreted to describe and explain the nature of relations between SADC as 
an interstate organisation and civil society, and how they could be improved to ensure 
participative and inclusive decision-making. 
The sources for the primary data were semi-structured interviews conducted using an 
interview schedule with four categories of respondents. Respondents were some members of 
the senior management in the SADC Secretariat, some members of the senior management 
in the SADC-CNGO, some members of selected civil-society organisations at the country level 
and some senior government officials from selected member states whose responsibilities 
included dealing with issues relating to SADC. Secondary data was acquired through an 
analysis of the records of the meetings of the Council of Ministers, SADC policy documents, 
SADC protocols, SADC communiqués and all other related SADC publications.  
In the process of data analysis, the researcher made use of the four tenets of the deliberative 
democracy conceptual framework as a guide. In that regard, all data from the primary sources 
and secondary sources was organised according to the categories of deliberation 
accountability, deliberation reciprocity, and deliberation publicity or deliberation equality.  
The analysis frame borrows significantly from Green (2007), as it uses his prescription by 
starting with counterchecking the interview transcripts and contextual data. After that, the 
researcher organised data from whole transcripts, which were then delineated according to 
themes guided by the tenets of deliberative democracy. Thereafter, the researcher made 
representations of how each aspect links up and how they feed to the greater picture of 
inclusive decision-making in SADC using the deliberative democracy conceptual framework 
as an evaluation tool. The use of the four deliberative democracy tenets, explained above, 
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assisted in evaluating the current configuration of SADC’s decision-making processes and in 
indicating how the deliberative democracy approach could enhance decision-making in the 
institution’s policy-making processes. 
5.8.1 Analytical framework 
The analytical framework for the data that was sourced from the primary and secondary 
research uses the four tenets of deliberative democracy – reciprocity, equality, publicity and 
accountability – to evaluate the state of inclusiveness of the decision-making process in SADC 
and the opportunities that exist for enhanced inclusivity in decision-making. 
The analytical framework is based on the following thematic frameworks: 
I. Detailed description of SADC and its decision-making institutions. 
II. Identification and discussion of the legislative framework that enables participation. 
III. Application of the tenets of deliberative decision-making, and description of the actual 
processes in SADC in relation to civil-society participation. 
The first step in the data analysis process was the synthetisation of the data gathered 
according to the themes of the conceptual framework, which is based on the four tenets of 
deliberative democracy of equality, reciprocity, accountability and publicity. Tesch (1990) 
argues that the differing analytical procedures can be grouped into content, discovery and 
meaning. The analytical process of this study focused on two levels. The first level was about 
reviewing and identifying recurrent themes within the data, as well as common themes of 
meaning across the data. The second level was about the data bringing back together into 
meaningful relation with one other, developing, as it were, a narrative structural synthesis of 
the core elements of the experiences described. This was aimed at establishing patterns and 
connections among elements of data. These were then coded, sorted and organised to identify 
patterns or connections between them. 
In the process of data analysis, the researcher continuously compared the data to the 
collection method and evaluated it against the four tenets of the deliberative democracy 
conceptual framework: reciprocity, equality, accountability and publicity. This is in line with 
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) argument that thematic analysis typically involves a constant 
comparative method – meaning a progressive process of grouping text segments, to create 
and then clarify the definition of categories or themes within the data. Tesch (1990:27) 
describes this process as: “the thematic analytical procedures refocuses on developing 
categories, derived inductively from data itself, rather than from prior theory to enable 
systematic description’’. During the analysis process, the researcher ensured that data was 
understood and located in the contextual environment from which it was gathered. The context 
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related to each country and its peculiar circumstances. This helped to attach appropriate 
background information to the data. 
In the process of data analysis, the researcher paid special attention to the advice of Rice and 
Ezzy (1998), who argue that whatever analytical approach is used by the researcher, an 
effective system for readily retrieving data is essential, since qualitative analysis involves 
progressively exploring the data, and comparing and contrasting different parts of the data to 
evolve a more sophisticated understanding as more data is gathered and retrieved iteratively. 
Rice and Ezzy (1998) suggest that coding, which they view as labelling segments, is central 
to effective data retrieval in two ways. First, it allows the researcher to clearly locate and bring 
together similarly labelled data for examination and, second, to identify more than one label 
when wanting to consider patterns, connections or distinctions between them. Whatever the 
case, qualitative data analysis involves much more than just simply coding data, and 
developing and understanding qualitative data. 
There are, however, some authors – for instance, Duggleby (2005:34) – who argue that 
qualitative data analysis should occur concurrently with data collection, so that investigators 
can generate an emerging understanding about research questions, which in turn informs both 
the sampling and questions being asked. This iterative process of data collection and analysis 
eventually leads to a point in the data collection where no new categories emerge; this is called 
saturation. In the process of data analysis, the researcher integrated the interaction dynamics 
of different groups that were sources of data. Most importantly, as Denzin (1994) argues, good 
qualitative research is characterised by congruence between the perspective (or paradigm) 
that informs the research questions and the research used. 
5.9 Ethical issues 
Due consideration was taken regarding ethical issues. This research was conducted without 
exploiting the interviewees. According to Anderson (1999), during the research process, the 
interviewee should not be exploited for personal gain; as such, it is important to build a way of 
acknowledging the contributions that the respondents make into the research method. 
According to Klockars (1977), the measure of the ethical quality of any interview study is 
whether the researcher harms the participants. 
In this research, all possible measures were put in place to ensure that the respondents were 
well-protected during and after the interview process. This is consistent with the argument by 
Reiman (1979) that the outcome of the research process should enhance the freedom of 
participants more than it enhances the researcher’s career. In line with this assertion, Seale 
(1999) argues that the research process take into consideration four ethical issues, namely: 
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a) Reduction of the risk and unanticipated harm of the respondents during and after the 
research process. 
b) Protection of the interviewee’s information, which means it should be secure from any 
possible leakages. 
c) The need to effectively inform the interviewees about the nature and purpose of the 
study, so that their responses are well-informed by the reality and dynamics affecting 
that study. 
d) Reduction of the risk of exploitation of the interviewee. 
In this research, all the above ethical issues were taken into consideration by making sure 
that, among other things, the interviewee was protected and that the respondents were not 
exploited. This ensured that the outcome of the research does not reflect crooked means and 
unethical ways of data collection. 
To ensure that consent was granted without reservation by respondents, the researcher 
requested that respondents sign an interview consent form, after explaining the nature of the 
research and how the data would be used after the interview. There were respondents who 
requested to remain anonymous for professional reasons and the researcher did not list their 
names or positions in the organisations for their protection. 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the research methodology for this study. It outlined qualitative research 
as the preferred method that was used, comprising an interview guide and document analysis. 
It outlined the interview data collection techniques and how the interviews were conducted. It 
further outlined how this research fits within the confines of a case study.  
Most importantly, it defined the number of people who were interviewed, how they were 
selected, and how they would contribute solid data about how participative and inclusive 
decision-making in the policy formulation processes of SADC could be enhanced. It further 
outlined the data analysis process and how it was synthesised to give meaning, particularly 
as evaluated against the deliberative democracy tenets of reciprocity, equality, publicity and 
accountability.  
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Chapter 6: Presentation of the research findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at how the data that was sourced from the research process is organised. 
Data for this research was sourced from four different sources incorporating both primary and 
secondary data. The sources for primary data were semi-structured interviews conducted 
using interview schedules from four categories of respondents. These respondents included 
senior management officials in the SADC secretariat, members of the senior management in 
the SADC-CNGO, senior members of the management of selected civil-society organisations 
at the country level and senior government officials from selected member states whose 
responsibilities included dealing with issues to do with SADC.  
Secondary data was sourced through an analysis of the records of the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers, SADC policy documents, SADC protocols, SADC communiqués and all other 
related SADC publications. In the process of data analysis, the researcher made use of the 
four tenets of the deliberative democracy conceptual framework as the guide; data was 
organised according to whether it fitted within the category of accountability, reciprocity, 
publicity or equality. 
These four tenets were used to analyse the data from all the primary sources and the 
secondary sources mentioned above. The analysis frame borrows significantly from Green 
(2007), as it uses his prescription by starting with counterchecking the interview transcripts 
and contextual data. After that, data was organised from the transcripts and then delineated 
according to the themes guided by the four tenets of deliberative democracy.  
Thereafter, the researcher made representations showing how the categories of data link up 
and how they feed into the larger picture of inclusive decision-making in SADC, using the 
deliberative democracy conceptual framework as an evaluation tool. The use of the four 
deliberative democracy tenets explained above assists in evaluating the current configurations 
of SADC’s decision-making processes and, thus, in indicating how the deliberative democracy 
approach can enhance inclusive decision-making in the institution’s policy-making processes. 
6.1.2 Data presentation framework 
The framework for the presentation of data sourced from secondary and primary research 
used the four tenets of deliberative democracy of reciprocity, equality, publicity and 
accountability to evaluate the state of inclusiveness of the decision-making process in SADC 
and the opportunities that exist for enhanced inclusivity in decision- making. 
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The data presentation framework is based on the following thematic frameworks: 
I. Description of SADC and its decision-making institutions in detail. 
II. Identification and discussion of the legislative framework which enables 
participation. 
III. Application of the tenets of deliberative decision-making, and description of the 
actual processes in SADC in relation to civil-society participation. 
6.2 SADC organisational framework and decision-making institutions 
The way an institution is arranged is important in determining the policy formulation and 
decision-making processes. This is because there is a correlation between the policy 
formulation and the political environment, which is usually a result of the power dynamics of 
the day. According to Ditlhake (2012:1):  
Article 23 of the SADC Treaty recognises civil society as a key stakeholder in the 
process of regional integration. Although the treaty provides for civil society 
participation in SADC processes, reality on the ground however remains a 
contradictory experience. Until around 2011, SADC was almost completely closed to 
mainstream civil society, with the exception of specialised associations such as private 
sector and workers. The entire gamut of civil society engaged in human rights, 
economic justice, environmental protection, women, children, youth etc did not 
consistently and effectively engage with SADC. 
Ditlhake (2012) further argues that the way that SADC is constructed made it structurally 
closed to civil society and that there were no measures in place to operationalise Article 23. 
Article 23 remains a political pronouncement, which is not applied through a comprehensive 
policy framework. At SADC, the Summit of Heads of State and Government provides policy 
oversight. The Summit adopts major regional policy frameworks such as declarations which 
may be developed as part of operationalising policy proposals. The SADC Council of Ministers 
approves major policy, strategic and budgetary issues relating to or emanating from efforts to 
operationalise policy implementation. The Council makes recommendations to the Summit on 
major policy issues that require the attention of the Summit. Below is the architectural and 
organisational construction of the organisation including the role and responsibilities of each 
of the major organs. 
6.2.1 The Summit of Heads of State and Government 
The Summit is the SADC’s supreme policy-making institution. It is made up of heads of states 
and government of all member states and is chaired by the SADC chairperson with a deputy. 
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It gives overall policy direction and has overarching control of the organisation. It is the 
supreme policy-making institution of SADC. 
According to Oosthuizen (2006:188):  
From its own ranks the Summit elects the SADC chairperson and deputy chairperson. 
Upon the recommendation of the COM, it appoints the Secretariat’s executive 
secretary and deputy executive secretary, and judges of the tribunal. It decides on the 
admission of member states and the procedures for doing so. It also determines the 
membership contribution formula. 
Some of the Summit’s major powers include the reviewing the RISDP and amending the 
SADC Treaty. It works through discussion of matters tabled by the chairperson at the request 
of the chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (the Organ). Furthermore, it 
may also, when recommended by the chairperson of the organ, decide on enforcement action 
if peaceful attempts at resolving a conflict have failed. The Summit must meet at least twice a 
year, but may convene extraordinary meetings should the need arise. According to Oosthuizen 
(2006), when it comes to decision-making in the Summit, the exceptions to consensus rule 
apply. This means that all decisions made by the Summit are binding on all member states 
regardless of whether they agreed. Decisions are generally made by consensus, although 
though there are some that require a vote.  
Those decisions requiring a vote include an amendment of the SADC Treaty or dissolution of 
its institutions; these votes require a three-quarters majority of the Summit’s members. A 
unanimous decision is required for the admission of a new member state, as well as decisions 
to impose sanctions or enforce action failing peaceful efforts to resolve conflicts. With regards 
to decisions on enforcement of action, Oosthuizen (2006:191) states that “when peaceful 
attempts to resolve a conflict fail, the Chairperson of the Organ may recommend to the Summit 
that enforcement action be taken against one or more of the disputant parties”.  
Ditlhake (2012:1) argues that civil society views the Summit as merely an approval structure 
of decisions that have been discussed and agreed at the senior official level and the Council 
of Ministers. In its current form, there are no mechanisms through which civil society can 
provide direct input to the Summit. Ditlhake (2012) concludes that civil society should, 
therefore, engage SADC National Committees contact points or lobby through political parties. 
Civil society could also lobby high-profile persons with access to government officials or 
engage key institutions which may have influence on Summit agendas such as the UN, AU 
and the Organ. 
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6.2.2 Council of Ministers 
The Council of Ministers (COM) consists of ministers from each member state. In line with the 
SADC Treaty, these are usually ministers who are responsible for foreign affairs or economic 
and financial affairs. The Council is responsible to the Summit and advises it on policy matters. 
It is tasked with ensuring that the organisation functions efficiently. It compiles SADC’s 
common agenda and strategic priorities and programmes, including the RISDP. It also decides 
on new areas of cooperation and recommends approvals of protocols and other treaties to the 
Summit. It also supervises the Executive Secretary and other bodies subordinate to it. 
The COM is answerable to the Summit and works as an advisory body to the latter on policy-
related matters. Oosthuizen (2006) indicates that the COM develops the SADC Common 
Agenda and strategic priorities, and approves as well as oversees the implementation of 
SADC policies, strategies and programmes, including the RISDP. It decides upon additional 
areas of cooperation, recommends the approval of protocols (and other treaties) to the 
Summit, gives preliminary consideration of proposals for amending the SADC Treaty and may 
approve cooperation agreements between SADC and states. 
Further to that, the COM has powers to recommend the establishment of new SADC 
institutions and bodies, or the reconfiguration of existing ones, to the Summit. Over and above 
these powers, it may create its own operation committees whenever necessary and may make 
recommendations on new applications for membership to the Summit. In the event that the 
need arises for the organisation to be dissolved, the COM has the powers to make preliminary 
recommendations on how this should be done.  
The COM has overall oversight on the functioning of the Secretariat, as well as recruitment of 
staff. For instance, it is the body that recommends the appointment of the Executive Secretary 
and Deputy to the Summit. It is also responsible for the appointment of auditors, calls for the 
nomination of judges to the Tribunal, recommends judges to Summit and then designates 
which five of them are appointed as regular judges. With regards to staffing and general 
administration issues, Oosthuizen (2006:192) states that: 
Generally the COM is responsible for determining the number and specifications of 
SADC posts and the conditions of service of SADC staff members. As regards the 
tribunal it determines the conditions of service, salaries, and benefits of the judges, 
registrar and other staff. 
Further to that, the COM has powers to waive the immunity and privileges of the Executive 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary, and approves administrative regulations, standing orders 
and rules for managing the organisation’s affairs. 
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The COM is empowered to decide what funding, other than that from member states, could 
be harnessed for the organisation. It also decides on the financial year, approves the estimates 
of revenue and expenditure, and must approve the audited annual statement of accounts for 
the Secretariat and financial regulations submitted by the Executive Secretary. This is over 
and above its responsibility of determining the management of the SADC Regional 
Development Fund. Decision-making in the COM is by consensus. 
6.2.3 The Troika 
In a meeting held in August 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique, the Summit decided to formalise 
the practice of a troika (“triumvirate” – “sum-total”) system. The Troika consists of the Chair, 
the incoming Chair and the outgoing Chair of SADC. According to Article 9(a) of the SADC 
Treaty, “the Troika will apply with regards to the following institutions: Summit, Organ, Council, 
and Integrated Committee of Ministers”. The respective offices of the Troika are held for a 
period of one year.  
The membership and the term of office of the Troika of the COM and the Integrated Committee 
of Officials is the same as that of the Troika of the Summit. The Troika of the Summit functions 
as a steering committee of the institution and, in between meetings, it is responsible for 
decision-making, facilitating the implementation of agreements and providing policy direction. 
The Troika of each of the institutions is empowered to create committees on an ad hoc basis 
to determine its operational frameworks as well as rules and procedures.  
The Troika is empowered to co-opt members whenever a need arises. The Troika system has 
made it easy for the institution to execute some tasks and to expeditiously implement 
decisions, thus assisting in the provision of policy direction for SADC in between meetings. 
6.2.4 The Organ on Politics Defence and Security  
The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security is managed on a Troika basis and is 
responsible for promoting peace and security cooperation in the SADC region. It is mandated 
to steer and provide member states with direction regarding matters that threaten peace, 
security and stability in the region. It is coordinated at the level of the Summit; consists of a 
Chairperson, incoming Chairperson and outgoing Chairperson, and reports to the SADC 
Summit Chairperson. The SADC Summit and the Organ Troika Summit are mutually 
exclusive; the Chairperson of the Organ does not simultaneously hold the Chair of the Summit.  
The structure, operations and functions of the Organ are regulated by the agreements on 
cooperation. The organ has the following structures: the Chairperson of the Organ, the Troika, 
the Ministerial Committee, the Interstate Political and Diplomacy Committee, the Interstate 
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Defence and Security Committee and any other substructures that may be established by any 
ministerial committee. The Organ has developed fairly good mechanisms for security 
cooperation, conflict prevention, management and resolution. Some of these institutions 
include the SADC Electoral Advisory Council, the SADC Mediation Support Unit, the SADC 
Standby Force, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Regional Early 
Warning Unit. Like the Summit Chair, the Organ Chair rotates on an annual basis. 
6.2.5 The Integrated Committee of Ministers 
The Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) replaced the Sectoral Committee of Ministers 
and, although it was formally established in 2001, it started to function in 2003. Its main 
function is to provide policy guidance to the Secretariat, as well as to oversee the work of four 
socio-economic directorates of the Secretariat including the implementation of the RISDP. 
All the ICM ministers (at least two from each member state) meet in plenary at the integrated 
committee level. It also operates at the cluster level, where ICM ministers meet separately in 
four groups corresponding to the directorates of trade, industry, finance and investment; 
infrastructure and services; food and natural resources, and social and human development 
and special programmes. The ICM may make policy recommendations for changes by the 
COM. Its decisions are implemented by the Secretariat. Policy changes to the COM are 
implemented by the Secretariat. According to Oosthuizen (2006:194): 
The ICM may create the necessary permanent or ad hoc sub committees to attend to 
cross-cutting issues such as gender, and HIV and AIDS, relevant to more than one 
directorate and other issues. In effect, the cluster-level meetings seem to be 
subcommittees of the plenary of the ICM. It also seems as if the later reports to it on 
the implementation of the RISDP. 
The ICM may make decisions regarding the implementation of policies between the COM. 
6.2.6 The Standing Committee of Senior Officials 
This is a technical advisory committee to the COM which meets twice a year. It consists of 
one Permanent/Principal Secretary, or an official of equivalent rank from each member state, 
preferably from a ministry responsible for economic planning or finance. The Chairperson and 
Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee are appointed from the member states holding 
the Chairpersonship and Vice-Chairpersonship of the COM. The policy documents, strategy 
papers and preliminary negotiations and agreements are constructed at the senior official 
level. The agreed policy positions are then tabled at the COM. In many cases, there are also 
thematic meetings of senior officials to discuss specific policies and strategies in detail. It 
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meets at least four times a year and the general position with regards to the troika system, 
quorum and decision-making applies. It is responsible and reports to the COM. 
6.2.7 The SADC Tribunal 
The Tribunal works as an arbitration body and provides advisory services to the Summit. In 
terms of the SADC Treaty, the Tribunal is meant to ensure the treaty and subsidiary 
instruments are adhered to and are properly interpreted, and to adjudicate upon disputes that 
referred to it. The Summit is mandated to take appropriate action, which could include 
sanctions, when the Tribunal reports that member states have acted contrary to the tribunal 
decisions.  
The Tribunal was disbanded at the 2010 SADC Summit after several judgment rulings against 
the Zimbabwean government. On 17 August 2012 in Maputo, Mozambique, the SADC Summit 
addressed the issue of the suspended SADC Tribunal. The Summit resolved that a new 
Tribunal should be negotiated and that its mandate should be confined to interpreting the 
SADC Treaty and to protocols relating to disputes between states. The newly constituted 
tribunal was approved by the Summit held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe on 17 and 18 August 
2014. 
6.2.8 The SADC Secretariat 
The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of SADC, and is responsible for the 
strategic planning, coordination and management of SADC programmes. It is also responsible 
for implementing SADC’s policies as well as the decisions of institutions such as the Summit, 
the Troikas and the COM. Its headquarters are in Gaborone, Botswana. 
The Secretariat is guided by Institutional Vision and Mission and according to Oosthuisen 
(2006:195):  
The Secretariat is responsible for the co-ordination, harmonising and reviewing the 
strategies, policies and projects of the organisation and its members, and for the 
strategic planning and management of SADC programmes and projects. It also assists 
with and monitors the implementation of SADC treaties, plans and projects, and 
ensures that the gender matters and other cross cutting issues such as poverty 
eradication and combating HIV and AIDS are integrated with SADC policies and plans. 
The secretariat oversees preparation through its directorates of the detailed updates and 
implementation matrix of the RIDSP. Further to that, it makes recommendations to the COM 
on the selection of implementing partners for some projects and supervises them. 
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The Secretariat has a key role of organising SADC meetings, including the crucial role of 
setting the agenda and records of meetings of various bodies including the ICM and the COM. 
It is responsible for preparation of administrative regulations, as well as standing orders and 
management rules for the approval by the COM. This is over and above its responsibilities of 
implementation of decisions of the Summit, the Organ, the COM and the ICM, and their troikas. 
The SADC Secretariat is structured as follows: 
Executive Secretary 
The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary assisted by two deputies, who are 
appointed at the Summit by recommendation of the COM. Some of the key responsibilities of 
the Executive Secretary include consulting governments and other relevant institutions of 
member states, and coordinating SADC activities. He/she is also supposed to liaise closely 
with other SADC institutions, and guide, support and monitor their performance and adherence 
to SADC’s polices and plans. The Executive Secretary is tasked with all public and media 
relations, public affairs, protocol and special events management for the SADC Secretariat, 
and is the custodian of communications, branding and promotional strategies within SADC. 
The Executive Secretary also directly manages: 
• Directorate: Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation – an instrument for 
ensuring the political and socio-economic security and safety of the southern African 
region. 
• Gender Unit – tasked with mainstreaming gender perspectives and concerns in all 
SADC policies, plans and programmes. 
• Internal Audit Unit – an internal, independent and objective oversight unit tasked with 
evaluating and improving the effectiveness of SADC's risk management, control, and 
governance processes. 
• Macro-economic Convergence Surveillance Unit – coordinates macro-economic 
surveillance processes and providing policy guidance to member states. 
• Public Relations Unit – maintains lines of communication, mutual understanding, 
acceptance and cooperation between SADC and its internal and external 
stakeholders. 
Deputy Executive Secretary: Finance and Administration 
The Deputy Executive Secretary: Finance and Administration is responsible for administrative 
elements of the SADC Secretariat. He/she is responsible for two directorates and two units: 
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• Directorate: Budget and Finance – provides financial administration and risk 
management services to the operations of the SADC Secretariat. 
• Directorate: Human Resources and Administration – supports the operations of the 
SADC Secretariat through the management of human resources, procurement of 
goods and services, and management of physical assets. 
• Conference Services Unit – provides support to SADC policy meetings and any other 
meetings in terms of documentation, translation, interpretation services, conference 
facilities and scheduling. 
• Procurement Unit – responsible for all aspects of procurement within the SADC 
Secretariat, through the administration of tender opportunities and ensuring adherence 
to the SADC procurement policy. 
• Legal Unit – guides SADC in the application and interpretation of SADC legal regimes 
including the SADC Treaty, SADC protocols and legal instruments, and the application 
and interpretation of international law. 
• Information and Communication Technologies Unit – guides the adoption of ICT within 
SADC and supports the implementation of the technological aspects of the RISDP. 
Deputy Executive Secretary: Regional Integration 
The Deputy Executive Secretary: Regional Integration is responsible for five directorates: 
• Directorate: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment – facilitates and coordinates the 
gradual reduction of trade restrictions and improved relations in the areas of trade and 
finance by establishing a free-trade area and a single customs and monetary union for 
the region. 
• Directorate: Infrastructure and Services – improves the quality of infrastructure in the 
region, through infrastructure rehabilitation and modernisation, improving access to 
basic infrastructure, and increasing trade and maximising regional competitiveness; 
• Directorate: Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources – ensures food availability, 
access, safety and nutritional value; disaster preparedness for food security; equitable 
and sustainable use of the environment and natural resources, and strengthening 
institutional framework and capacity building. 
• Directorate: Social and Human Develop and Special Programmes – supports the 
development of SADC’s human capital to its fullest potential as an essential step 
towards tackling the socio-economic challenges facing the region. 
• Directorate: Policy, Planning and Resource Mobilisation – coordinates all the planning, 
policy development, and monitoring and evaluation functions of the SADC Secretariat 
including the Corporate Business Plan and the RISDP. 
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6.2.9 The SADC National Committees 
SADC established the SADC National Committees (SNCs) in terms of the Amended Treaty of 
2001 as organs to facilitate the interface between the SADC Secretary and stakeholders at 
the member state level. The SNCs were established to provide inputs at national level in the 
formulation of regional policies and strategies, as well as to coordinate and oversee the 
implementation of programmes at the national level. The SNCs are also responsible for the 
initiation of SADC projects and issue papers as part of the preparation of the regional 
strategies. 
The SADC Treaty stipulates that each member state must create an SNC of key stakeholders 
including the government, the private sectors, civil society, NGOs, and workers’ and 
employers’ organisations. The composition is supposed to reflect key areas of integration and 
coordination, corresponding to clusters of sectors reflected by the four Secretariat 
directorates.  
The national steering committees are supposed to have a chairperson of the SNC and the 
chairperson of the subcommittees. The SNC should have subcommittees and technical 
committees which must operate at ministerial and official level and, in the execution of their 
duties, they should involve stakeholders. Each member state should create a secretariat to 
facilitate smooth operations of its SNC and must fund this secretariat. Each SNC national 
secretariat is supposed to submit reports of its activities and operations to the SADC 
Secretariat. 
6.3 The legislative framework for participative decision-making 
SADC has a legislative framework to facilitate participative decision-making. This section sets 
out the legal provisions from the SADC Treaty on how inclusive decision-making could be 
enhanced. 
In its founding documents, SADC makes a firm commitment to enable citizens to participate 
in decision-making. This is well-detailed in Article 23(1) of the founding treaty, which boldly 
claims: 
In pursuance to the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully the 
peoples of the region and non-governmental organisations in regional integration. 
The SADC Treaty Amendment of 2001, Article 1(5.2)(b), also stipulates that the organisation 
will: 
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Encourage the people of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop 
economic, social and cultural ties across the region and to participate fully in the 
implementation of the programmes and projects of the SADC. 
This commitment is further developed in Article 23(2) with another bold declaration that: 
SADC shall cooperate with and support the initiatives of the peoples of the region and 
non-governmental organisations contributing to the objectives of this treaty in the 
areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, 
associations and peoples of the region. 
Further to this, the founding statutes of SADC make clear provisions in the framework for 
engagement by citizens to improve engagement with the institution. This is defined in Article 
24(2) which proclaims that: 
Conferences and other meetings may be held between the member states and other 
governments and organisations associated with the development efforts of SADC to 
review policies and strategies and evaluate the performance of SADC in the 
implementation of its programmes and objectives, identify and agree on future plans of 
cooperation. 
The approach of engaging in meetings and conferences is aimed at ensuring, among other 
things, what is set out in Article 5(a) of the founding treaty, which speaks of the organisation’s 
desire to harmonise political and socio-economic policies and plans. The aims of the meetings 
are to encourage a culture of debate and deliberation among the citizens, so that whatever 
policy decision that emerges reflects the collective, rather than individual, view. This dovetails 
with the ideals of deliberative democracy.  
The founding documents see this approach as capable of achieving what is set out in 
Article  5(b) which is to: 
Encourage the peoples of the region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop 
economic, social, and cultural ties across the Region and, to participate fully in the 
implementation of the programmes and objectives of the SADC. 
In order to fully operationalise the objectives set out by SADC, Article 6(a) of the founding 
statutes declares a commitment by member states, indicating that:  
Member states undertake to adopt adequate measures to promote the achievement of 
the objectives of the SADC and shall refrain from taking any measure likely to 
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jeopardise the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and 
implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. 
Some of these objectives, as already outlined, include involving the citizens of SADC in the 
decision-making and developmental processes to ensure the accelerated implementation of 
developmental programmes. This approach, aimed at promoting accountability, is one key 
feature of deliberative democracy. This is a way of promoting inclusive decision-making within 
the interstate organisation. To operationalise the statutory and legal requirements for citizens’ 
participation in its decision-making structures, SADC has gone a long way to put in place 
institutions within the organisation meant to facilitate such participation.  
The SNCs are one such organ, having been established to provide inputs at the national level 
in the formulation of regional policies and strategies, as well as to coordinate and oversee the 
implementation of programmes at the national level. Further to that, they are responsible for 
the initiation of SADC projects and they issue papers as an input into the preparation of the 
regional strategies. 
6.3.1 Operationalisation of the SNCs 
As already stated, SADC established the SNCs in terms of the Amended Treaty of 2001 as 
organs to facilitate the interface between the SADC Secretariat and stakeholders at the 
member state level. 
The record of the COM meeting held in Blantyre, Malawi, on 9–11 August 2001 reflected a 
desire by SADC to establish SNCs. The minutes read that, as a follow-up to the Summit 
decision on the establishment of SNCs, draft guidelines had been developed – and were 
approved – to facilitate the adoption of common minimum standards for the structure and 
operations of SNCs. The Council also noted that the main purpose of the SNCs would be to 
ensure broad and effective participation of key stakeholders in SADC policy-making initiatives. 
The record of the minutes of the meeting of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and 
Government held on the 15 February 2002 in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania note that 
at its meeting held in Blantyre, Malawi in August 2001, it approved the guidelines on the 
establishment of the SNCs. The Council also noted that member states had been requested 
to establish their committees in line with the approved guidelines. A report was presented 
indicating that, at that time, Malawi and the Seychelles had reported that they had established 
SNCs, while Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania had started the process 
of establishing theirs. 
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The record of that meeting indicates that the Council also noted that the establishment of 
SNCs was to be undertaken in two phases: starting with the appointment of the committee 
and followed by the actual launching of the SNCs, as would be appropriate in each member 
state. The Secretariat was assessing the status of the establishment of the SNCs with a view 
to compiling a report to assist in sharing information and experiences on the establishment of 
the committees.  
There were also presentations to the effect that the Secretariat had approached its ICPs to 
assist in the strengthening of capacities of SNCs once their needs had been identified. In this 
regard, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung had offered to assist all member states and the 
Secretariat. In the same meeting and with a view to improving communication lines, the 
Council noted that the Secretariat had sent reminders to member states to provide the 
requested information, including a timetable and programmes for the establishment of the 
SNCs. The Council urged the remaining member states to establish their SNCs by the end of 
March 2002 and to submit the composition of their SNCs to the Secretariat and required 
information regarding their needs. 
The record of the COM meeting of 23–24 August 2004 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, indicates 
that a progress report on the SNCs was presented, with the Council recalling that, at its 
meeting in March 2003, it had urged member states to present quarterly reports on the 
establishment and operations of the SNCs, including any challenges. In that meeting, the 
Council noted that the Secretariat was to elaborate on the guidelines for the establishment 
and operationalisation of the SNCs and present a report in August 2003. 
In the same meeting, the Council approved amendments to the SNCs’ functions and the 
functions of the subcommittees. These amendments related to a new role of coordination and 
overseeing the implementation of regional policies, strategies, programmes and projects at 
the national level. It also related to the coordination and provision of inputs at the national level 
for the development and review of the RISDP, to monitoring implementation at the national 
level through subcommittees and to the coordination of the dissemination of SADC information 
at the national level. 
6.3.1.1 Functions of subcommittees 
The functions of the subcommittees related to promoting and broadening stakeholder 
participation in the core areas of integration and the facilitation of information exchange 
between the SNCs and the subcommittees, as well as providing inputs to the SNCs on 
regional programmes, projects and policies. The subcommittees were also assigned the roles 
of proposing inputs to the SNCs towards the formulation of the national positions on issues to 
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be discussed at the regional level and of assisting the SNCs to prepare for SADC events and 
meetings at the national level, as well as of identifying, monitoring and evaluating regional 
programmes and projects at the national level. They were further mandated to mobilise 
resources for the implementation of programmes and projects within the subcommittee.  
The Council further approved the following recommendations from the workshop on the role 
of the SNCs in facilitating the implementation of the RISDP: the convening of workshops, 
seminars and meetings on the RISDP to ensure that members of the SNCs are familiar with 
the RISDP and its key processes; the convening of national stakeholders for the sensitisation 
and information dissemination to secure ownership and support of the RISDP; as well as the 
development of national strategic and implementation plans aligned with the RISDP to 
facilitate the achievement of the SADC agenda.  
Over and above that, it was agreed that funds should be allocated in member states’ national 
budgets for the operations of the SNCs and the commemoration of SADC Day. The Secretariat 
would also mobilise resources from the ICPs to support the SNCs and allocate funds by 
member states from the national budgets to support the SNCs operating costs. 
Council approved recommendations from the workshop on creating awareness among 
stakeholders on the role of the SNCs and that member states, with the support of the SNC 
Secretariat, should organise sensitisation campaigns to disseminate information about SADC 
at the national level. It was also agreed that member states should provide SNCs with 
adequate ICT facilities to enable the flow of information at all levels and that member states 
should provide funds for publicising SADC, including the production of promotional and 
educational material on SADC and its distribution at the national level. The member states 
were urged to involve national media institutions, including the SADC National Media Awards 
Coordinators, in disseminating SADC information and in the coverage of SADC events and 
programmes at the national level. 
The Council noted that the Secretariat was to develop a project proposal before October 2003 
for the presentation to ICPs to source funds to strengthen the SNCs through the provision of 
technical and financial assistance, as part of an annual region conference to share 
experiences and best practices for SNCs in the first three of its formative years.  
At its meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, on 13–14 March 2004, the record of the minutes indicates 
that the COM considered and approved guidelines and procedures for the operationalisation 
of the expanding linkages and networks by increasing stakeholder participation in its decision-
making processes. According to the record of the minutes, the Council considered and 
approved the following guidelines and procedures. 
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6.3.1.2 Guidelines 
The record of the COM held in Tanzania on 13-14 March 2004 indicate that the SADC COM, 
working on the recommendation of the Integrated Committee of Ministers, was to approve 
each request from an organisation intending to execute SADC programmes and projects 
under the Principle of Subsidiarity, considering the following factors: 
i) legal status of the subsidiarity organisation in the member state in which it will be based 
ii) objectives, principles and mission of the subsidiarity organisation 
iii) the principles and programmes of these subsidiarity organisations shall be consistent with 
the objectives and Common Agenda of SADC 
iv) governing structure of the subsidiarity organisation is expected to be of a multinational 
character in accordance with SADC multilateral status 
v) the legal status of the governing or management body (such as the board of trustees or 
board of management) 
vi) defined areas of activity for each subsidiarity organisation in the SADC Common Agenda 
vii) competencies of the managers of the subsidiarity organisation relative to the defined area 
of activity 
viii) sources of funds of the subsidiarity organisation 
ix) financial sustainability of the subsidiarity organisation 
x) programme of work of the subsidiarity organisation. 
There was an agreement that bodies created by the COM would use the SADC logo together 
with their own logos and would be designated as SADC agencies. SADC and the subsidiarity 
organisation would formalise their partnership and cooperation through accreditation in the 
form of a MOU. The SADC Executive Secretary was mandated, where appropriate, to issue 
letters of introduction to subsidiarity organisations as a way of assisting them in performing 
their work.  
The COM, following a recommendation of the ICM, was tasked to determine which SADC 
meetings subsidiarity organisations might be invited to attend and the conditions for their 
participation in such meetings. The Executive Secretary, through the ICM, was tasked with 
making recommendations to the Council regarding the categories of SADC information to 
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which subsidiarity organisations might have access. There was also an agreement that the 
subsidiarity organisations would be encouraged to work and interact closely with the SNCs. 
The representatives of the governing bodies or management bodies of subsidiarity 
organisations were directed to hold regular consultations with the SADC Secretariat to review 
the performance of programmes and projects executed under the principle of subsidiarity, the 
results of which were to be reported to the ICM and to Council, accordingly. The SADC 
Secretariat was urged to maintain an annual roster of subsidiarity organisations; yet, at the 
same time, the subsidiarity organisations were to be independent entities from SADC with the 
following conditions:  
i) Subsidiarity organisations shall not be accorded the designation of SADC institutions. Such 
designation is restricted to those institutions outlined in Article 9(1) of the SADC Treaty, as 
well as those institutions to be created by the Summit as provided for in Article 9(2) as read 
with Articles 10(b) and 1 (f) of the SADC Treaty. 
ii) Other subsidiarity organisations shall not use the SADC brand name or SADC logo in any 
of their activities. 
iii) Subsidiarity organisations shall mobilise their own resources, including those devoted to 
the execution of SADC programmes and projects. 
iv) Subsidiarity organisations shall benefit from participation at SADC meetings by invitations 
to be approved by the ICM. 
v) SADC shall not bear responsibility for liabilities of subsidiarity organisations; 
vi) Subsidiarity organisations shall be registered in the member state in which they wish to 
operate. In this regard, the legal status of subsidiarity organisations shall, depending on the 
application or operations of each subsidiarity organisation, be determined by each host state 
in accordance with its laws. 
vii) The diplomatic status of each subsidiarity organisation shall be determined by each host 
state in accordance with its laws. 
viii) The SADC Protocol on Privileges and Immunities shall not apply to the subsidiarity 
organisations as these do not fall in the category of sadc institutions in terms of the SADC 
Treaty. 
ix) Subsidiarity organisations shall submit annual reports to the Integrated Committee of 
Ministers as a way of making them accountable to SADC. 
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The process of putting in place the modalities of establishment of the cooperation was put in 
place and the following procedures were agreed:  
i) That the Executive Secretary shall post the approved guidelines on the SADC website to be 
readily available to all stakeholders. 
ii) That any organisation interested in executing SADC programmes and projects under the 
principle of subsidiarity shall make a formal application to the Executive Secretary. 
iii) That the Executive Secretary shall assess the application based on the approved guidelines 
and submit recommendations to the COM through the Integrated Committee of Ministers. 
iv) That once the application is approved, the Executive Secretary shall inform the organisation 
concerned, negotiate and conclude a MOU. 
These guidelines made room for the establishment of partnerships with new organisations for 
expansion of the participation of citizens in the decision-making processes of SADC. The 
guidelines also made room for a partnership with, among other organisations, the SADC-
CNGO, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
6.3.2 The SADC Parliamentary Forum 
While the SADC PF is not necessarily a SADC institution, there have been moves to transform 
it into a formal parliament of the region. It also plays a very important advisory role to the 
SADC. For now, it remains an important regional inter-parliamentary body composed of 
members of parliament from the national parliaments of SADC member states, representing 
over 3 500 parliamentarians in the SADC region. Established by the SADC Summit, on 
8 September 1997, the Forum consists of presiding officers and a maximum of five 
representatives elected by the national parliament of each member state. 
The aim of the Forum is to provide a platform to support and improve regional integration 
through parliamentary involvement, and to promote best practices in the role of parliaments in 
regional integration and cooperation. The SADC PD does not have a reporting relationship to 
Summit and other SADC institutions, but works together with them on matters of common 
interest. Given that there are proposals that the SADC PF be expanded into an elected body, 
it could be a useful organ for enhancing citizens’ participation in decision-making. However, 
as it stands now, it is only an advisory body and will not be a subject of deeper discussion in 
this research. More detailed research into how the conversion of the SADC PF to a fully-
fledged parliament could enhance the participation of citizens in governance could form a 
basis for another interesting study in future. 
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6.4 SADC decision-making processes in relation to the participation of CSOs 
This section focuses on the application of the tenets of deliberative decision-making and 
describes the processes in SADC that relate to civil-society participation. It focuses on the 
SNCs as the official institutions designed to enhance this participation. It analyses their state 
of functionality and their meaning to the decision-making processes of SADC as an 
organisation. It integrates findings from the records of the minutes of the meetings of the COM, 
the SADC Summits, SADC communiqués and those from primary sources. 
6.4.1 The state of functionality of SNCs 
SADC presents the SNCs as the institution for the promotion of interface between citizens and 
the organisation. The state of functionality thus becomes crucial in answering the critical 
question about why civil society and stakeholders find it difficult to participate in SADC 
decision-making processes, despite statutory provisions in the SADC Treaty. The state of 
functionality of the SNCs is crucial in adequately answering this question as they are the 
official structures for the enhancement of participative decision-making.  
The questions put to the respondents were structured to find out whether there were any SNCs 
at the country level and, particularly, to elicit information about the way they were constructed 
and the nature of the relationship between SADC as an institution and these committees. The 
responses presented first reflect data from the document analysis and rely significantly on the 
record of the minutes of the COM. The minutes give the official SADC position regarding the 
organisation’s understanding of the state of development of these committees, as well as their 
state of functionality within the member states under study. 
The record of the COM meeting of 23–24 August 2004, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, notes 
that the Secretariat wrote to all member states in April 2003 to request progress reports on 
the operations of the SNCs. Progress reports were received from Angola, Botswana, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The 
Council further took note of the fact that the Secretariat convened a workshop on 29–30 July 
2003 to enable member states to share experiences regarding the structure and operations of 
its SNCs, and to identify best practices for SNCs for them to be effective vehicles for regional 
integration at the national level. The workshop was attended by all member states except the 
DRC and the Seychelles.  
The Council further noted that the workshop for member states presented updates on the 
operations of the SNCs. Attendants identified that some of their key challenges included a lack 
of qualified and experienced staff; a lack of financial and material resources including 
computers, internet facilities, printers, photocopiers and fax machines, and inadequate office 
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space. They also indicated the absence of a standard plan or strategy for the dissemination 
or propagation of SADC’s activities and programmes at the national level, and that there were 
delays in receiving documents translated into Portuguese from the SADC Secretariat, making 
it difficult to meet deadlines. Other challenges included the lack of dedicated SNC staff, 
inadequate commitment from the members of the subcommittees, and the unclear role of the 
SNC with regards to the guidance and coordination of committees, which effectively 
compounded the lack of clarity on budgetary provision for the implementation of projects and 
programmes within the context of the RIDSP.  
It was also indicated that there was a need for stakeholders to internalise and fully understand 
the role and function of the SNCs. Other problems brought to the fore related to the weak 
coordination and information flow between the Secretariat and the SNCs, and at the member 
state level, as well as high staff mobility and turnover, which affected the institutional memory 
and continuity. 
The record of the COM meeting of 23–24 August 2004 in Dar es Salaam also indicates that 
the Council approved recommendations from the workshop for the establishment of a 
technical team or desk at the SADC Secretariat, within the context of an ongoing evaluation 
exercise, to support the SNCs and to ensure the prompt translation of documents into 
Portuguese (the Secretariat was to address this issue within the context of the ongoing Job 
Evaluation Exercise).The Council also called for provision of adequate resources to the SNCs’ 
Secretariat to effectively serve their SNCs, as well as capacity building, especially in the areas 
of economic integration, project management, IT, policy analysis and negotiation skills, in 
order for them to effectively service the SNCs.  
There was a call for the development of an implementation plan regarding the RIDSP and the 
role of the SNCs in it, as well as effective information- and experience-sharing through an 
annual forum for the SNCs at the regional level. Over and above this, there was a 
recommendation for annual visits by members of the Secretariat to the member states’ SNCs 
with the aim of improving operations of the SNCs. 
At same meeting of the COM on 23–24 August 2004 in Dar es Salaam, the Council recalled 
that, at its meeting in Luanda, Angola in October 2002, it urged member states to expedite 
action on the establishment of the SNCs and to submit the required information on the 
composition of the SNCs, and operational needs and activities of these committees to the 
Secretariat. The Council approved the provision of support to the National Secretariat, 
including the provision of office equipment, ICT infrastructure and the training of staff. The 
Council further approved the convening of a regional workshop to enable member states to 
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share experiences on the structure and operations of their SNCs, and directed the Secretariat 
to make the necessary arrangements. 
The Council once again urged the member states to urgently establish the Secretariats for the 
SNCs, which would service these committees and provide a vital link with the SADC 
Secretariat and other key stakeholders. The Council was also given a report indicating that 
the Secretariat wrote to all member states on 2 December 2002, requesting progress reports 
on the operations of the SNCs since the last COM meeting. At that time, responses had been 
received from eight member states, namely: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
In Angola, the SNC was launched on 8 January 2003 by Prime Minister Fernando da Piedade 
Dias do Santos. During the launching ceremony, Mrs Beatriz de Orais was sworn in as Head 
of the Secretariat of the SNC of Angola. 
The SNC of Botswana met twice since its launch in September 2002: in October 2002 to 
prepare for the SADC Council of Ministers Summit and in November 2002 for a briefing on the 
outcome of the SADC meeting which included the Summit, the Council, Consultative 
Conference, the SADC-EU Joint Ministerial Conference, legal experts and Addis Ababa 
ambassadors meeting on the amendments to the AU Constitutive Act. Four technical 
committees had been established. The Development Section of the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning provided secretariat services for the Botswana SNC. 
In Malawi, the activities of the SNC have slowed down due to budgetary constraints. The 
technical committees of the SNC have been established, along with four directorates and the 
additional cluster for politics, defence and security. The regional integration division of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation serves as the secretariat for the SNC. 
In Mozambique, the process of establishing a SNC was said to be awaiting Cabinet approval. 
In the meantime, the committee is operating informally with the structure of the four 
directorates and has been involved in the preparations for SADC meetings. The Committee 
also provides a monthly journal. 
The SNC in Namibia was said to be operational, but its efficiency is hampered by the absence 
of a secretariat and inadequate financial resources. Namibia appealed to the Secretariat to 
mobilise resources to support the activities of the SNCs.  
The SNC in South Africa operates as an interdepartmental committee comprising two 
permanent representatives from all national line-function departments who meet every third 
Thursday of the month. Indications were that the committee was in the process of establishing 
the technical committees according to the directorates, with an additional committee for the 
129 
Organ on Defence, Politics and Security. The technical committees include provincial 
departments, the private sector and NGOs in their respective areas of responsibility. The 
Secretariat of the SNC in South Africa is operational and is within the Chief Directorate: Africa 
Multilateral in the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
In Tanzania, the SNC has held several meetings including on preparations for the SADC June 
2002 council meeting in Gaborone. The SNC held three meetings that year on the outcome of 
the SADC Summit to prepare for the March 2003 COM meeting. The country is in the process 
of setting up a SNC Secretariat to be the SADC National Contact Point.  
The SNC in Zimbabwe has been meeting regularly to prepare for the Summit and Council 
meetings and to prepare inputs for the RISDP. The Department of Regional Cooperation in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the Secretariat.  
Table 1: The establishment of the SNCs 
 Member state Date of establishment Current status 
1 Angola SNC established on 8 May 2002 SNC launched on 
8 January, 2008 
2 Botswana SNC established in 1999 and 
launched on 14 September 2002 
Update provided 
3 DRC No information received No update 
4 Malawi SNC established and launched 
in September 2002 
Update provided 
5 Mauritius SNC established and launched 
in August 2002 
No update 
6 Mozambique SNC establishment at advanced 
stages 
Update provided 
7 Namibia SNC established on 4 March 
2002 
Update provided 
8 Seychelles Committee dealing with SADC 
sffairs in place since February 
2000 
No update 
9 South Africa SNC established and operational Update provided 
10 Swaziland Establishment of SNC at an 
advanced stage 
No update 
11 Tanzania SNC established in April 2002 
and launched in August 2002 
Update provided 
12 Zambia SNC established and launched 
on 28 March 2002 
No update 
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 Member state Date of establishment Current status 
13 Zimbabwe SNC established Update provided 
14 Lesotho SNC established No update 
Source: Record of minutes of the COM held on 23–24 August 2004 in Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania 
The Council was also briefed that the Secretariat was preparing a project proposal and 
submitting it to cooperating partners to support the SNCs in terms of office equipment, ICT, 
infrastructure and staff training. Another project proposal had been prepared for a regional 
workshop to enable member states to share experiences on the structure and operations of 
the SNCs, and had been submitted to the ICPs for funding requests. If the funding was 
secured, the workshop was to be held in June 2003 in Gaborone, Botswana. There are no 
details of the success of the said meeting. 
The minutes of the SADC COM meeting held on 14–15 August 2007, in Lusaka, Zambia, show 
the Report of the 2007 SADC National Committees’ (SNCs) Regional Meeting 
(SADC/CM/2/2007/3.5) was considered. The Council noted that, at its meeting of August 
2003, it directed the Secretariat to hold annual meetings of the SNCs to exchange experiences 
on best practices and improve their operations. The Council further noted that the 2007 SNCs 
regional meeting, held from 10–11 May 2007, in Zanzibar, Tanzania, had focused on the 
implementation of the RISDP, including the development of a Monitoring and Evaluation 
System, information- and experience-sharing on best practices as an attempt to consolidate 
the SNCs in the member states, and the Institutional Capacity Assessment Study for SNCs. It 
also noted the substantial progress in the establishment of the SNCs. although they were at 
different stages of establishment and operationalisation.  
The Council further noted that, despite the progress made, the majority of SNCs suffered from 
severe capacity constraints with regards to financial and human resources, which hampered 
the effective implementation of RISDP/SIPO at the national level. The 2007 SNCs meeting 
made recommendations which included, among others, the need to build capacity and share 
best practices on incorporating RISDP plans and programmes into national development 
plans. The Council concluded by urging member states to build the capacity of the SNCs.  
In 2011, a decade after the first proposals for the establishment of the SNCs, a review of the 
state of progress indicated in the record of the COM meeting held in Luanda, Angola, on 11–
16 August 2011 shows that the involvement of key stakeholders in SADC business was 
discussed. In this discussion, the Council took note of the factual reality that the SADC Treaty 
recognises key stakeholders as important partners in the implementation of the SADC 
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Programme of Action. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty provides the foundation for the 
participation of key stakeholders and defines them as the private sector, civil society, NGOs, 
and workers and employers’ organisations. The Council also took note of the fact that the 
RISDP and SIPO, which were developed in consultation with key stakeholders, reiterate their 
importance in the implementation of the SADC Programme of Action. Furthermore, all SADC 
protocols, declarations and communiqués outlining SADC policies and commitments 
emphasise the importance of working together with civil society and the private sector. 
The Council was briefed that, in line with the guidelines on subsidiarity that were adopted in 
the SADC COM held on 15 February 2002 in Zanzibar, Tanzania, the Secretariat had 
formalised its relationship with key stakeholders by signing MOUs with the SADC-CNGO, the 
Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI) and the Southern Africa 
Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC). MOUs provide a legal framework for 
cooperation and collaboration between SADC and key stakeholders in working towards the 
common goals of sustainable development, economic growth and poverty reduction.  
There were indications that most member states maintain strong relationships with key 
stakeholders who are resident in their jurisdictions, through which the latter participate in the 
national processes of economic and social development. Over and above this, the meeting 
was briefed on the extensive collaboration between SADC and key stakeholders which 
facilitated their participation in most SADC activities including contributing to policy-making 
and technical meetings, consultative conferences, the International Conference on Poverty 
and Development, negotiations on the SADC Free Trade Area, the launch of the Free Trade 
Area (August 2008), and the development and adoption of the SADC Protocol on Gender and 
Development.  
The Council made decisions reaffirming that key stakeholders should participate in the SADC 
integration agenda through the SNCs. It also approved that cooperation and consultations the 
at the regional level be strengthened through the implementation of existing and new 
agreements. It further mandated the Secretariat to update the list of regional key stakeholders 
and present it to the Council at its February 2012 meeting.  
The research findings from the records of the COM are complemented by primary data 
sourced from research interviews. Research findings from the qualitative research interviews 
indicated that most of the SADC member states had fragile or totally dysfunctional SNCs.  
The respondents from Tanzania indicated that, as far as they knew, there was no SNC in their 
country. They indicated that if it existed, it did so in secrecy and was not accessible to all 
stakeholders. As such, it could not be said to be representative of the key civil-society 
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groupings, as they would have at least known of its existence even if they had not participated 
in its processes. One of the respondents professed surprise on the existence of such a 
structure in the SADC statutes. This was also the case with the respondents from Swaziland, 
who indicated that there was no SNC and that this inhibited the ability of civil society to 
participate in decision-making and contribute to the national policy debates.  
Zambia was similar, with the respondents indicating that their SNC was unknown, because it 
was totally dysfunctional and totally absent. They all converged at the conclusion that 
effectively they did not have a SNC. The respondents from South Africa indicated that they 
knew of the existence of the SNC, but they were all in consensus that it was totally inept and 
dysfunctional. In fact, one of the respondents summed it up by saying that the South African 
SNC only existed in name, but was not effective at all as there was no link between it and civil 
society, which is antithetical to its existence. 
Respondents from Botswana intimated that while the SNC existed in their country, it was far 
from meeting the standards outlined in the SADC statutes. They indicated that it had been 
hijacked by the government and housed under the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs, and 
the government determined who attended meetings. In the event of a failure to make a 
breakthrough in discussion through consensus, the government had the veto power which 
made it superior in the process. The government, according to the respondents, has the sole 
prerogative of selecting which organisations and individuals participate in these processes 
and, as such, it has created a forum for partisan and non-objective approaches to dealing with 
national issues.  
The respondents indicated that despite being part of some vibrant civil-society organisations, 
they had no privilege of invitation to or participation in the SNCs processes. They thus called 
for the establishment of an all-encompassing and independent committee which takes on 
board all stakeholders, as defined in the statutes. This, however, has contributed to the 
paralysis of the SNC. The respondents proposed that Botswana should have a SNC which is 
functional and independent from government interference. There were indications that there 
was no participation and the respondent had never heard anything or contributed anything to 
the SNC. The SNC is funded from the national budget, but the respondent indicated that, when 
it comes to meetings and activities, he did not know if they ever met because the SNC was 
not functional at all. 
The respondents from Lesotho indicated that there was indeed a SNC, but that it was very 
ineffective as it was unknown to many stakeholders and hardly met, and therefore had no 
influence at all on the policy-making processes of the country. In Zimbabwe, respondents 
indicated that there used to be a SNC, but over the years there had been an irretrievable 
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breakdown in the relationship between the government and civil society, and as such the two 
never met under the banner of the SNC. They cited preparations for the 2014 SADC Summit 
of Heads of State and Government in that country, which were totally outside the paradigms 
of nationals, who were excluded from these consultations.  
By contrast, the respondents from Mozambique indicated the existence of vibrant SNC 
meetings, as set out in the guidelines adopted by the COM meeting. 
The respondents from Mauritius, the Seychelles and Malawi spoke of the existence of SNCs, 
but stated that they were “paper tigers” which were not accessible and did not contribute at all 
to inclusive decision-making. If anything, the respondents described them as extensions of 
the government system of patronage.  
In summary, all the respondents who spoke of the existence of non-functional national 
committees indicated that they did not have the required technical committee, effectively 
meaning that they were not meeting the requirements of the SNCs as defined in SADC’s 
statutes. Only Mozambique had a national committee with fully operational technical 
committees covering all the four sectorial clusters, namely: infrastructure, food and services, 
agriculture and natural resources, trade industry finance, and social and human development. 
To the credit of Mozambique, the SNC was said to have a fully-fledged Secretariat which was 
the focal point for coordination between the government and stakeholders. 
6.4.1.1 Meetings of the SNCs 
The questions asked of respondents sought to assess the extent to which SNCs met and 
whether they fulfilled the prescribed four meetings per year. This is an important requirement 
under the deliberative democracy framework, in that it allows for the continuous exchange of 
views and ideas between the elected official and the citizens. 
On this requirement, the respondents who indicated that their countries had existing, but non-
functional committees, including South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
the Seychelles, said they did not meet regularly and that was one of the reasons why the 
SNCs were weak and could not be relied on as fora for inclusive decision-making. They 
blamed the government for monopolising the process and using it for its own ends, which they 
described as a desire to exclude other stakeholders from participating in SADC’s decision-
making processes.  
Only Mozambique seemed well-organised with the SNC meeting the prescribed four times per 
year and even allowing for specialised meetings of different sectoral technical committees 
outside the meeting of the main committee.  
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6.4.1.2 The existence of functional secretariats 
Secretariats are the engine room for the coordination of activities and interface between 
citizens and their elected representatives. The state of their strength is thus crucial in driving 
the process of inclusive decision-making. The questions asked of respondents aimed to find 
whether the SNC secretariat exists in member states, the extent of the coordination of their 
activities and their links with the SADC Secretariat. The key weakness identified in Swaziland, 
Malawi, South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia and the Seychelles was the 
absence of a functional SNC secretariat. In these countries, the committee and its coordination 
role appeared to be a preserve of the government, which seemed to make selective piecemeal 
progress in coordination.  
The requirement in the statutes that provides for SNCs to have secretariats was based on a 
well-founded and acceptable role that coordination could be done well if it existed. But in most 
SADC countries, as indicated, no such a structure existed, thus making the coordination role 
very difficult. The absence of well-functioning secretariats militates against the principle of the 
smooth flow of information. Only Mozambique had a well-coordinated secretariat which was 
good conduit for information flow between the Secretariat and stakeholders. 
Respondents from all the countries, including Mozambique, cited a lack of financial resources 
as the reason for not having vibrant secretariats. Those from Swaziland, Malawi, South Africa, 
Botswana, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia and the Seychelles cited government 
monopolisation of the space provided for SNCs as one of the reasons for their failures to 
function properly. The respondents indicated that while SADC in its meeting indicated that the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung foundation had committed to fund the establishment of secretariats, 
there seemed to be little movement in that direction.  
The lack of funding for the establishment of secretariats was thus seen as one of the key 
factors affecting coordination, and the capacity and ability to make meaningful impact in 
contributions to collective decision-making in their respective member states. Some of the 
respondents indicated that if the SNCs did not become more vibrant, they were in danger of 
being overshadowed by a new high-priority initiative that promotes SADC participatory policy 
solutions at the national level. There were indications that the Regional Poverty Observatory 
(RPO) of SADC might usurp some of the functions of the SNCs. 
6.4.2 SADC-CNGO and enhancement of civil-society participation in SADC 
There were questions to make a determination of how the SADC-CNGO as the umbrella body 
of civil-society organisations has enhanced the participation of its members in decision-making 
in the regional bloc. One of the aims of the SADC-CNGO is to enhance the participation of 
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civil-society organisations in the policy-making processes of SADC. This aim dovetails well 
with the deliberative democracy theory, assuming that the greater participation of citizens in 
decision-making is vital in promoting accountability, which in turn could accelerate 
development. Mafunisa (2004) argues that, in making decisions and implementing them, 
public institutions should take into account the attitudes and activities of the institutions that 
constitute civil society. This view builds on assertions by Hyden (1999), who contends that 
legitimate democratic public participation is vital because authoritative decisions imposed by 
governments demand justification from those burdened by authority and this justification must 
appeal to evidence and arguments acceptable to reasonable citizens. 
In an attempt to find out the extent of civil-society participation in SADC’s decision-making 
processes, the research was guided by the arguments of Habermas (1987:364) that citizen 
participation in policy-making organs buffers the public from state domination and provides 
what he calls “effective restraining barriers to protect civil society from state domination”. The 
record of the minutes of the meeting of the SADC COM, held on 16 August 2011 in Luanda, 
Angola, indicated that the Council adopted guidelines for the establishment of a framework for 
involvement of key stakeholders in decision-making. 
In that meeting, the Council acknowledged that the SADC Treaty recognises key stakeholders 
as important partners in the implementation of SADC programmes. Article 23 of the Treaty 
establishes the foundations for the said participation. The Council was briefed and adopted 
the formalisation of relations with some of these key stakeholders, among them the SADC-
CNGO. Cooperation was a way of enhancing the participation of other stakeholders in SADC’s 
decision-making processes as a measure of accelerating economic growth, sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. One of the key questions to the respondents was how 
the SADC-CNGO was constructed and how it facilitated the participation of civil society in 
decision-making. 
One of the key respondents to this question – Boichoko A. Dithlake (the Executive Director of 
SADC-CNGO) – indicated that the SADC-CNGO is a membership-based organisation 
constituted by umbrella bodies representing all organisations at the national level including 
social movements and other related organisations. Over and above NGO membership, the 
CNGO upholds a thematic alliance with other bodies such as SATUCC and the Fellowship of 
Christian Councils in Southern Africa (FOCCISA). The respondent indicated that the SAD-
CCNGO has a MOU signed in 2003 which is currently under review. According to the 
respondent, an instruction came from the COM to review the MOU within 12 months, 
considering the formation of a partnership with the SADC-CNGO towards the establishment 
of an economic and social council modelled on the UN’s ECOSOCC. 
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The respondents from Mauritius described the formation of SADC-CNGO in 2003 as a long-
awaited and inevitable development following conversion of SADCC to SADC – an indication 
of the changing times at the turn of the millennium. Given the rise in issues of democracy, 
good governance, anti-corruption and the fight for human rights, civil society became a 
formidable force to reckon with that could no longer be ignored. The change, which 
characterised the politics of the day, gave impetus to the organisation of civil-society activism 
at the regional level. Therefore, the formation of the CNGO resulted from the common need 
to hold governments accountable for their actions to citizens who constitute the electorate. 
Other respondents from Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and Lesotho 
also indicated knowledge of the SADC-CNGO as a regional organisation of civil-society 
organisations grouped to promote participation of SADC civil society in SADC’s decision-
making processes. However, Botswana’s respondent surprisingly, despite the SADC 
Secretariat being in that country, expressing limited knowledge of the organisation and its 
operations. 
The respondents from the government of Zambia indicated that there was a committee of 
ambassadors and high commissioners accredited to Botswana, but it remained unknown. 
They indicated that it was formed some time in 2005 by a resolution of the COM, but it 
remained inactive. Oosthuizen (2006:226) also indicates that:  
It comprises High Commissioners of SADC members accredited to or responsible for 
Botswana and permanent secretary in Botswana Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation. It does not seem to be a subsidiary body of any of the 
principal institutions. Its proposed functions include (a) advising the COM through the 
SCO on issues related to implantation of SADC programmes and activities including 
the RISDP and SIPO, (b) facilitating consultations between SADC member states and 
Secretariat, (c) helping prepare COM and ICM meetings and (d) following up the 
implementation of COM decisions, It is meant to meet every two months. 
The respondents from the SADC Secretariat indicated that if this organ were fully functional, 
it could be one important avenue for civil-society engagement in SADC. The respondents 
spoke of the establishment of the SADC-CNGO protocol tracker, aimed at keeping track of 
and monitoring the signing, ratification and implementation of each of the protocols developed 
by SADC with a view to holding individual member states and SADC as an accountable 
collective body. The protocol tracker is not only a monitoring and social accountability project, 
but also an advocacy initiative in support of citizens’ participation in regional integration. 
6.4.3 SADC-CNGO and the enhancement of CSO participation at the national level 
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The SADC-CNGO aims to promote the participation of civil society in decision-making 
processes. This is consistent with Habermas’s (1987) assertion that facilitating citizen 
participation in policy-making organs buffers the public from state domination. He provides 
what he calls effective restraining barriers to protect civil society from state domination. One 
of the key issues put to respondents was the links, synergies and mechanisms for 
collaboration between the SADC-CNGO and civil society at the country level. This was meant 
to determine the structures, activities and processes that allow for the enhanced participation 
of stakeholders in decision-making processes. Respondents indicated that the SADC-CNGO 
has increasingly become an authoritative and reliable link between civil society at the country 
level and the SADC Secretariat because of its structured relationship with SADC which was 
enhanced by the signing of the MOU in 2003, which has also seen it receive observer status 
in some of the meetings of SADC such as the ICM meetings.  
The respondents from Mozambique indicated that they viewed the SADC-CNGO as having 
been able to bring civil-society organisations to congregate and work together in bringing the 
voice of the grassroots to policy-makers. In their view, there is a mutual dependency 
relationship; for instance, during the SADC We Want campaigns, the SADC-CNGO and civil 
society work hand in hand in drafting declarations which are then forwarded to the SADC 
regional body for consideration.  
This was also the view of the respondents from Zambia, who stated that working together 
under the umbrella of SADC-CNGO had been vital in delivering the voice of grassroots civil-
society organisations to policy-makers. They also stated that they saw a mutually dependable 
relationship between SADC-CNGO and civil society, for instance in the SADC We Want 
campaigns. This view was also shared by other respondents from Botswana who, like their 
Mozambican and Zambian counterparts, indicated that the SADC-CNGO and civil society 
work hand-in-hand in drafting the declarations, which are then forwarded to the SADC regional 
body for consideration of how SADC could be transformed into more people-friendly institution.  
The respondents from Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the Seychelles 
demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the SADC-CNGO which they defined as a reliable 
conduit of views between civil society at the country level and the regional body, based on the 
MOU that was signed with SADC. They noted that there was considerable technical support 
given to the national associations by the SADC-CNGO. They referred to the capacity and 
technical skills development programmes that had been conducted by the SADC-CNGO for 
the national umbrella associations of Zimbabwe and Malawi, the National Association of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NANGO) and the Council for Non-Governmental Organisations 
in Malawi (CONGOMA) respectively. Respondents further indicated that the SADC-CNGO 
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has facilitated engagement and discussions by the region’s civil-society organisations on key 
issues of how to improve the RISDP. 
Respondents lauded the SADC CNGO for being meticulous on information dissemination by 
continuously giving updates to the various members of the state of the region political, 
economic and social issues. Respondents indicated that they made some inputs on the SADC 
CNGO policy issue papers like the SADC We Want documents. 
6.4.4 SADC-CNGO facilitation of government–CSO interaction at the country level 
Ongoing interaction between elected representatives and citizens is important in promoting 
political accountability. Schedler (1999) argues that, under the deliberative democracy 
framework, political accountability is defined as the obligation of both political and public 
officials in governments to be held accountable for their actions to citizens.  
Bratton and Logan (2006) view political accountability as serving the dual purpose of ensuring 
that representatives do not abuse power and enabling governments to function effectively and 
efficiently. They also refer to processes and mechanisms that are in place to ensure that those 
in decision-making positions adhere to the principles of democracy and good governance, with 
answerability and enforceability being identified as the two fundamental constituents of 
political accountability.  
Respondents from Mozambique revealed that the SADC-CNGO facilitates the interaction of 
civil society through the meetings they conduct and the implementation of awareness 
campaigns. These awareness campaigns help to reduce the knowledge gap within groups. 
To facilitate the functioning of the SNCs, the SADC-CNGO is included on the board and it 
participates in gatherings of the SNC’s General Assembly. They contribute to and are involved 
in the strategic planning processes. However, respondents from Zambia and Malawi 
converged on the point that SADC-CNGO cannot do much because its focal point in SADC is 
the Secretariat, which works for heads of state, not citizens. They went on to say that there 
was little initiative by the Secretariat to include citizens in decision-making. This was also the 
view of respondents from Lesotho, who indicated that this was not the responsibility of SADC-
CNGO but that of the SNC.  
Respondents from Botswana were of the view that there had been facilitation of good relations 
with one of them saying:  
They have a good relationship with civil society, but with the Secretariat they have to 
fight for recognition. Of course, they are at times involved in different initiatives and 
decision-making procedures, but they constantly have to remind the Secretariat of their 
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existence. They are consulted in decision-making, but he said that of course during 
consultation they contribute, but BOCONGO [Botswana Council of Non-Governmental 
Organisations] needs to be involved in the real negotiations. They need to be 
recognised they need to add everything; they are not satisfied with mere consultations. 
They want to negotiate, to add something tangible. 
This respondent advocated that there needs to be a paradigm shift regarding relations: “It’s 
high time the civil society is taken seriously.” 
The respondents from South Africa indicated that SADC-CNGO had facilitated a meeting in 
2013 between the civil-society umbrella body and the government to plan on pushing for the 
proper formulation of national committees. There has also been training for both civil society 
and the government on how these national committees should be constituted and should 
function. Consultations were also been held on how to best go about forming the national 
committees without soliciting resistance, and a strategic plan for the next five years was 
agreed upon. These respondents, however, highlighted a new and seemingly inclusive 
process called the Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO). They indicated that this was 
promising to be a more organised institution to promote ministerial and civil-society interaction 
at the country level. They indicated that, as things stand and if it lives up to its commitments, 
the RPO would be the answer to the poor coordination between stakeholders and civil society 
in SADC’s decision-making processes. 
6.4.5 Decision-making processes of SADC-CNGO 
The section of the research sought to examine how the SADC-CNGO as an institution has 
handled decision-making and how that could be used as best practice for SADC. The 
respondents from the SADC-CNGO Secretariat could outline many position papers that they 
had developed and indicated that it was difficult to measure the extent to which they had been 
taken into consideration by SADC. (There is a dedicated section in this thesis on “How are 
your views considered by SADC?” which deals with these issues.) Respondents from the 
SADC-CNGO Secretariat revealed that accountability is ensured through the Council’s 
General Assembly which convenes every two years and through the Executive Committee 
that meets three times a year to account for the progress made or lack thereof. The Directors 
Forum, which meets annually, tables reports to give feedback to their membership at the 
national level and to review strategies in preparation to formulate new ones. This was 
corroborated by respondents from Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe, the Seychelles, 
Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and Mauritius, who confirmed that the 
SADC-CNGO civil-society forum is indeed an annual meeting which is held consistently. 
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Respondents indicated that, in the annual general meetings of the SADC-CNGO, there is 
robust and no-holds-barred debate on both administrative and programmatic issues, with 
decisions made mostly through consensus. However, there have been instances where issues 
have been deferred to a vote, but even when that has happened, compromises were found to 
avoid a winner-take-all mentality. Respondents indicated that this had built confidence in the 
organisation as most of its membership views it as promoting inclusive participation in its 
decision-making processes. 
Some respondents felt that civil society should strengthen its utilisation of the Southern Africa 
Civil Society Forum, which is held alongside the Summit to capture civil-society perspectives 
on issues of concern. Furthermore, there could be utilisation of clusters and sectors that mirror 
the directorates of SADC. The civil-society organisations in each of the clusters are facilitated 
to conduct common analysis of issues, develop common positions and ultimately engage with 
SADC and its structures. The basic idea of using the cluster approach is to ensure that any 
civil-society organisation in the region can feed its views on thematic areas of interest into the 
SADC processes. 
6.4.6 SADC-CNGO participation in SADC decision-making processes 
Questions were then put to measure the extent of participation of the SADC-CNGO in SADC’s 
decision-making processes in line with the deliberative democracy tenet of promotion of 
accountability. Gutmann and Thompson (1996) argue that elected officials should provide 
reasoned explanations for their decisions that could reasonably be accepted by free and equal 
citizens with fundamentally competing perspectives. This is more evident in deliberative 
democracy theory, which emphasises the accountability of public officials by subjecting policy 
and governance decisions to public participation. This is also the view of Elster (1998), who 
argues that deliberative democracy focuses on the obligations of public officials to engage in 
reasoned deliberation on which courses of action would promote the public good.  
Richardson (2002) advances the same argument with the view that elected officials must 
engage in decision-making processes that consider all the relevant interests and perspectives. 
This is similar to the argument of Staszewski (2009), who is of the view that decisions adopted 
pursuant to these criteria are democratically legitimate, because each interest and perspective 
is treated with equal respect and arbitrary decision-making is prohibited. Deliberative 
democracy provides for greater legitimacy based on theories that seek to eliminate arbitrary 
governmental action and to reach the best decision on merit, after considering all the 
information made available and fundamental differences of opinion. The research, thus, used 
the deliberative democracy framework to assess the decision-making processes and the state 
of inclusiveness in SADC.  
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Respondents emphasised the role played by the SADC-CNGO in the instrumentalising the 
Regional Poverty Observatories, with 70% of their review undertaken by CSOs and adopted 
by SADC member states. SIPO II was also developed with some involvement of SADC-CNGO 
and was officially adopted in 2002 by the then-SADC Chairperson, Tanzanian President 
Jakaya Kikwete in 2002. 
Respondents highlighted that the CNGO had been working with the SADC Secretariat to 
review the RISDP and, to that end, a task team had been assembled to undertake the review. 
However, respondents stated that although there had been several interventions in the policy-
making architecture that involved civil-society participation, this still happened at an informal 
level. This was corroborated by respondents from Zambia, who argued that the SADC-CNGO 
had also managed to successfully claim the space on issues discussed on the forum. They 
indicated that, at times, they could even request to table their issues through the proper 
channels and they were adopted, for example, the Gender Protocol and RPO.  
SADC’s membership uses the SADC-CNGO’s Poverty Indices Matrix to monitor poverty at 
the national level. This matrix provides measurable indicators which are comparable and 
which member states can uniformly use to assess themselves. This helps in the evaluation of 
the Millennium Development Goals and ensures there is substantive progress.  
The SADC-CNGO is usually involved at the initial stages of policy-making during the 
consultations, or during the monitoring stage – and even during the policy initiation phase. 
However, this was not the view of the respondents from Malawi and Mauritius, who indicated 
that that there is no formal participation of the SADC-CNGO in policy-making at the regional 
level. There is also no consultation of the SADC-CNGO by SADC in policy-making. The only 
role of the CNGO is in following up on adopted protocols to assess whether there they have 
been implemented according to set and agreed standards. CNGO assumes a lobbyist role, 
rather than as an equally important decision-making structure of SADC.  
Respondents from Botswana indicated that their submissions were mostly not involved in the 
formulation and adoption of policy decisions. They made submissions, but sometimes these 
were ignored. For example, they aired their views on the issue of the dissolution of the SADC 
Tribunal and were ignored. They also indicated that some of the protocols – such as the 
Gender Protocol – were not signed by countries like Botswana because of the exclusion of 
civil society. 
Respondents from Namibia were sceptical, arguing that civil-society views were considered, 
but mainly on “soft issues”. These soft issues relate to the service-delivery of water and 
sanitation, but not to issues of governance. However, they pointed out that there was room for 
142 
improvement, saying that participation was not yet at the level that civil society wanted it to 
be. They cited the example of there being no civil-society participation or consultation when 
SADC disbanded the SADC Tribunal. However, they conceded that there had been 
remarkable participation in RISDP. Respondents from the Seychelles professed ignorance on 
any form of participation on the subject, while Malawi and Swaziland confirmed that that the 
SADC-CNGO had participated in many policy-making initiatives by the Secretariat especially 
on the RISDP. CNGO organised meetings for NGOs and collected views which were 
submitted to the secretariat and were considered.  
Respondents, however, reiterated the snubbing of the SADC-CNGO in Malawi during the 
COM meeting held on 17 August 2013. They also indicated that before every Summit, the 
SADC-CNGO is given copies of proposed policy to engage with and debate on, and to suggest 
amendments. SIPO and RISDP are examples where civil society was actively engaged in the 
policy-making process through consultations and the consideration of civil-society viewpoints. 
However, the major problem is that the SADC-CNGO has no power over what is included on 
the agenda; all it tends to do is to give suggestions on issues already tabled by the Secretariat. 
They indicated that this participation usually takes the form of consultations, and the provision 
of information and suggestions to the SADC Summit. However, the effectiveness of this 
participation is limited, because the CNGO has no control over outcomes at the level of the 
SADC Summit as it has no voting power.  
6.4.7 CSO policy contributions to the SADC COM 
The interviews identified the Summit of Heads of States and Government and the SADC COM 
as the key policy-making organs. Of the two, the Council was identified as the more accessible 
organ, in that it is the forum in which discussions are made and adopted, and it sets the agenda 
for the Summit of Heads of State and Government. It is the most effective policy-making 
structure, as it does all the work, cleaning up proposals for formal signing by the heads of 
states and governments. These questions also sought to identify whether there are any other 
representations made to another, formal organ of SADC. 
There were varying responses. Respondents from Mauritius indicated that, as far as they were 
concerned, they fed policy proposals to the SADC-CNGO which in turn made policy 
representations to thematic committees. The respondents notted that a protocol tracker had 
been introduced on the civil-society blog. This protocol tracker is an instrument which is used 
for tracking and assessing contributions made by stakeholders and the way they are treated 
in the ultimate policy-implementation process. They indicated that as a watchdog organisation 
to keep SADC accountable to its citizens, the SADC-CNGO was doing a good job in ensuring 
that it worked hand-in-glove with the rest of its membership. Respondents from Botswana 
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indicated they were aware of the continued interaction and engagement between the SADC-
CNGO and SADC, but indicated that they were not sure whether there was any formal 
communication with the COM. 
The way SADC is structured allows for limited participation of the SADC-CNGO and other 
approved stakeholders through the thematic committees and not directly through the Council. 
This was also the view of respondents from the Seychelles, who indicated that, to them, the 
SADC remained a closed club of elites and heads of state, and that the COM was the one that 
stood as a gatekeeper and screened anyone intending to interact with the club. They argued 
that, in most instances, the Council actually kept people from any form of direct engagement. 
Respondents from Malawi and Namibia were of the view that the SADC-CNGO actually did 
make representations of the resolutions and policy proposals to the COM. They indicated that 
every year before the Summit of Heads of State and Government – if held – it holds a civil-
society forum in the host country. After that, it usually sends delegates to the COM meeting 
and makes representations of their resolutions to be incorporated into discussions and 
possibly considered in the decision-making processes. As quoted verbatim from a respondent 
from Malawi:   
CNGO makes presentations to the council of ministers. This happens when the 
Council of Ministers meets before the SADC summit. Resolutions of the CNGO are 
given to the council of ministers. Some of the issues in these resolutions may end up 
on the SADC agenda. 
The same respondents spoke glowingly about the construction of the Gender Protocol, to 
which they were given the platform to make their own contributions. This view was also shared 
by respondents from Mozambique, who indicated that policy presentations were made and 
specifically referred to the SADC Gender Protocol where the SADC-CNGO was given the 
platform to make its own contributions. However, respondents from Lesotho were more 
sceptical, indicating that SADC had a limited respect for civil-society organisations and their 
issues are reflected by the failure to honour an invitation to the 2014 SADC Civil Society Forum 
in Harare by the SADC Executive Secretary. 
6.4.8 Compliance with the provisions of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty 
In its founding documents, SADC makes a firm commitment to allow citizens to participate in 
decision-making. This is detailed in Article 23(1) of the founding treaty, which boldly claims 
that SADC commits itself to involve its citizens in decision-making processes: 
In pursuance to the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully the 
peoples of the region and nongovernmental organisations in regional integration. 
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This is further amplified in the SADC Treaty Amendment of 2001, Article 1(5.2)(b), which 
stipulates that the organisation would: 
Encourage the people of the Region and their institutions to take initiatives to develop 
economic, social and cultural ties across the region and to participate fully in the 
implementation of the programmes and projects of the SADC. 
To achieve this objective, the statutes further make a commitment in Article 23(2) with another 
bold declaration that:  
SADC shall cooperate with and support the initiatives of the peoples of the region and 
nongovernmental organisations contributing to the objectives of this treaty in the areas 
of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities associations 
and peoples of the region. 
The basis for the provision of spaces that allow citizen participation, as defined in Article 23 of 
the SADC Treaty, emanates from a realisation that while government representatives to 
interstate organisations should be given credit for justifying their policy, they should make civil-
society views known publicly. Doing so helps their processes to include a diversity of views. 
This notion is more pronounced in Staszewski (2012) who argues that decision-making and 
policy formulation in a democracy is not, and should not try to be, purely majoritarian, even if 
the idea is to promote policy decisions to reflect the pre-political preferences of the people. 
Arbitrary and exclusionary reliance on elected officials to control the discretionary policy 
choices of the administrative agencies could produce a contested outcome.  
In contrast, decisions adopted pursuant to deliberation are more likely to be democratically 
legitimate because each interest and perspective is treated with equal respect and arbitrary 
decision-making is prohibited. The importance of this approach is that it empowers citizens to 
resist arbitrary government action on policy-making and governance. In a democracy, arbitrary 
action by the government is anathema, as it breeds a citizenry that is made up of passive 
consumers of government policies without participation. Such an approach derogates from 
the sustainable development of communities.  
The provisions of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty are in line with the deliberative democracy 
theory, which is used as the conceptual framework for this study because of its ability to allow 
for inclusivity and a respect for a diversity of views in decision-making. O'Doherty and 
Davidson (2010) argues that deliberative democracy emphasises democracy as government 
by discussion and, specifically, rational deliberation among citizens about matters of the 
common good. According to Watts (2009), not only is the role of political reasoning in decision-
making a matter of great practical importance and sharp legal disagreements, but this is an 
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issue which goes to the very heart of what distinguishes the leading contemporary theories of 
legitimacy in the modern regulatory state.  
The research thus sought to determine the extent of conformity and adherence to the 
provisions of Article 23, as supported by arguments of the deliberative democracy conceptual 
framework on enhancing the participation of citizens in decision-making. Respondents from 
South Africa indicated that it was very difficult to conclude that there was adherence to the 
provisions of Article 23, as there had been massive co-opting of civil-society organisations by 
SADC governments.  
There was a “good NGO-bad NGO” scenario, which made it very hard to recognise which civil-
society organisations were actually pushing their own agendas and not the ones they had 
been told to push by their respective governments. Respondents called this a “state capture 
of civil society”. They argued that civil society was largely ineffective because it had no 
capacity to make any meaningful policy contributions; it was also institutionally incapable of 
doing so as there was no organisational mechanism to make sure that civil society was not 
ignored by SADC. 
Respondents noted that civil society lacked the proper advocacy skills to effectively lobby 
SADC. Respondents from Tanzania indicated that there was limited consideration of the views 
of civil society, because whenever a policy reaches the protocol level, it only reflects and 
protects the interests of the elite, except for maybe the Protocol on Gender. As such, SADC 
needs to be reformed to live up to its commitment of being people-centred. Respondents 
advocated for a more structured and formalised participation of civil society by prioritising the 
free movement of citizens across the region and removing all travel barriers such as visas. 
The current set-up where some citizens of SADC member states pay for visas was viewed as 
retrogressive. They cited, among other things, the $100 that Angolans have to pay to get in to 
Zimbabwe and called for a visa-free regime in SADC. 
Respondents also indicated that a regional parliament should be established that would 
oversee the needs and interests of the people of SADC. They indicated that a structured 
SADC parliament that has elected representatives from each member state would allow for 
better representation of its citizens’ voices in the decision-making processes of SADC. 
Respondents from the SADC-CNGO Secretariat indicated that SADC was not living up to its 
commitment of ensuring the participation of stakeholders in decision-making, as outlined in 
Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. However, they acknowledged that while the SADC has not fully 
reached a stage where it could be viewed as a best-practice model, it has been evolving and 
has come of age. They stated that most of the SADC countries were still battling with the 
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politics of liberation movements that underpinned some governments’ views of being in power 
as an entitlement that allowed them to deny their citizens liberties and the freedom to 
participate in the processes of decision-making, under the guise of protecting the gains of the 
liberation struggle.  
Respondents, however, indicated that there is forward movement in opening spaces for the 
increased participation of stakeholders in decision-making processes to allow the institution to 
be an effective regional organisation. Respondents reiterated the need for the re-envisioning 
of SADC. They bemoaned the lack of meaningful participation by all stakeholders in SADC’s 
policy processes, adding that the issue of the reopening of the SADC Tribunal should be taken 
seriously. They also added that SADC should establish a regional parliament to ensure a 
system of checks and balances, and as an embodiment of the interests of the people. 
Respondents also reiterated that SADC should prioritise the welfare of its Secretariat and not 
leave it to the mercy of the donor community. Instead, member states should contribute to 
SADC’s annual budget to ensure its independence and enhance its effectiveness. 
Furthermore, respondents buttressed the need for the formalisation of civil-society 
participation in SADC decision-making and the dedication of the institution to the region’s 
citizens to serve their interests, rather than allowing it to turn into an elite grouping of heads of 
state. In actual fact, the SADC-CNGO is calling for the democratisation of the regional body. 
Respondents also emphasised the need for SADC to prioritise the interests of citizens and to 
effectively address the ills currently plaguing the region such as poverty, corruption and 
individualism among member states.  
Respondents from Mozambique and Zambia claimed that SADC, as the regional body, was 
not living up to its commitment. They cited a lack of dedicated resources to implement 
protocols. They claimed that, on most occasions, SADC promoted initiatives that favoured the 
elite and that at times there was no engagement of civil society. The SADC body lacks 
enforcement capacity; it is incapacitated and much needs to be done for it to be effective.  
The respondents from Zambia indicated that the government had not done much to popularise 
the value of belonging to SADC as a regional economic bloc. It had failed to explain the 
benefits of being a member of SADC. They compared it with Africa’s founding father, Kwame 
Nkrumah’s (of Ghana), explanation of the OAU (at its formation in 1963); they clearly stated 
that now Africans are free from colonial rule and this body would be a regional economic bloc 
that would unite Africans. Although it was clear to everyone what the objective of the body 
was, now the situation is different and previous levels of unity have largely dissipated. 
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To improve, respondents indicated that SADC should embark on capacity-building in the civil-
society organisations. It has to train these organisations; it has to capacitate them so that they 
are able to work on their own and so that they might be sustainable. CSOs could be supported 
by the SADC body financially, so as to reduce “donor syndrome”. They stressed the need for 
the CSOs to be wholly independent. They indicated that SADC as an organisation should start 
evaluating the performance of National Steering Committees, as sharing results with member 
states enhances their productivity and effectiveness. 
Respondents argued that, as an organisation, SADC should start mobilising citizens and 
reviving SNCs at the national level. They also stressed the need for continuous engagement 
with the relevant government authorities. Respondents from Malawi were of the view that 
SADC was not living up to its commitment of ensuring CSO participation in decision-making 
processes and they cited the example of most of their proposals being shot down before the 
Summit. They also cited the issue of the SADC Tribunal. There was extensive representation 
by civil society against its dissolution; yet, the authorities went ahead and dissolved it. They 
indicated that the organisation is not people-centred as the decision-making processes do not 
have space for consultation between stakeholders. They argued that policy formulation in the 
SADC is intra-state and not “intra-people”. Civil society is thus not taken seriously. 
Respondents from Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Namibia also indicated that the SADC policy-
making and decision-making processes were exclusive to major stakeholders and the 
organisation was not living up to its commitments of ensuring participation because there was 
a top-down approach. This situation gives too much power to elected representatives, at the 
expense of citizens, and thus becomes exclusive rather than participative. 
Respondents indicated that the best way to improve the situation would be to strengthen 
engagement at the national level, by supporting SNCs to be fully functional and thus influence 
the policy-making processes at a grassroots level. Respondents also commented that 
governments should make provisions for support of civil society without necessarily interfering 
with their programming. A respondent from Namibia showed his thorough understanding of 
SADC-CNGO and SADC processes because he once worked for the organisation. He had 
zeal and enthusiasm that SADC would reform and that space for civil society would gradually 
increase, making way for more inclusive policy formulation environment in SADC. However, 
he worried that this might take longer than necessary because of resistance from 
governments.  
In his own words, the respondent from Lesotho said that: 
SADC is far away from reaching a point of inclusiveness in its policy-making 
processes. As such, the SADC should do a lot of work including the implementation of 
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its own policies and decisions. The organisation should desist from employing a weak 
Secretariat in order to control it and thus maintaining the status of the organisation as 
a club of the elite. 
The respondent from Malawi indicated that the SADC of 1992 was people-centred and citizen 
participation was its hallmark, unlike the SADC today, which he accused of a liberal approach 
to conducting business and assuming the character of being a club of states. He highlighted 
that SADC’s main problem is that it is donor-driven and the political will to tackle real issues 
in the region had disappeared. The respondent suggested a scenario whereby the SADC-
CNGO would be stationed permanently in the office of the SADC Secretariat and they would 
work together, complementing each other, not antagonising each other. 
South Africa’s respondents were of the view that civil-society voices were very weak, 
characterised by poor coordination, and lacking in vision, depth, research and courage. 
Overall, civil society was not perceived to be very effective, as governments are not challenged 
to be more accountable to SADC citizens. Respondents bemoaned the existing situation 
where governments just bulldozed their way. This view was stressed by respondents from 
Mozambique, who indicated that SADC should move away from being an organisation of 
rhetoric without action, to being an organisation of rhetoric accompanied by practical action 
the and implementation of agreed-upon positions. 
Respondents from Swaziland said that, to a considerable extent, the SADC was working to its 
own expectations and cited that this could be detected in the protocols, declarations, policies 
and treaties that SADC formulated and adopted, some of which addressed the interests of the 
region’s populace. However, what remains unpalatable is the lack of domestication and the 
implementation of these legal statutes by member states. Therefore, the setting up of an 
institution such as the African Peer Review Commission at SADC level to regularly assess 
progress would be recommended. 
However, even civil society has not been vocal enough in lobbying for the creation and 
operationalisation of such a mechanism. Respondents indicated that civil society should 
improve its capacity to tackle issues of regional interest, and should be able to provide 
solutions to problems, especially for those marginalised in the region. They cited civil-society 
organisations’ “weakness” as being bereft of resources, thereby hampering staff development 
programmes for the SADC-CNGO human resources. There remains a great need to further 
train and develop their staff, but financial and material challenges have been a hurdle that 
needs overcoming. Respondents spoke of the need for civil-society organisations to rework 
their funding models as problems came from donors whose agendas were not to enhance 
149 
positive interaction between governments and citizens, but rather to fuel tension which 
benefited their own agendas.  
Governments should work with CSOs and NGOs, and begin to consider these entities as 
important stakeholders in the process of developing and improving the livelihoods of the 
region’s citizens. On the other hand, respondents argued that SADC member states should 
uphold solidarity and promote unity among them. The regional grouping should prioritise the 
human development and economic empowerment of its citizens. 
6.4.9 Direct participation of national CSOs in SADC decision-making 
Article 23 of the SADC Treaty speaks of a desire to allow for participation in decision-making 
by citizens; yet, SADC has constructed an interstate organisation where engagement and 
decision-making is done through governments. It is important to explore whether there are any 
avenues for the direct participation of citizens in decision-making processes, as outlined in the 
founding treaty and as is the basis of the deliberative democracy conceptual framework. The 
questions thus sought to find out whether there was any direct participation, given the 
intergovernmental construction of the organisation. 
Tanzania’s respondents highlighted a lack of meaningful participation by civil society in 
SADC’s policy-making initiatives. Instead, civil society has been limited to advocacy and 
lobbying on the peripheries, for example, the campaign against the violations of human rights 
in Zimbabwe during the 2008 era, where TANGO [Technical Assistance to NGOs] called for 
global solidarity of civil-society organisations to attend to Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and 
political challenges. Respondentsy stated that civil society had remained an unceremonious 
watchdog of the programmes and policies formulated by SADC without civil society’s input.  
To this end, interviewees hinted that efforts were underway to create National Poverty 
Observatories, a state–civil society organ which would be tasked with monitoring the 
implementation of the RISDP. These observatories are to be domiciled in each member state. 
They further highlighted that civil society in Tanzania had been working outside government 
systems purely as a watchdog. However, although discretionary, civil-society groups had on 
certain occasions been invited onto advisory committees in programme or policy development.  
Respondents spoke of resistance to co-option due to fear of being compromised. They were 
sceptical about government sincerity and indicated their desire to safeguard the important role 
of civil society by protecting its integrity against any attempts by the government to use it for 
its own benefit. Respondents from Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and the Seychelles 
indicated that they have minimal participation in policy issues. However, respondents from 
Zimbabwe indicated that in the resolution of the Zimbabwean political instability from 2009–
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2013, there was some space for engagement on how to solve disputes, but that did not 
translate to policy-related issues. 
Respondents from Mozambique stated that they had participated, especially when they were 
demanding the free movement of people during the formulation of the SADC Protocol on 
Trade. They even participated in the regional integration demands and during the 
implementation of the Trade Protocol. Respondents indicated that government officials do 
participate in various discussions. One respondent from Mozambique went on to say that, in 
April 2013, the Minister of Trade and Industry officially opened a dialogue on regional cross-
border trade in Maputo. This created a platform for informal cross-border traders from SADC 
countries to engage on critical issues of the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA). TFTA is 
a free-trade agreement which was negotiated between SADC, the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC).  
However, these respondents mentioned that even if the organisation has participated in these 
initiatives, especially the Trade Protocol, there has been limited positive response to their 
advocacy. They also listed other policy initiatives they participated in, which included the 
SADC Gender Protocol. They had advocated for the promotion of health of refugees, by 
demanding the construction of health centres at the border posts of all member states. They 
further elaborated that the organisation had been advocating for older people’s rights to health 
and for the rights of orphans, the vulnerable and the youth, as well, in most SADC discussions.  
HelpAge International had been involved in SADC consultative meetings on providing a 
minimum package of services for orphans and vulnerable children and youth in 2012. The 
organisation participated during the development and roll-out of that programme. Civil society 
and other partners of HelpAge International also participated in this process. The respondent 
cited a few participants which included the Mozambican Association for the Support of Older 
People (AMAI), Mozambique Red Cross Society (IFRC) and Action for Community 
Development (ACODEV). Government officials who represent vulnerable children from social 
welfare and those engaged in issues of youth education in Mozambique were also involved in 
these initiatives. 
Zambia’s respondent indicated that the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) had 
the privilege of engaging with the SADC Secretariat as well. He noted that policy formulation 
processes at the national level are limited and are usually done through the SADC National 
Committee, although it rarely meets. Although the organisation has participated in policy-
making initiatives, he emphasised that civil-society organisations are given limited space when 
participating and are hardly consulted when it comes to trade issues, for example. When it 
comes to drafting of protocols, even if they air their views, they are usually not considered. 
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The protocols are endorsed without their participation and they never see any of their 
contributions in the final documents. 
Zambia’s respondent, Matrine Chuku, has a predefined agenda regarding donor and World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) interests which are adopted by the government. Chuku, who has 
been part of the gender equality movement for some time, specified that her organisation and 
other gender movements have been involved in the drafting of the SADC protocols and in 
gender and development initiative policy issues. During these discussions, the government 
officials were involved in the partnership and they cooperated in developing policies at the 
national and regional levels with, for example, the AU. She went on to explain that other 
organisations were involved, especially those which advocate for women’s rights in Africa and 
those which promote the anti-gender-based violence laws in Zambia. They have been involved 
in the amendment and constitutional reviews, and the respondent noted that there is equality 
during these discussions. 
The respondents from South Africa indicated that they have participated in SADC processes, 
including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) representative. Although 
this had been done through an official government position, the respondent pointed out that 
the Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council’s (SATUCC) involvement in the Social 
Charter in South Africa in 1992 was done through active engagement by civil society. The 
respondent from Namibia indicated that their organisation was new, so they did not have the 
privilege of direct participation in SADC’s policy-making processes. The respondents from 
Mauritius indicated that their apex organisation, the Mauritius Council of Social Services 
(MACOSS), has been involved informally in making presentations to some protocols that were 
being drafted. The respondents from Lesotho indicated that that their organisation has been 
involved in several SADC policy-making initiatives through being consulted on several SADC 
draft documents on key protocols such as the SADC Gender Protocol. 
The respondents from Botswana indicated that they have been making some representations 
to SADC, taking advantage of the proximity of the Secretariat, which is in Gaborone. They 
indicated that one of the organisations, the Botswana Khwedom Council, which deals with the 
rights of the San people, has started to get an ear on the issues that affect them as SADC 
seems to be keen to listen to minorities’ views. The respondents indicated that the organisation 
has not been participating in the SADC policy initiatives all along; they started participating in 
SADC’s policy initiatives recently, but they are probing SADC as a body to address their 
grievances. 
Respondents from the SADC Secretariat indicated that in recognition of the importance of 
quality policy research and analysis in developing SADC’s strategies, the Secretariat initiated 
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the SADC Policy Analysis and Dialogue Programme in 2001 and budgeted for pilot 
implementation in 2012/2013.The purpose of the initiative is to enhance policy dialogue among 
all key stakeholders at both the member state and regional levels, and it is designed to feed 
into the  deliberations and discussions of the SADC policy organs and other intergovernmental 
processes.  
The objective of the SADC Think Tank was to provide a platform for dialogue and the 
exchange of views among stakeholders, particularly to policy-makers and researchers, on the 
status and processes of regional integration in southern Africa. The conference was organised 
with the Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (CEEI) and attended by a whole 
range of key stakeholders, including the Secretariat, business and SADC-CNGO. In that 
conference, the SADC Deputy Executive Secretary, João Samuel Caholo, stressed the critical 
need for SADC operational processes to involve all its stakeholders, especially the 
governments of member states, civil society, the private sector, the media, policy research 
institutions and the SADC Secretariat. 
The Deputy Executive Secretary observed that one of the major threats to the successful 
implementation of regional integration and the RISDP and SIPO was the inadequate 
establishment of SNCs and the fact that the key stakeholders appear to be excluded from the 
decision-making processes of the organisation. This view was reiterated by the Director of 
SADC Policy, Planning and Resource Mobilisation, Dr Angelo Mondlane. 
Other participants in that think tank meeting indicated that the governance structures of the 
regional organisations were weak, non-participatory and not inclusive. Dr Mondlane indicated 
the need to critically revisit the state of functionality of the SNCs and why member states were 
not living up to their commitments to stakeholder involvement in decision-making processes. 
Member states were cited as dominant figures in the decision-making processes and they do 
this at the expense of key stakeholders such as national legislatures, civil society and the 
business community.  
6.4.10 Equality of voice and minority views in SADC decision-making 
One of the key tenets of deliberative democracy is equality of voice. This refers to the way in 
which minority views are treated in the decision-making processes. Cohen (1996) argues that, 
in a democratic society, members are conceived of as free and equal citizens. Equality of 
voice articulates values that apply to the democratic arrangements for making binding, 
authoritative and enforceable decisions, and it aims to provide appropriate guidance about the 
appropriate design of such arrangements. Cohen (1996) further argues that the principle of 
equality applies to the framework for making authoritative and enforceable collective decisions 
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and specifies, inter alia, the system of rights and opportunities for free and equal members to 
influence decisions with which they are expected to comply and that are made in their name. 
Most importantly, it is framed in a manner that ensures that members can legitimately make 
systems on the highest levels of systems of authoritative collective decision-making. 
The research thus fielded questions to determine how minority views are treated in the 
decision-making processes. The research dealt with minority views in both SADC as an 
institution and the civil-society organisations themselves. The views of respondents from 
Tanzania were that there is limited consideration of the minority views in various policy 
discussions due to what they cited as “limited platforms” for discussions, which includes 
minority views. They indicated that gender issues had been incorporated in the new 
constitution, but there seemed to be a limited commitment on the part of the government to 
protect these rights. They cited a constitutional court challenge that hoped to ensure the 
equality of men and women in government positions, but which was dismissed as not practical 
and could only be implemented progressively. Respondents also revealed their views that 
minority views such as gay and lesbian rights were not only taboo but criminal in Tanzania. 
They spoke of what they called difficulties in ascertaining the impact of citizen participation in 
the policy-formulation processes. 
The respondents from Swaziland indicated that all views and contributions made were taken 
on board, since civil-society contributions were done prior to the Summit. However, there 
cannot be any guarantee that the input materialised will be adopted and implemented. They 
further revealed that the government does not recognise the views of minority groups, since 
more often these groups will not be represented and the Swazi system discriminates against 
gender. Although they are recognised in the constitution, they are not honoured in practice. 
The respondents indicated that the situation in Mozambique was different, with respondents 
indicating that they were all respected and their views treated equally. They said the views of 
minorities were taken on board and taken as seriously as the views of others. A representative 
of a gender equality group from that country said that they were treated with equality during 
discussions. She even went on to say that the organisation had been invited to other SADC 
policy and programme reviews, where they will be raising awareness or reviewing SADC 
policies and programmes to see how age is reflected in the policies and programmes, and that 
all the participants are treated equally.  
The respondents from Zambia gave a different picture on the treatment of minority views. They 
were of the view that not all the stakeholders are treated equally. Some participants are given 
ample time, while others are not given adequate space for participation. They consider 
specialist knowledge when they are in discussions, for instance, if it is trade, people with a 
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good knowledge of trade mobilise organisations to engage with government. They are the 
ones who are invited and who are given the opportunity to express their views. After a rigorous 
process of debate, consensus can be reached, but where there are strong differences in 
opinion a vote may be called for to arrive at a final position. 
A representative of the women and gender equality movement in Zambia argued that usually 
during the discussions they agree with other stakeholders and what they agree becomes a 
policy position issue. She argued that the views of the minority are supposed to be considered, 
that is why civil society speaks for them. Moreover, she argued that the discussions represent 
what has been achieved so far to come up with certain laws. The respondent said their 
organisation has been effective as the civil-society voice in SADC. They have managed to 
accelerate various achievements in Zambia through pushing the government to implement 
different policies as agreed in various protocols. She indicated that this has seen an increase 
in the influence and numbers of women in leadership positions. The respondent also spoke of 
the influence of civil society in influencing constitutional reforms on the anti-gender-based 
violence laws which are being implemented and enforced. These have assisted in the 
protection of women and girl children from sexual abuse and increased gender awareness. 
The respondents from Botswana outlined that, ideally, the outcomes of the discussions should 
reflect the views of the stakeholders, especially minorities; however, in practice, they reflect 
the interests of the leaders. The San movement argued that in Botswana they were not treated 
with equality as the views of the minority are not considered. For instance, ever since the 
SADC-CNGO started the fora of civil-society organisations in 2002, there has never been any 
discussions of the issues of minorities and indigenous groups. The organisation has been 
advocating for the right to their land as they represent the voice of the San people. They are 
being relocated to areas they do not like, the government is imposing strict legislation on 
hunting and they are not allowed to use their traditional hunting methods. None of these 
grievances are being considered, even in the regional body; yet, they are a special-interest 
group faced with extinction. 
The South African respondents were of the view that that there is limited consideration of 
minority views and as such there is limited fairness. This is because veto power still lies in the 
hands of government and is used arbitrarily to scuttle any suggestions or motions made by 
civil society. Respondents also noted that big business still wields significant influence over 
government. Other respondents noted that NGOs have plenty of space to discuss issues both 
at the country and regional levels; however, there is no clarity in the transmission of ideas from 
the NGOs to the regional body.  
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The respondents from Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Namibia agreed with 
consensus that there is limited consideration of minority views, as decision-making uses 
majoritarian approaches. They spoke of the decision-making structures as promoting a 
winner-take-all system and not promoting a compromise approach. However, at the level of 
the SADC-CNGO there seemed to be general agreement from both the Secretariat and the 
membership that all views of members are taken on board. They cited as an example that, in 
the recent past, they have received membership from minority group organisations 
representing the elderly, children and indigenous people who are recognised under the 
Council’s framework as Associate Members. There were further indications that during the 
discussions of the SADC-CNGO, either in ordinary executive meetings or in the meetings of 
annual general meetings, decisions are made through exhaustive discussions until a position 
of consensus is reached. They indicated that while the constitution provides for voting, when 
a consensus position fails, there have been very few times when they resorted to that. They 
further indicated that even when they had to divide the house into a vote, minority views were 
not totally rejected. 
6.4.11 Effects of state–CSO relations in SADC decision-making 
Deliberative democracy also emphasises decision-making in which those in government and 
the governed make decisions after a collective process of discussion. In that regard, it is 
against the state’s domination of citizens in decision-making. It speaks of the need for 
exhaustive engagement by all concerned parties to a position of consensus. Where consensus 
is not reached and decisions have to be put to a vote, that vote should be taken after all 
participants have been made to sufficiently understand all the issues on the table. In this way, 
deliberative democracy buffers the state’s domination of citizens. O'Doherty and Davidson 
(2010) views the deliberative democracy approach as emphasising democracy as government 
by discussion, and specifically rational deliberation, which is process of a reason giving 
citizens information about matters of the common good. 
In that regard, this research also sought to determine the state–civil society relations in 
different member states and how they affect the ability of the CSOs to contribute significantly 
to the decision-making processes of the SADC. The respondents from Tanzania indicated that 
state–civil society relations are tense, especially for organisations dealing with issues of good 
governance and human rights. One of the respondents said that: 
The government seems to have an entrenched view that those civil-society 
organisations dealing with these issues were not sincere as they seemed sympathetic 
to the opposition political movement. In some instances, they were viewed as often 
regarded as fronting for opposition political parties and agents of Western countries 
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seeking to destabilise the country by replacing it with opposition parties that are not 
rooted to the liberation struggle and thus easy to manipulate for imperialism purposes. 
This has even escalated to the regional level and the same hostile reception 
experienced by CSOs at national level is also transferred to SADC level. 
The respondents revealed the serious need for multi-stakeholder participation in addressing 
policy issues at the regional level. They singled out the need to concentrate efforts towards 
addressing the Protocol on Agricultural Funding, which they believe is at the epicentre of the 
development of the region, arguing that nations should prioritise the funding of agriculture in 
their budget policies. Respondents also emphasised the need for civil society to seek 
alternative methods of engagement with SADC, such as targeting the SADC Secretariat 
Committees. 
However, one of the respondents revealed that in Tanzania state–civil society relations have 
improved, with more space for civil-society participation in governance being created. He, 
however, felt more could still be done in increasing the role of civil society in decision- and 
policy-making platforms. The only problem was that the Tanzanian government does not seem 
keen to create such platforms; instead, it is through efforts by CSOs that fora are convened, 
such as roundtables where government officials are invited to address policy-related matters 
in conjunction with non-state actors. The respondents indicated that there were some 
instances of cooperation which, they stated, only come about when government needs help 
from non-governmental organisations, for example, the recent discovery of gas in Tanzania 
where organisations were approached to carry out research on that discovery. 
The respondents from Swaziland spoke of how the democratic space remains closed in that 
country, which in turn has increased tension between the two entities. Government has 
continued to take a firm hand against civil-society organisations, because they have been at 
the forefront of the fight for democratisation in the country so that modern democratic systems 
can replace Africa’s last remaining absolute monarchy. In his own words, a veteran civil 
society leader, Ndlangamandla, from Swaziland said: 
Civil-society organisations in Swaziland continue to take an adversarial approach and 
are not being complimentary of government efforts, and this has led to soured relations 
between the two entities, as the government perceives the civil society as proxies of 
opposition political parties. Relationship between civil society and government will 
remain unsavoury as long there is a dearth of democratic practices in Swaziland. 
CSOs will continue to be viewed as enemies of the state and will thus not be granted 
any role in policy-making. This will lead to the continued lobbying for space at regional 
level by civil society. 
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The situation seemed different in Mozambique, as respondents intimated that relations 
between the state and civil society were good, and there was constant interaction between 
the two entities through the SNC. They indicated that this interaction created warm relations 
which have allowed them input into national polic-making processes. They indicated that most 
organisations, including the Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA), 
where one of the respondents came from, were often invited to the national policy 
development processes. Respondents said despite the usual discord that characterise group 
dynamics, there was a functional system of interaction at all levels of government. 
However, the head of the Southern Africa Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA) 
indicated that while it was true that there is good interaction between the government and civil 
society, there seemed to be a deliberate approach to work with individual civil-society 
organisations. The respondent stated that the government seemed not to be keen to work with 
organised civil society organisations and that, in most government initiatives, the apex 
organisation was excluded with government choosing to work directly with individual civil-
society groupings. He indicated that, when it comes to the ministerial and central government 
level, the apex organisation is excluded from discussions, thus eroding the input of a collective 
and organised civil-society voice in policy-making processes. The selective approach in 
working with civil society was described as a source of mistrust, ostensibly premised on the 
view that the selection process might be abused to lean more towards those viewed as 
sympathetic to the government – what the respondent described as “GONGOs” (government 
organised non-governmental organisations). 
The Zambian respondents stated that their relationships with government were not good at 
all, owing to governments’ desire to monopolise power and make unilateral decisions. The 
situation was said to be critical when it came to human rights issues, while for those dealing 
with what they termed “soft issues” to do with food aid, there seemed to be substantial 
accommodation. They spoke of what they termed restrictive laws against human rights 
organisations that make their operations extremely difficult. 
Given the gulf between government and civil society, participation at SADC level is very 
difficult. Cooperation is minimal on both local and regional issues. The dysfunctionality of the 
SNCs was cited as one of the main reasons for the gulf between government and civil society. 
Restrictive legislation and regulations have seen the Zambian NGOs take the government to 
court, challenging the newly revised NGO Act, which among other things empowers the 
government to deregister NGOs. In her own words, one of the respondents said that: 
There is no complementary relationship; partnerships are not really there. This has 
been due to the mistrust. Right now, in Zambia, the CSOs is in court with the 
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government due to the NGO Act which is stiffening their operations. They are now 
being asked to review their sources of funding and financial resources; yet, they are 
not in favour of it. The government is saying that those organisations delivering 
services should register under the Registrar General. 
The respondents from Botswana presented the relationship between government and civil 
society as not smooth flowing. Government views civil-society organisations as radical. They 
are seen as members of the opposition party. The respondents further emphasised that the 
relationship has rarely been friendly. These relations negatively affect the work of civil society, 
as they are not allowed to contribute real issues to SADC. They indicated that, in most 
instances, they hear of adopted policy decisions “through the grapevine”. Civil-society 
organisations have not been taken seriously, and anything they advocate for is viewed as a 
threat to government. They spoke of a need for an NGO policy in Botswana to facilitate proper 
engagement between the government and the BOCONGO, to enhance understanding and 
ensure transparency. 
The respondents from South Africa admitted that even though there is some space for 
engagement, it was not sufficient to allow for any meaningful action to be taken by civil society 
in influencing policy formulation in SADC. They indicated that, at SADC level, it is virtually non-
existent. One of the respondents displayed the clear disconnect that existed, because in his 
conceptualisation of civil society, he appeared limited to the narrow-minded view of a trade 
union group lobbying for wage increments, instead of focusing on the larger picture of civil 
society as a whole within SADC policy formulation and implementation. This showed the 
vacuum that exists in the civil society movement – that of a fundamental disconnect between 
trade unionists and other NGOs in terms of vision and policy thrust.  
Other respondents from South Africa indicated that, in some cases, NGOs work hand-in-hand 
with the government. However, these areas were largely divorced from governance issues 
and mainly focused on research through partnerships with universities and think tank 
organisations. Dr Hartzenberg argued that the government sees civil society as being too 
critical, and this creates a very tense and unfriendly working environment for engagement, 
even though official policy is for engagement. This respondent displayed an in-depth 
knowledge of the processes that take place both within SADC as an intergovernmental body 
and the CNGO as a civil-society actor at regional level. She also displayed optimism at the 
prospects of greater citizen involvement in SADC policy-making through civil-society 
engagement, claiming that this was her right as espoused in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. 
She referred to herself as a SADC citizen all through the interview. 
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The respondents from Namibia indicated that there was significant acceptance for working 
together between government and civil society, but the former was sometimes viewed as 
being a too radical and this has caused some tension, albeit at a minimal level. The fragile 
SNC in that country limited the space for direct and consistent engagement between the 
government and civil society. Lesotho’s respondents spoke of strained relations between the 
government and civil society. They argued that government lacks commitment to work 
together with civil society and accused it of being too political, even when it was not necessary. 
The respondents also accused the government of misrepresenting facts to SADC on matters 
that civil society and the government have discussed. They argued that the government has 
limited respect  for the views of civil society and  an inability to facilitate a continuous exchange 
of ideas through the SNC has made the situation even more problematic. 
In Zimbabwe, the situation was said to be one of tension and mistrust between the government 
and civil-society organisations. The suspicions arose from government accusations that the 
CSO movement was an extension of the opposition political front working in cohort with the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to effect what they termed an “illegal regime change 
agenda”. The government of Zimbabwe, under siege from the domestic and international 
community due to its unpopular and undemocratic policies, turned its fangs on anyone 
opposed to its views. In some instances, the state accused CSOs of being the recipients of 
foreign funding that is then channelled to the MDC. Zimbabwean legislation governing the 
operation of political parties prohibits the foreign funding of political parties.  
On the other hand, CSOs view the Zimbabwean government as being undemocratic, and 
closing all spaces and avenues for citizen participation in policy decisions that affect their lives. 
They argued that they are all fighting to facilitate the active and meaningful participation of 
citizens in the way they are governed.  
6.4.12 Communication to enhance SADC–CSO participative decision-making 
The deliberative democracy tenet of communication emphasises the need for continuous 
feedback between citizens and elected officials. Norris and Odugbenin (2008) see 
communication between elected officials and citizens as key to empowering people to make 
better choices, by providing them with timely and accurate information. For governance, the 
two‐way flow of information is the central conduit connecting citizens and the state. Coronel 
(2003) argues that governments cannot be held accountable if citizens are ill-informed about 
the actions of officials and institutions, with the “watchdog press” being the guardian of the 
public interest, warning citizens against those who are doing them harm. Sen (1994) also 
outlines the need for “transparency guarantees” such as a free press and the free flow of 
information. Sen (1994) sees the media as a watchdog not just against corruption but also 
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against disaster, further arguing that there has never been a famine in a functioning multiparty 
democracy with regular, credible elections, healthy opposition parties and an unfettered media 
(Curran, 2002:217).  
Contemporary democratic theory appreciates the watchdog role in ensuring that the 
government is held accountable for all its actions. It is argued that the government cannot be 
held accountable if citizens are ill-informed about the actions of officials and institutions. This 
role requires the media to act as a guardian of the public interest, warning citizens against 
those who are doing them harm. In this regard, the research sought to determine whether 
there were any formal communication channels that enabled easy interaction between civil 
society and the government for enhanced participative decision-making. 
The respondents from Tanzania outlined that there were no formal and clear lines of 
communication between the state and civil society. For instance, access to the Ministry of 
Gender is through informal means. They indicated that the only form of interaction that exists 
is normally through efforts made by civil society. For instance, the introduction of gender-
based budgeting in Tanzania was an effort by civil-society thematic groupings to train 
government officials on the promotion of women’s interests starting with the budget. 
Another respondent revealed that they normally engaged government officials, including the 
President of Tanzania, for instance, during the Church and Religious Leadership Meeting in 
Mining in 2014.The respondents further indicated that the government of Tanzania is receptive 
to faith-based organisations and, as such, there is frequently feedback and interactional 
communication on progress made concerning multi-stakeholder programmes, ensuring that 
there is accountability. However, respondents bemoaned the absence of media coverage and 
advertising of the government–civil society engagements, thus stifling efforts for enriching 
feedback. 
The respondents from Swaziland indicated that there were no clear channels, as the 
government did not communicate anything formally to civil society since engagement between 
the two is informal. For instance, communication between the respondent’s organisation and 
the relevant government department was a privilege derived from kinsmanship, since the 
respondent and the minister responsible hail from the same village. 
The absence of a functional SADC national committee was cited as one of the major causes 
of the disconnection between the government and civil society when it comes to information 
exchange. Respondents from Mozambique indicated that while there was a well-functioning 
SNC which allowed for effective information flow between the government and civil society, 
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there was a hitch when it came to communication of information to beneficiaries. Beneficiaries 
of the programmes had little information on processes and their outcomes.  
Respondents spoke of the need to widen information dissemination platforms to reach out to 
a wider audience and thus widen the sphere of citizen participation in the decision-making 
processes. The respondents from Zambia said while there was a dysfunctional SNC, there 
was considerable feedback by the government to stakeholders on the state of affairs in policy-
making processes. A respondent from Zambia said:  
The outcomes were published and they even distributed various pamphlets; some are 
posted on their websites and advertised, but accessibility of such material is difficult 
because most of the population of Zambia is illiterate. Even those who are literate [sic] 
access to various outcomes are still a challenge. That is why in terms of access to 
services of our organisation is still low because people are still much behind [sic]. They 
cannot use them. 
The respondents also indicated that even though the information was constantly given out 
during constitution feedback meetings and was found on websites, the rural population who 
form the bulk of the Zambian population was excluded. 
The respondents from Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, the Seychelles, Malawi and Lesotho 
were of the common view that little is done by their governments to facilitate continuous 
information flow between them and civil society. They also indicated that there was no 
advertisement of the spaces that could enhance the interaction and engagement of the two 
entities. The absence of interactive and effective communication structures between civil 
society and the SADC Secretariat, as well as civil society and the government, are very 
limitative in enhancing increased stakeholder participation in SADC decision- making 
processes. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented data and responses from various categories of respondents on their 
views regarding the state of civil-society participation in SADC’s policy-making processes. The 
responses are categorised into three key thematic areas focusing on SADC’s organisational 
structure and decision-making processes. The other thematic focus is on civil-society 
participation as a function of inclusive decision-making in SADC. The third thematic area 
focuses on the legal and statutory provisions for participative decision- making and the extent 
of their functionality. The data presented is from different categories of respondents namely 
the SADC Secretariat, the senior officials of civil-society organisations at the member state 
level, the senior officials of the SADC-CNGO and government officials directly linked to the 
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operations of SADC. The responses, in summary, reflect a state of disarray with regards to 
the participation of civil society in SADC’s decision-making processes.  
The SNCs – the key organs constructed to enhance this participation – are totally 
dysfunctional in all but one SADC member state and, in their absence, there are no other 
viable avenues for this participation. It also emerges that there are other issues relating to 
state–civil society relations that are a serious cause for a disconnection in operations between 
the two institutions, to the detriment of enhanced citizen participation in SADC decision-
making.  
The chapter also presented material from research conducted into SADC documents relating 
to the establishment of SNCs and other related organs from stakeholder participation in its 
decision-making processes. The combination of data from document analysis and field 
interviews assisted in giving a comprehensive picture on the state of affairs regarding civil-
society participation in SADC’s policy-making processes. 
The next chapter analyses these responses against the key tenets of deliberative democracy, 
namely: accountability, equality of voice, reciprocity and communication, and how their 
absence in the current SADC decision-making processes is limitative to stakeholder 
participation. It will further make conclusions based on analyses as to whether their application 
could be the prescription for the enhancement of stakeholder participation in the decision-
making processes of the regional bloc. 
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Chapter 7: Data analysis and conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter makes an in-depth analysis of the research findings presented in Chapter Six. 
The analysis is measured against the conceptual framework of deliberative democracy in 
enhancing inclusive decision-making in SADC’s policy-making processes. The analysis 
framework tests how the deliberative democracy tenets of accountability, reciprocity, equality 
and communication are dealt with in SADC’s decision-making processes. The analysis seeks 
to answer three key issues on civil-society participation in decision-making: 
I. How ADC and its decision-making institutions currently operate using the tenets of 
deliberative democracy as an evaluative lens. 
II. Identification and discussion of the legislative framework which enables participation 
and deliberation. 
III. Exploration of possibilities for deliberative decision making in relation to civil-society 
participation. 
The analysis seeks to answer the primary research question which is: 
Why do civil society and stakeholders find it difficult to participate in SADC decision-making 
processes despite statutory provisions in the SADC Treaty?  
The secondary and related questions are: 
a. Does the interstate nature of SADC institutions limit meaningful participation of civil 
society in policy formulation processes? 
b. Do SADC democratic policy formulation processes adequately include civil-society 
interests in the region and within member states? 
c. Why would the deliberative democracy principles of equality, reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability be useful in enhancing civil society participation in SADC’s decision-
making processes? 
7.2 SADC legislative and institutional provisions for participative decision-
making 
The research findings reveal that the SADC Secretariat, civil society organisations at the 
country level, government officials and the SADC-CNGO all acknowledge that the 
organisation provides for institutional structures for civil-society and stakeholder participation 
in decision-making processes. 
164 
Most respondents were aware that in terms of the SADC Treaty, Article 23 provides for 
stakeholder participation in decision making processes. The SADC Treaty Amendment Article 
1(5.2)(b) stipulates that SADC will: “encourage the people of the region and their institutions 
to take initiatives to develop economic, social and cultural ties across the region and to 
participate fully in the implementation of the programmes and projects of the SADC”. 
The SADC Treaty recognises key stakeholders as important partners in the implementation of 
the SADC Programme of Action. Article 23 of the SADC Treaty lays the foundation for key 
stakeholder participation and defines them as the private sectors, civil society, NGOs, and 
workers’ and employers’ organisations. The organisation further provides for organised 
structures for the participation of civil society and other stakeholders through the SNCs, which 
were assembled to provide inputs at the national level in the formulation of regional policies 
and strategies, as well as to coordinate and oversee the implementation of programmes at the 
national level.  
The committees are responsible for initiating SADC projects and issuing papers that provide 
input into the preparation of strategies. Committees comprise key stakeholders from the 
government, private sector and civil society in each member state. A provision for their 
establishment is reflected in the SADC Treaty. Furthermore, the organisation has made strides 
in forging partnerships with other key stakeholders such as the SADC-CNGO, a partnership 
which  was sealed through the signing of an appropriate MOU. The minutes of the SADC COM 
meeting, held on 11–16 August 2011 in Luanda, Angola, indicate that in line with guidelines 
on subsidiarity that were adopted in the SADC COM held on 15 February 2002 in Zanzibar, 
Tanzania, the Secretariat has formalised its relationship with key stakeholders by signing 
MOUs with the SADC-CNGO, the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(ASCCI) and SATUCC. 
However, even with the presence of such prescribed structures for the participation of 
stakeholders in decision-making, the research findings reveal that there is minimal 
participation of stakeholders in decision-making processes. The research confirmed the 
existence of some structures, but these do not assist in the participation of civil society in 
SADC decision-making. Evidence from the research assisted in answering questions on why 
civil society and stakeholders find it difficult to participate in SADC decision-making processes 
despite statutory provisions in the SADC Treaty.  
It also answered why SADC institutions and engagement mechanisms are limitative of 
meaningful participation of civil society in policy formulation processes. The increasing power 
of regional organisations raises fundamental issues of the impact they have on the sovereignty 
of each country in decision-making processes and how that affects citizen voices in decision-
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making. The research therefore sought to identify spaces for direct citizen participation in the 
decision-making processes of such institutions, given the amount of power and influence they 
wield in domestic policy-making.  
The evidence from the research is that despite the presence of an authoritative legislative 
framework in the form of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty and institutional provisions on 
organisational statutes, the reality is that they remain on paper with obvious limitations at the 
operational stages to allow for enhancement of stakeholder participation in decision-making. 
The glaring discovery made by the research is that the situation at SADC is not that of an 
absence of institutions for legislation, but of absence of utilisation of both existing institutions 
and legislation. The researcher’s conclusion is that the reasons for the failure of the provided 
institutional and legislative framework cannot be blamed on one group, but are traceable to all 
the key stakeholders involved in SADC’s institutional governance. It is the problem of civil 
society, the government and the SADC Secretariat as well – no single player should be blamed 
for failure to operationalise such institutions. 
The key organ for the participation of stakeholders in the decision-making of SADC is 
undoubtedly the SNCs; yet, the research reveals that of the 12 SADC countries used in the 
research, only one – Mozambique – has a functional SNC which, while not meeting all the 
standards as required by the guidelines, has some life. In all other countries, the committees 
only exist on paper or are mere extensions of certain government departments.  
The SNCs are supposed to be the pulse of the operationalisation of stakeholder interaction 
and participation in SADC decision-making, yet they are moribund. Using measures of the key 
tenets of deliberative democracy, the following is observed as one of the reasons for limitations 
in participation of stakeholders in the SADC decision-making processes. 
While in 2003 there seemed to be progress in the establishment of the SNCs in most SADC 
countries, that enthusiasm seemed to die down and later events reflected digression in the 
operationalisation of set organs to the extent of reaching dysfunctional levels in some 
countries. The situation regarding the existence and life of SNCs reflects a serious decline in 
their influence or construction, yet the SNCs are supposed to be key organs for 
operationalisation of inclusive decision-making between civil society and SADC institutions. 
7.3 CSO participation and promotion of accountability in SADC 
Steffek and Ferretti (2009) are of the view that the participation of civil society in international 
governance might enhance the democratic accountability of international organisations, in the 
sense that it might help citizens to regain control over international governance and to hold 
decision-makers publicly to account.  
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In the SADC context, CSOs act as watchdogs and creators of the public sphere in that they 
monitor political developments and act as transmitters of highly specialised information, thus 
creating a link with global citizenry. Steffek and Ferretti (2009) further argue that such functions 
might provide the global audience with critical counter-expertise to challenge international 
organisations and governments. Public criticism and contestation of polices thus create public 
accountability, urging decision-makers to explain their choices. Invariably, such participation 
of civil society may assist in improving the quality of decisions by introducing views and 
arguments from that global constituency that otherwise would be neglected. 
The deliberative democracy tenet of accountability calls for what Beckmann (2000) points to 
as the exercise of power, use of resources and implementation of policy, inextricably linking 
the concept to democratic management and other related concepts such as participation, 
decentralisation, empowerment and transparency. The key institutional structures in SADC for 
the participation of civil society are the SNCs which are supposed to enhance the 
accountability of elected representatives to citizen electors. However, from this research, there 
seemed to be limited evidence to conclude that there was maximum utilisation of said spaces 
in a manner that could promote accountability.  
While the SADC COM defines how the SNCs in all SADC member states should be 
constructed, there seemed to be no standard, therefore causing problems of functional 
measurability. Findings from the records of the SADC COM meeting, held on 9–11 August 
2001 in Blantyre, Malawi, reflect a desire by SADC to establish the SNCs. The minutes speak 
of a Summit decision on the establishment of the SNCs and that draft guidelines had been 
developed to facilitate the adoption of common minimum standards on the structure and 
operations of the SNCs. The Council approved these draft guidelines. The Council also noted 
that the main purpose of the SNCs was to ensure broad and effective participation of key 
stakeholders in SADC policy-making initiatives.  
The guidelines state a SNC should have technical committees with chairpersons in four key 
named areas: Trade and Industry and Finance and Investment (TIFI); Infrastructure and 
Services (I&S); Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR); and Human and Social 
Development and Special Projects (HSD&SP). However, the research revealed that, save for 
Mozambique, even specific countries claiming to have national committees did not have such 
structures in place. The structures were designed to maximise the interaction and coordination 
in each cluster to guarantee that stakeholders had easier access to decision-making, thus 
improving accountability. The absence of well-structured standardised and functional SNCs 
makes it extremely difficult to measure the state of common progress in each country 
regarding the accountability of the government to its citizens.  
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The absence of well-structured SNCs defeats the whole purpose of providing a form of 
engagement between stakeholders and the government on issues to do with regional 
governance. These findings are consistence with Nzewi and Zakwe’s (2009:21) research on 
national committees. They concluded that “the lack of a standardised structure for SNCs in 
the country case studies poses problems in terms of monitoring and evaluating their functions 
and effectiveness”. 
7.3.1 Frequency of meetings by the SNCs 
Regular meetings are a key measure of enhancing accountability under the deliberative 
democracy model. With regards to SADC, the SADC Treaty of 2001 stipulates that SNCs 
should meet quarterly. This is a way of ensuring that there would be continuous feedback and 
the participation of key stakeholders in decision-making processes.  
However, there is no provision in respect of the regularity of the meetings of the 
subcommittees and technical committees. The reality from the countries studied was that there 
was no sign of SNCs meeting quarterly as defined in the Treaty. Even those committees that 
claimed to be meeting were unable to provide any proceedings of these meetings. This also 
applies to the technical committees; their meetings were difficult to trace leading to a 
conclusion they had not been held at all. 
The situation was only different in Mozambique where there was some semblance of regularity 
in meetings. In Botswana, the situation seemed delicate, in that the government seemed to 
be the one controlling who and which civil society organisations were involved in the 
processes; it was the custodian of all proceedings and access to them was not easy at all. 
The idea of structured and regular meetings is meant to improve interaction by different 
stakeholders. Meetings are also aimed at ensuring there is continued accountability of primary 
policy-makers to secondary policy-makers. The government as the primary policy-maker 
would be more accountable to its stakeholders, namely civil society, if it had regular meetings 
with them as defined in the statutes that create those SNCs. 
The above assertion further confirms a conclusion from the related research by Nzewi and 
Zakwe (2009), who indicate that meetings of SNCs were ad hoc, irregular and largely issue-
driven; they were convened when there was a need. In Mozambique, the respondents stated 
that the plenary meets once a year and the national committee structure meets once a month. 
However, the respondents admitted that SNC activities were the determined by availability of 
donor funds and related issues. 
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7.3.2 Absence of capacitated Secretariat 
One of the key drivers of the functional SNCs was identified as a well-capacitated Secretariat. 
The research findings indicated that a well-capacitated secretariat ensures that the 
organisation can continuously coordinate meetings and communicate with stakeholders, thus 
enhancing accountability and participative decision-making. However, as already noted, most 
of the countries did not have a Secretariat and, in those that did, it was not properly 
capacitated. 
In most countries, there was evidence that they were just focal points where the SNC was 
dependent on already existing departmental structures to function within governments. In 
other words, SNC officials combined their SNC responsibilities with their day-to-day 
responsibilities in the government. The net effect would be weak coordination and poor 
mobilisation of programmes, thus undermining the link that is supposed to exist between 
government and civil society. Inevitably, this reduces government accountability to citizens. 
These findings are consistent with similar findings by Nzewi and Zwake (2009:22), who reveal 
that: 
Linked to the issues of fully operational SNC secretariats is the need for human 
resources and the financial capital to fund them. SNC secretariats were found to be 
staffed by single individuals within the Department of Foreign Affairs. Usually these 
officers also combined their SNC responsibilities with their day-to-day responsibilities 
in the government. 
The absence of functional secretariats has made it difficult for the SNCs to operate and 
promote the intended continued interaction between SADC and civil society in a manner that 
enhances the accountability of the former to its citizenry. 
7.3.3 Poor advocacy and engagement strategies 
One of the key weaknesses that was identified as hindering the effective positioning of the 
civil-society voice in the discussion for SADC’s policy inclusiveness was the nature and 
approaches of the engagement by civil-society organisations themselves.  
While the SNCs are supposed to embark on constructive engagement with governments, 
officials interviewed together with the Secretariat of SADC revealed that civil-society 
organisations in most cases were the reasons behind the dysfunctionality of said committees. 
Government officials in collaboration with the SADC Secretariat indicated that SNCs were 
established in Malawi, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania in 2002, 
while in Zimbabwe and Lesotho they were established in 2003. However, the government 
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official indicated that in meetings it emerged clearly that civil-society organisations did not 
have a complementary role, as they began to use committees to discredit their governments.  
Officials indicated that while there was appreciation for expanded engagement for inclusive 
decision-making, it was important for civil-society organisations to understand that 
governments have a mandate derived from the votes of the majority of their citizens and took 
a constitutional oath to represent them effectively. Civil society, they noted, was nothing more 
than part of the citizenry and they represented specific constituencies, which in most instances 
did not include the whole of the population. In that regard, government officials indicated that 
it would be a dereliction of duty on their part if they were to defer all decision-making to civil 
society that did not have the legal mandate of the whole state.  
These officials noted that while the government might not have come into power with 100% of 
the votes of all voting citizens, they had the constitutional power and authority to preside over 
all citizens, including those who did not vote for them. They indicated that SADC countries are 
representative democracies and civil society needed to respect that. However, it was their 
view that instead of engaging in progressive policy issues, civil society turned national 
committees into organisations for personal aggrandisement and grandstanding, ultimately 
creating reluctance on the part of governments to engage them. It is this researcher’s view 
that this poor engagement approach by civil-society organisations themselves has contributed 
to governments limiting accountability to citizens. 
In most countries where there is tension between civil society and the government, poor 
engagement approaches by civil society have been used to justify leaving the government in 
sole control of decision-making processes. This weakens the ability of SADC to fulfil its 
commitments as outlined in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty which calls for involvement of key 
stakeholders in decision-making. For civil society to facilitate government accountability to the 
citizenry in decision-making processes, it would be prudent for them to revise their approaches 
and be more diplomatic, strategic and results-oriented. This argument draws from Anyang’ 
Nyang’o (2002) who speaks of the imperative necessity of establishing an organisational 
mechanism for civil society in every country to institutionalise relations with the government. 
This has the effect of assisting African systems through the restructuring of relations between 
the state and society, by strengthening the capacity of civil society to impact policy reforms 
and create accountable systems of governance. 
There are, however, complications associated with engagement between the state and 
society. For instance, Masterson (2010) speaks of complications in the engagement between 
the state and society because he sees the latter as more complicated than meets the eye. He 
argues that in both developed and underdeveloped states society, continues to be accepted 
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as a significant factor in the determination and driving of governance policies, yet the term 
“civil society” remains nebulous. He further speaks of the gap which remains unexamined, that 
of the field of relations between society and the state in the context of institutional governance. 
It is this researcher’s conclusion that there is more to be gained by civil society for its 
constituency if it were diplomatic and strategic in its engagement with the government and 
vice versa. 
The strategy of civil society in being too militant against the government breeds tension and 
repulsion, and it does not assist in making meaningful contributions to SADC’s decision-
making processes. Furthermore, this researcher concludes that while the recognition of the 
involvement of stakeholders in decision-making is important, there should be no illusion that 
stakeholders can be the primary actors in decision-making. They exist to complement the 
government and not to replace it.  
Stakeholders and civil society are available to complement the government. In this regard, 
civil society should use different engagement strategies from those of opposition political 
parties who aim to replace the government. The tragedy that faces most civil society in the 
SADC region is that while there is congruency on the issues raised by them and opposition 
parties on where the government is going wrong, their strategies for solving these problems 
should be different. 
Regrettably, evidence from the research seems to indicate that because of the similar nature 
of the issues raised by the two groups, there has been an alliance in engagement approaches, 
which unfortunately, in most instances, has created militancy on the part of the government 
as it views civil society as part of the opposition political movement and not complementing it 
in solving national problems. There is a need for civil society to tone down and accept that it 
can only go as far as complementing government efforts and that militancy should be issue-
based. Furthermore, it must have limits for them to revise their strategies so that they are not 
seen to be in the same corner with opposition political movements, as this strains relations 
and renders advocacy strategies ineffective.  
According to Nzewi and Zwake (2009:27): 
Regional NGOs in SADC proactively work to create the opportunities for interaction 
with SADC. In SADC, public participation seems to be NGO-driven through activities of 
the SADC-CNGO rather than being SADC or government-driven. The SADC CNGO, 
for instance, has been working proactively to establish a structured and systemic 
mechanism for CSO public participation in SADC. The SADC CNGO sees itself as an 
independent network of NGOs in SADC working to co-ordinate efforts of NGOs to 
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engage with SADC. The SADC CNGO sees its role as challenging civil society to 
begin talking with SADC and engaging with the SADC secretariat to transform SADC’s 
public participatory framework. 
However, conclusions from the research reflect that despite the SADC-CNGO initiative in 
building a systemised structure of civil-society interaction with regional policy and institutional 
frameworks, there is evidence indicating that structured CSO interaction at the national level 
is far from being achieved. 
7.3.4 The financing model and its effects on decision-making 
Key evidence agreed upon by the SADC Secretariat and civil-society organisations 
themselves as well as government officials is that the funding model of the SNCs affects their 
abilities to function properly. The overreliance on donor funds has affected the programming 
schedule and sometimes even the agenda and direction of discussions. In terms of SNC 
functionality, the issue of independent financing is important. For SNCs to function well, there 
should be the financial support to sustain the necessary skills and activities of these 
institutions. The SADC Treaty has provisions for the funding of the SNCs by member states, 
but in actual practice that is not happening. The SNCs have continued to rely on donor funds 
and this affects their operations. Nzwewi and Zwake (2009:24) state similar research findings: 
In the countries researched, funding for SNCs was generally expected to come from 
national budgets. In Mozambique, government officials were of the view that despite 
the inadequacies of government funding, this source nevertheless still represented the 
biggest component of funding to SNCs.69. The general picture coming from 
respondents in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique was that the mechanism for funding 
SNCs has generally not worked since budgets are determined by country development 
priorities and departmental budget expenditures have ceilings for programmes and 
projects. 
Evidence from the research also revealed that although expectations were that governments 
should fund SNCs, they seemed to feature very low in government-funding priorities. The 
respondents indicated that national budgets did not make provisions for SNC funding. They 
revealed that there was little political commitment to fund SNCs, and this sentiment flowed 
from an overall commitment to the SADC agenda and benefits, which member states believed 
they would derive from regional integration, transactions and activities.  
Given the crippling nature of the existing funding model and desirous of promoting a healthy 
balance sheet to enhance participative decision-making, it is important for SADC to revise the 
SNC funding model to ensure that the Secretariat takes over the role of funding. This will allow 
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for meetings to be held regularly, even in countries where there are tense relations between 
the government and civil society. In this way, there would be continuous engagement through 
regular SNC meetings whose agendas and influence would not be determined by any of the 
interested parties or donors. This could assist in going a long way to ensure that there is 
greater accountability of governments to citizens in the decision-making processes for the 
SADC region. 
7.4 Dealing with minority views in SADC decision-making 
One of the key tenets of deliberative democracy is the equality of voice as a way of promoting 
inclusive decision-making. The premise of the arguments for equality of voice is that while it 
is acceptable that the government is elected to represent all citizens, including all those who 
did not vote for it, it does not follow that they should make decisions without consultations. 
A vote for an individual to represent people in the legislature, and therefore in the government, 
does not always translate into a vote for a policy that the government would implement during 
its tenure in office. This means that even those who would not have voted for the political party 
which forms the government need to have a say on any new policy issues. The assumption of 
representative democracy that identifies decision-making procedures with one for electing 
political personnel and another for electing policies or laws is far from being true.  
It is true that in choosing one, people choose the other; yet, it is the parliament that makes 
laws and governments that make policies, and not the people. While representing the people, 
parliament is not “necessarily the people”. The assumption that citizens choose public officials 
based on understanding is highly contested. For instance, Hirst (1988) argues that an 
investigation into political science shows that voters do not pay attention to the specific policy 
promises of parties. Voters identify with and choose political parties and party leaders, and 
they are usually ill -informed about policy proposals. In simple terms, in many instances, voters 
don’t understand where the representative democracy game would take them to. So, as 
important as the election may be, electoral winners and therefore the representatives of the 
people cannot always be taken as representing the true will of the people. 
Arguments that in a representative democracy set-up there is impartiality and that the policies 
developed cannot infringe on the will of the people are wrong. There is a generally accepted 
but false assumption that what the parliament does is pass general laws and that the executive 
is more than an important agency of enforcement of those laws. Yet, as Hirst (1988) puts it, 
far from being a servitor of the legislature, the government is the initiator of legislation; the 
legal requirements necessary for policy programmes are brought to the legislature and carried 
by means of party discipline. What this means is that the government is a party government. 
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A party government refers to a situation where citizens vote for a political party on the strength 
of its manifesto and, after it wins, the party turns that manifesto into government policy. In the 
implementation of government policy, the political party itself will have more say in decision-
making than the government. The power to make decisions is vested in the political party and 
not its functionaries in the government. There is no pure form of representation, just packages 
of political mechanisms and voting systems. Representative democracy has limited value in 
enabling some leading decision-making personnel in the state to be changed periodically. 
Representative democracy is used as a way of shielding the government from public scrutiny 
and accountability; yet, making the government accountable to and responsive to public 
debate and public pressure may help to make the process of policy formulation and execution 
more consistent and effective. There is no doubt that in a representative democracy there are 
some levels of engagement between citizens and their elected officials, but the ultimate power 
for decision-making rests with elected government officials. However, in a representative 
democracy, the political elites who happen to be in control of the coercive instruments of state 
power have the ultimate say on what policy decisions can be put in play.  
This is the case because, being nationally elected, elected government officials are assumed 
to reflect the preferences of the majority electorate and, therefore, are politically accountable 
to the whole national constituency. However, in actual practice this is not the case because 
representative democracy, on most occasions, seems to ignore the views of minorities. 
Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett (2001) are of the view that, in some circumstances, majority rule 
might not resolve the choice among three or more mutually exclusive alternatives that are 
voted on in pairs. Accordingly, the outcome of a majority vote in policy-making bodies is 
frequently the result of the way in which the decision-making process is structured, rather than 
the true policy preferences of a majority vote. 
Deliberative democracy is said to improve governance as it allows for decision-making to be 
reached through substantial discussion and consensus, taking into consideration minority 
views as well. The winner-take-all approach does not always prove to be democratic, as the 
majority might not always be right. In fact, majoritarianism in decision-making can be used as 
a tool for the oppression of minority groups and views. The deliberative democracy principle, 
which the SADC recognises in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty when it calls for the expanded 
participation of different stakeholders in decision making, indicates that the process of 
decision-making in the regional body cannot be relegated to a select few, although they were 
elected to office.  
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The idea of the expanded involvement of stakeholders in decision-making is what runs in the 
grain of the deliberative democracy debates as argued by Gutmann and Thompson (2004:7) 
who view deliberative democracy as: 
A form of government in which free and equal citizens and their representatives justify 
decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually 
acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are 
binding in the present of all citizens but open to challenge in future. 
However, as the research revealed, there is minimal consideration of minority views in SADC. 
The respondents from Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, South Africa, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and Botswana indicated that there was militancy against minority voices 
in decision-making. 
The government remains the dominant voice which dictates what happens and what should 
be done at SADC. This flies in the face of SADC’s attempts to strengthen the participation of 
citizens in decision-making by allowing for interactive engagement between the government 
and stakeholders. In countries where some semblance of these structures exists, there is little 
regard of minority views in discussion, thus rendering the processes not very different from 
those with no structures for interaction.  
The basic idea behind meetings of the government and stakeholders is to use deliberation as 
a tool for reaching decisions. This entails discussion of issues to a point of saturation such 
that, when decisions are made, they are made by consensus taking into consideration minority 
views. 
7.5 Communication in the enhancement of inclusive decision-making in SADC 
Communication and publicity form one of the key tenets of inclusive decision-making in the 
deliberative democracy approach. The basis of the importance of communication is that where 
there is continuous feedback on activities and processes, stakeholders are empowered to 
make informed decisions. This also allows for the exchange of ideas through communication 
and dealing with barriers that arise when dominant stakeholders are the only ones tasked with 
making decisions without sharing communication and information with other stakeholders. 
In the current SADC set-up, what emerges clearly is that all participants spoke of a dearth in 
publicity and communication between SADC and stakeholders, and that was also the case 
between the state and its own stakeholders at the national level. This means that current 
configurations in SADC, when measured against the yardstick of deliberative democracy, fail 
the test by a wide margin.  
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The deliberative democracy approach views communication channels as bridges or 
transmission belts of ideas between society and elected representatives. Caparini (2010) says 
that because the mass media is closely linked to the political system and the public sphere, it 
plays a dual role of representing and forming political opinion. On the one hand, mass media 
communicates information that individuals use to make informed decisions and political 
choices. On the other hand, politicians rely on the media to present their positions, take stock 
of public opinion and interact with the public. According to Gunther and Mughan (2000:2), 
“media, therefore, form a fundamental inter-connective tissue between society and the 
government, communicating information, intentions, concerns, priorities and reactions to 
policies”. 
A more robust communication mechanism that enables a smooth flow of information from 
stakeholders to the government and vice versa is what is required for SADC systems to work 
well and to ensure that there is increased stakeholder participation in its decision-making 
processes. 
This is more achievable if the deliberative democracy approach is used in decision-making. 
since it advocates for greater stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes as 
well as emphasises the smooth flow of communication as a way of achieving this goal. The 
current set-up, which is characterised by minimal information flow and communication 
channels between different categories of stakeholders, is limitative to inclusive decision-
making and needs to be improved. 
7.6 The extent to which SADC decision-making adheres to reciprocity 
The principle guiding deliberative democracy reciprocity is that citizens and their 
representatives seek to give one another mutually acceptable reasons for the laws and 
policies they adopt. The underlying emphasis is a desire to justify policies to the people who 
would be bound by them. In that regard, reciprocity sets standards or criteria for assessing 
decision-making on the strength of the justification that decision-makers give; they should use 
reasons that are accessible, morally respectful and revisable. The findings from the research 
are not consistent with principles of reciprocity. 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004:19) are of the view that the principle of reciprocity implies that 
the capacity to make critical judgments is a prerequisite for making reciprocal claims and that 
denying citizens space to engage in ideas is not consistent with the principle of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity recognises that citizens owe one another mutually justifiable reasons for the laws 
and policies that they would impose on one another. The decision-making process of SADC 
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is favours the interests and desires of elected officials and leaves minimal room for the 
participation of civil society. 
While elected officials have the relevant mandate to make decisions on behalf of citizens, the 
principle of reciprocity requires that reasons be justified to all parties who are motivated to find 
fair terms and social cooperation. It further allows for the principle of accommodation based 
on mutual respect, thus encouraging cooperation on fair terms. The legal provisions of the 
SADC Treaty in Article 23 and the subsequent establishment of SNCs speak of a desire to 
justify decision-making on the basis of the sensible reasoning of affected parties. The situation 
at SADC in practice defies all the intentions of the SADC Treaty, and the institutional 
provisions work contrary to – and thus against – reciprocity in decision-making. It also requires 
more than simply agreeing to disagree; it encourages that each side has a favourable attitude 
towards the other and interact constructively with the side that it disagrees with. This keeps 
the possibility of a different, more accommodating solution open in future. 
The importance of accommodation in policy-making is that it allows for citizens to promote 
policies where their principles converge, even if they would have placed these policies on a 
lower list of political preferences. This could be an important process in accelerating the SADC 
decision-making process as an interactive and inclusive decision-making process, by helping 
to find a point of convergence between elected officials and citizens, and thus helping them 
work together to accelerate development. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter made an in-depth analysis of the functionality of the SADC institutions. It outlined 
the operations of these institutions at the member state level and how they promote or limit 
participative decision-making. It further outlined the views and attitudes of specific individuals 
and civil-society organisations from the different member states on the state of participative 
decision-making at SADC. It thus sums up the attitudes and beliefs held by the civil society, 
SADC Secretariat and government officials about how the organisational construction of 
SADC limits or prohibits stakeholder participation in decision-making. It therefore lays a solid 
foundation for the conclusions that are presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction  
The research set out to investigate the institutional and structural set-up of SADC and how it 
allows for participative decision making. The study was meant to find out how the institutional 
and legislative frameworks of the organisation complement one other in enhancing the 
participation of stakeholders in the policy-making processes. SADC in Article 23 of its founding 
statutes speaks glowingly of allowing for the participation of stakeholders – civil society – in 
its decision-making structures. This is a way of promoting accountability and people-centred 
decision-making.  
The legislative provisions of Article 23 of the SADC Treaty are seen to be operationalised by 
further provisions that provide for the construction of SNCs as the fora for enhancing 
participative decision-making within member states. The rationale for the creation of the SNCs 
is that they are the inclusive internal structures at the national level where the government, 
civil society and other related stakeholders meet and discuss the country’s approach and 
policy positions to be transmitted to SADC.  
The SNCs seem to be an acknowledgement that, despite respect for the popular mandate of 
the elected government and its constitutional duty to represent its people as provided for in 
the laws of each country (including at interstate organisations), it is important to promote 
accountability by allowing for a forum that enables stakeholder engagement. In that regard, 
the research framed the questions that follow as the basis of the enquiry.  
The primary research question that the research sought to answer was why civil society and 
stakeholders find it difficult to participate in SADC’s decision-making processes, despite 
statutory provisions in the SADC Treaty. This primary research was complemented by the 
following related secondary questions. 
8.1.1 Do SADC’s institutions limit meaningful participation of civil society in policy formulation 
processes?  
This question was specifically rooted in the fact that SADC is an international organisation 
where engagement on decision-making is on a government-to-government basis. The 
international nature of the organisation only provides for real decision-making to be made by 
elected representatives of each member state and that limits the participation of other 
stakeholders. The question therefore sought to explore how, despite the international nature 
of SADC, it could open avenues for direct participation in decision-making by its citizens. 
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Alternatively, it desired to find out how its legislative provisions should be operationalised to 
enable participative decision-making. 
8.1.2 Do SADC’s democratic policy formulation processes adequately include civil-society 
interests in the region and within member states? 
This question sought to track the policy decision-making processes of SADC starting from 
where the policy is initiated and measuring the extent of stakeholder engagement. It later 
sought to identify how decisions are made in each of the key organs of the institution. The 
focus was on the extent of adherence to the provisions of Article 23 of the SADC founding 
treaty which speaks of providing spaces for participative decision-making. The research 
further sought to enquire how the processes that take place within prescribed organs for 
participative decision-making, the SNCs, should work. These were the most important organs 
for stakeholder participation, given that they were created specifically to enhance government 
and stakeholder engagement on SADC matters at the country level. The research further 
sought to find out whether other formal decision-making organs of SADC like the COM and 
the Summit of Heads of State and Government provide for democratic and participative 
decision-making. 
8.1.3 Why are the deliberative democracy principles of equality, reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability useful in enhancing civil-society participation in SADC decision-making 
processes? 
The question sought to measure the feasibility of enhancing stakeholder participation in the 
decision-making processes of SADC on the strength of the deliberative democracy conceptual 
framework and its tenets of accountability, reciprocity, publicity and equality. The question 
stemmed from theoretical foundations that discuss and discredit representative democracy as 
less capable in enhancing stakeholder participation. Thus, the question tests the feasibility of 
enhancing stakeholder participation using the deliberative democracy conceptual framework.  
From a theoretical perspective, there is substantial literature that suggests that deliberative 
democracy has a greater chance of improving stakeholder participation in decision-making 
than representative democracy. Given the vast supporting literature on how it enhances 
stakeholder participation in decision-making, the research thus sought to determine the extent 
to which it could improve stakeholder participation in SADC’s decision-making processes. 
The rationale for this research was based on the realisation of the expanded importance and 
influence of interstate organisations in domestic policy; yet, there was limited participation by 
the citizens of individual countries in the decision-making processes of the institution. There 
is always an assumption that, as the elected representatives, the government of the day has 
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absolute power to make decisions on behalf of citizens, even in international fora. While this 
is not far from the truth, the institutional structure and legislative framework of SADC indicates 
a desire to allow for the participation of stakeholders in the decision-making processes of the 
organisation.  
8.2 The research in relation to the deliberative democracy conceptual 
framework 
The research was conducted using qualitative research and document analysis. The 
qualitative aspect of the research was conducted through structured interviews in 12 SADC 
countries in which different categories of respondents were engaged to find out their views 
about the nature of participative decision-making in the SADC.  
Respondents were drawn from an informative pool that included senior members of civil-
society organisations at the country level, senior officials of the SADC-CNGO, senior 
government officials in selected member states and senior officials of the SADC Secretariat.  
Data from the qualitative enquiry was complemented by data from a documentary analysis 
that drew from SADC policy documents, statues, protocols and COM meetings, as well as the 
Summit of Heads of State and Government. The data was measured against the tenets of the 
deliberative democracy conceptual framework: accountability, reciprocity, equality and 
publicity. 
8.2.1 Summary description of findings and results  
8.2.1.1 Does the interstate nature of SADC institutions limit the meaningful participation of civil 
society in policy formulation processes?  
The evidence and answers from both the qualitative and secondary research point out that 
SADC is constructed as an international organisation where decision-making is through 
government-to-government agreements that limit stakeholder participation. They also indicate 
that there is limited stakeholder input in the statutory provisions in Article 23 of the founding 
treaty, which speaks of a desire to enhance participative decision-making, yet is not 
implemented. It has limited impact as it is not adhered to, to the letter.  
The decision-making processes remain anchored on two formal organs which are not inclusive 
of stakeholders. The decision-making organ remains the COM, which effectively does all the 
work and then forwards the decisions to the Summit of Heads of State and Government for 
formal endorsement. The COM is a ring-fenced organ which has limited room for non-
government representatives to make any representations. Civil society has attempted to use 
pre-Summit demonstrations to make presentations to the council, but most representations 
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have never been taken into serious consideration. This indicates that the provisions relating 
to the participation of stakeholders seem to be just on paper, with limited links to actual 
decision-making processes. 
8.2.1.2 Do SADC’s democratic policy formulation processes adequately include civil-society 
interests in the region and within member states? 
It is my conclusion that despite the firm pronouncements by the SADC in Article 23 of the 
SADC Treaty, there is little appetite for the implementation of these declarations. It looks like 
SADC created avenues for the participation of its citizens in decision-making as a way of giving 
the impression that it is democratic. SADC’s decision-making process has not supported its 
institutions of stakeholder participation, presumably to allow for continued monopolisation of 
power by the political leadership of the region. While the institution on paper claims to be 
democratic, the actual decision-making processes seem to support the assertion that it is a 
club of elites who are out to protect their individual interests rather than those of their citizenry.  
Failure at the country level by national governments to provide for sustainable dialogue on 
SADC matters through the SNCs is living testimony of the lack of seriousness by the 
organisation to be accountable to its people. This is made worse by the continued suppression 
of minority voices, which is another living tale of how the institution is focusing more on 
personal development than citizenry development. The lack of functionality of the existing 
structures has made it impossible for civil-society organisations to be part of the decision-
making processes of the institution. The SNCs, which are supposed to be the forum for state–
civil society interaction on policy matters, are dysfunctional in 11 of the 12 SADC countries 
studied, thus making it impossible for the voice of civil society to be heard in policy-making 
processes. In countries which seem to have some structures, there is too much government 
influence and control. While it is true on paper that there are organs that provide for the 
participation of citizens in the decision-making processes of SADC, these are assumptions 
rather than functional initiatives. 
There are glaring shortcomings and inadequacies in the SNC structure and functions. A 
central question needs to be asked: whether there is a future for SNCs in enhancing 
stakeholder participation in SADC’s decision-making processes. What is emerging is that the 
SNCs may soon be overshadowed by a new high-priority initiative that promotes SADC 
participatory policy solutions at the national level. Already there seems to be an indication that 
such a structure – the Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO) – may justifiably assume some of 
the functions of the SNCs. Although it seems that the SNCs play the primary role of 
coordinating poverty interventions at the national level, national poverty monitoring structures 
of the RPO will co-ordinate the work by several ministries and provide information to the 
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regional poverty observation offices in the SADC Secretariat in the same department where 
the monitoring office for the SNCs is located.  
It is prudent for SADC to create a more structured and friendly framework for stakeholder 
participation. This means crafting or reviewing operations of the SNCs so that they are 
standardised and their work is measurable in each member state. It is also important to ensure 
that there is widening of the resourcing and financing base of the SNCs. The funding could be 
channelled through the SADC Secretariat and not through the government or directly by 
donors. Where the government is the key financier, it has problems of the selective choice of 
participants and creates problems of government dictating when the meetings should be held. 
Indications are that, in some countries where there is bad blood between the government and 
civil-society organisations, the government stifles meetings by denying them funding. 
8.2.1.3 Why are the deliberative democracy principles of equality, reciprocity, publicity and 
accountability useful in enhancing civil society? 
The deliberative tenets of equality, reciprocity, publicity and accountability are clearly useful 
tools in enhancing participative decision-making in SADC. This is particularly true because of 
their known traits that assist in the promotion of interactive engagements between government 
and the citizens that elect them. The traits embedded in these tenets assist to fill the gaps in 
why there is limited participative decision-making in SADC. 
8.3 Effects of the financing model for CSO participation 
The research shows that the financing model which relies on donors has a negative effect on 
SADC’s decision-making processes. This also applies to donors who, if allowed, could 
influence the agenda using the adage: “He who pays the piper, plays the tune.” The Secretariat 
becomes the most neutral organ to handle issues of resource mobilisation and the distribution 
of finances to the SNCs to enable them to function with a high level of credibility. This 
conclusion is in variance with that of Nzewi and Zwake (2009) on the same subject. They 
argue that there is a need to consider the option of semi-autonomous SNCs. One major issue 
for debate which has emanated from the research is the question of whether the SNCs could 
function as institutions within governments. First there is the current challenge of funding and 
the lack of capacity of governments to effectively run the SNCs, as well as SADC’s 
shortcomings in terms of funding and its capacity to support the SNCs.  
8.4 Government and CSO relations 
The second challenge lies within the context of the relationship between civil society and the 
government. The situation of some of the SNCs in national departments, as some respondents 
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highlighted, brings about a level of distrust in civil society engaging with this structure. Some 
civil-society groupings hold the view that they would be co-opted by the government and used 
to rubber-stamp decisions without proper civil-society input. Thus, from both the government 
and civil society respondents (although for different reasons: for the government, it was more 
in terms of functionality and reducing bottlenecks; for civil society, the argument was from athe 
point of view of influence), there was a strong feeling that the SNCs function as semi-
autonomous or autonomous arms of SADC at the national level. 
The respondents argued that if they were to be semi-autonomous institutions, the SNCs would 
serve as a coordinating structure with powers to run independently within the overall 
government system. They saw this as a way of ensuring that the SNCs escape the bottlenecks 
within the government. From an operational perspective, perhaps, this arrangement may 
contribute to better functioning of the SNCs. They still argued, though, that funding such an 
agency would likely be a challenge. However, it might be easier to access funding if the SNCs 
were semi-autonomous structures. Funding could be secured directly through donor partners 
and even stakeholder organisations. 
The respondents concluded that well-functioning SNCs which are integrated fully into the 
government could add value, especially in terms of the overall government participatory 
agenda in the context of policy-making. However, my conclusion, as already indicated, is that 
the best way forward is to have the SADC Secretariat mobilise and distribute funding to the 
SNCs. It could also be of great importance to make a deliberate effort to publicise and 
advertise the operations of SADC with a view to exposing spaces that are available for 
inclusive decision-making and the enhanced participation of citizenry. This should be the 
responsibility of member states, the SADC Secretariat and the SADC-CNGO as well as the 
general citizenry.   
It is the responsibility of each of the key stakeholders to work together as a collective to ensure 
that structures for collective decision-making in SADC, especially the SNCs, are fully 
operational because they are key avenues for the enhancement of stakeholder participation. 
These structures, if fully operational, could be an excellent avenue for promoting the 
accountability of the government to its citizens. It could also enhance the respect for a diversity 
of views, in the spirit of equality of voice, ensuring that there is adequate communication and 
publicity of SADC programmes and that processes of decision-making are reciprocal. 
8.5 CSO organisational capacity 
What I also discovered as a major problem during this research was the organisational 
capacity of most of the civil-society organisations in the region. This applies to organisations 
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at both the national and regional levels. The civil-society organisations themselves seem to 
be poorly capacitated to engage effectively against the strong machinery of the government. 
Most of the organisations are also poorly resourced and lack effective advocacy strategies, 
which has made them fail to find meaningful spaces in policy deliberations with the 
government. Moreover, most of the organisations have a limited understanding of the 
operations of SADC organs and which ones to engage to be able to effectively influence 
policies. The key policy-making organs which civil society organisations need to target are the 
COM and the Secretariat. These organs are critical in setting up the agenda for the Summit 
and, if properly lobbied, they could ensure that civil-society views find their way onto the 
agenda for discussion by heads of states and governments. 
While civil-society organisations are likely to have lots of problems in directly engaging with 
the heads of states and governments, they could ensure that their views reach them by 
lobbying ruling political parties in each member state. These parties could then use their 
organs to deliberate and inform respective members of the COM to table the issues at the 
Council and Summit meetings. To be able to achieve this, civil-society organisations need to 
reorganise their relations with governments and be seen to work on promoting developmental 
or related issues and not to be extensions of opposition political parties that aim to replace 
governments. Civil-society organisations thus need to focus on sharpening their advocacy and 
engagement mechanisms if they are to find space for their constituencies in the decision-
making processes of the regional bloc. The continued use of pre-Summit demonstrations as 
the only tool for achieving results is outdated, and needs to be revised and replaced with less 
confrontational and more targeted advocacy strategies. 
8.6 Elusive democracy in SADC 
It is my conclusion that democracy is elusive in SADC. Democracy and especially interstate 
democracy is an ideal that is hard to achieve for a range of reasons, notably power, capacity 
and understandings of representivity. 
Democracy is an ideal that most societies strive to achieve because of the known and 
generally acceptable assumptions that it leads to the peaceful cohesion of society and that it 
is a positive catalyst to development. However, democracy has been an elusive ideal that has 
been difficult to achieve for many societies, due to many of its facets which are outside the 
realistic reach of society. It is my view that democracy and especially interstate democracy is 
an ideal that is hard to achieve for a range of reasons which stem from the complication of 
power relations, capacity of the civil-society players and the rigidity of the elected governments 
to allow for participative decision-making. While interstate organisations like SADC are 
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increasingly becoming important players in influencing domestic policy-making, they continue 
to exclude many citizens from influencing their operational structures. 
Citizens have a say and a voice in determining the composition of their governments at home, 
but they have limited influence on the construction, composition and operations of SADC. The 
calls by SADC in its founding statutes for the inclusion of stakeholders and citizens, and the 
subsequent organisational and legislative provisions, show a desire to democratise SADC as 
an institution.  
8.6.1 Delusions of representivity in SADC 
There seems to be embedded thinking in the governments of most southern African countries 
that their mandate, which is derived from representative democracy, gives them the total 
power to do and act as they wish. There is of course the exception of Swaziland, which 
remains an absolute monarch. However, the SADC case shows that the assumption that 
representative democracy necessarily means participative decision making is simply not 
correct. Representative democracies seem to have a limited appreciation of the involvement 
of citizens in decision-making beyond just elections. 
There is little appreciation that the democratic participation of citizens in governance 
transcends the electoral processes. It should encompass their participation in policy- and 
decision-making, including in important organisations that affect their lives like SADC. In this 
regard, the democratic ideals have been difficult to achieve and this calls for a revisiting of the 
representation model of SADC. For instance, while the current set-up of SADC is purely on a 
government-to-government agreement, it could be reconstituted in the future to include the 
direct election of representatives to the organisation. The assumption that elected 
governments should have the absolute power to represent their citizens, even in interstate 
organisations when they were elected for a domestic mandate, is not in agreement with the 
emerging democratic trends of inclusive decision-making. 
The organisational and institutional reconfigurations of SADC require the entrenchment of the 
democratic participation of citizens by allowing them to directly choose the leadership of the 
organisation. This means amending statutes to allow for each country representative to SADC 
to be elected directly by the citizens and not forwarded by the ruling government at national 
level, as is the current case.  
There could also be a need for the creation of a SADC administration composed of the directly 
elected representatives from each member state, who would be mandated with major 
decisions on policy and governance of the region. The powers of such an organ would have 
to be negotiated so that it does not undermine the sovereignty or usurp the powers of each 
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member state’s government. The rights and responsibilities of the membership should clearly 
define the separation of powers of the regional government and the national government. The 
regional government should be empowered beyond any measure of doubt to create functional 
and legislated structures for citizen participation in decision-making. Structures like the SNCs, 
which are created for the democratic participation of citizens in the regional body’s decision-
making affairs, should thus be under the command of the elected regional parliamentary 
legislation and thus subject to the subsequent jurisdiction and enforcement mechanisms. 
The elusive nature of democracy in SADC can be addressed through legislative measures, 
and not political declarations without enforcement mechanisms. The implementation of 
democratic ideals sometimes requires the coercive instruments and powers that are derived 
from legislation and law, which unfortunately SADC is currently not furnished with. Simply put, 
democracy is expensive to achieve and SADC needs to invest in those measures that will 
make it work and will allow for the all-inclusive participative decision-making that will assist it 
to be successful.  
8.6.2 SADC’s capacity limitations  
The emerging truth that seems to have been ignored in the discourse on participative decision-
making in SADC is the capacity gap that is inherent in the civil-society organisations. This 
limited capacity – which includes weak organisational construction, poor institutional 
construction, poor corporate governance, limited financial resources, unskilled human 
resources, poor remuneration for staff, high staff turnover poor advocacy strategies and 
unhealthy relations with governments, among others – has been an albatross around SADC’s 
policy-making neck. There is, thus, a need for a paradigm shift by civil-society organisations, 
so that they position themselves and work to utilise the spaces provided in the SADC statutes. 
The issues of participation in decision-making by civil society should not just be viewed as 
operational ones aimed at fulfilling statutory requirements. Rather, it should be a way of 
locating citizens’ voice in the discourse of power relations and even the distribution of 
resources. Civil-society organisations seem to believe that their role is just to get space to 
participate in decision-making without understanding the political implications behind such an 
allocation of resources.  
The well-known adage that “politics is about who gets what when and how” is important and 
applicable in the debate and discourse on participative decision-making. In that regard, and if 
civil society is to maximise the benefits that its members can get from SADC, they have to 
effectively know that their inclusion in decision-making is about maximising their say in the 
political decisions of who gets what, when and how. A deliberate strategy is required to 
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strengthen the organisational capacity of civil-society organisations so that they are able to 
face colossal institutions like SADC. The annual pre-Summit demonstrations are far from 
being the most useful strategy in enhancing their participation in decision-making. However, 
strengthening their capacity to engage and finding new approaches to funding are all essential 
elements for increasing the role of SADC citizens in the future. 
8.6.3 Divisive power relations 
The relations of power between the state and civil society are clearly important in the matrix 
of the enhancement of participative decision-making in interstate organisations. The relations 
between the two have a vast influence on how to work together in influencing participative 
decision-making. The research makes the conclusions that point at the importance of the 
normalisation of the relationship between the two to achieve greater goals.  
Meaningful participative decision-making at the SADC level is not possible where there is 
antagonism between the state and civil society at the country level. The two entities need to 
find common ground to utilise and operationalise the spaces provided for by SADC in the form 
of the SNCs.  
This can easily be achieved if there is limited antagonism, with the government doing away 
with the “big brother” mentality and the civil-society organisations sticking to their core 
business and not being identified as extensions of the commissariat of opposition political 
parties. It is my conclusion that the strained power relations, far from being of assistance in 
enhancing participative decision-making, are divisive and do not assist SADC to work as a 
solid unit. 
8.7 Policy and institutional changes for inclusive decision-making in SADC 
If we really want to be more participative and inclusive in decision-making at SADC, the 
research suggests that the following institutional and policy changes might be relevant. 
• The creation of a legislative parliament will help to enforce the decisions of SADC. This 
could mean reworking the SADC PF from being just a forum of parliamentarians from 
member states to a more organised body elected by the citizens and with defined 
legislative powers.  
• Further to that, there could be need for revisiting the SADC Tribunal with a view of 
making it a regional court, allowing for proper litigation on cases brought to it by 
individuals who feel that their rights as SADC citizens and as defined by the body 
statutes have not been adhered to. This could be a serious deviation from the current 
set-up where the Tribunal is constituted to deal only with matters brought forward by 
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governments of member states. This will enable individual SADC citizens to have a 
say on violations of their rights. It may also be a platform to influence policy using the 
judiciary. 
• To influence robust domestic interaction between the government and stakeholders at 
the country level, SADC needs to revisit its funding model. One of the best policy 
interventions that could be necessary would be compulsory contributions by member 
states for national SADC business. Currently, the SADC member states make statutory 
annual contributions to the organisation for its operations at the regional level. It could 
be important to levy an additional amount of money and then remit it to an organised 
national SNC structure. This could assist in the functioning of the local structures of 
SADC. This money could be managed and disbursed by the SADC Secretariat to fund 
approved activities. This approach could assist in ensuring a systematic, regular 
tracking system for SNCs’ activities, as well as the transparency and accountability of 
public funds. 
8.8 Opportunities for inclusive decision-making 
8.8.1 Why the deliberative democracy tenets of equality, reciprocity, accountability and 
equality of voice can enhance participative decision making 
These tenets of deliberative democracy are very useful in consolidating the framework for 
inclusive decision-making that is provided for in the SADC statutes but that is not being 
implemented, owing to a number of challenges that were unearthed by this research. It is my 
conclusion that the deliberative democracy tenets stated above have great capacity to improve 
participative decision-making in the following ways. 
The findings show the porous nature of SADC in enhancing participative decision-making and 
so the key issue becomes: “So, what should be done?” The “ so what” questions are best 
linked to the secondary research question which speaks of why the deliberative democracy 
tenets of communication, accountability, reciprocity and equality of voice could be of greater 
importance in enhancing inclusive and participative decision-making in the organisation. They 
help fill to the gap that the research intended to fill. 
The importance of enhancing participative decision-making is in fulfilment of proposals by the 
deliberative democracy conceptual framework, which places emphasis on interactive 
engagement by elected officials and citizenry as key in accelerating development in the region. 
Such key observation is made in the founding treaty in Article 23, which speaks of SADC as 
committed to the involvement of its citizens in decision-making processes to accelerate the 
process of regional integration and development. With the realisation that the current set-up 
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of SADC does not measure up to commitments made by its legislative frameworks, the real 
question then becomes: “What should be done?” 
To answer this question, it must be understood that the key limitation of the organisation is its 
construction and its processes in terms of decision-making. It is my view that the operation 
and institutional democracy of the SADC, as an interstate organisation bound by international 
law that allows country-to-country engagement to be made through elected representatives 
from each country, could be significantly improved by allowing the additional voices of citizen 
representatives to be heard on matters relevant to them, over and above the elected 
representatives. 
The deliberative democracy framework speaks to a desire for enhanced participative decision-
making. This desire is also expressed in SADC statutes regarding citizens’ participation 
through the SNCs. The main problem which was unearthed is that the deliberative framework 
which the SADC statutes aspire to as a decision-making tool in the organisation is seriously 
suffocated by the actual practice of representative democracy. I have no qualms with 
representative democracy as way of deriving mandates for decision-making processes, but I 
am against majoritarianism and the winner-take-all syndrome in decision-making. My 
conclusions are premised on my own belief that the process of elections and the process of 
policy-making are different things altogether. The assumption that, by voting for a party or 
individuals, citizens are making a policy choice is parochial and simplistic. The assumption 
that all citizens should just bow down and accept decisions made by elected representatives, 
even if they did not vote for them, limits choices for citizens. If anything, it is the dictatorship 
of the majority. This is even worse in institutions like SADC where the mandate for 
representation is derived from an election at home.  
In fact, there are dangers of surrendering state sovereignty if only elected representatives are 
left to make governance decisions on their own. The mandate to make decisions at the 
interstate level without the active participation of citizens using structures like civil society runs 
against deliberative democratic principles. 
The danger with the arrangement of surrendering all decision-making powers to elected 
representatives and excluding other stakeholders is that while people could prefer a person 
or party to represent them at the local or national level, it might not be their desire to have the 
same person or party representing them at the international level. It is possible, for instance, 
that a political party or individual that gets the lowest votes at a national election could be the 
preferred choice to represent citizens at the intergovernmental level. In such cases, the 
transference of power and authority from a local election into representation at the 
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intergovernmental level might be undemocratic, as preferences for representation could differ 
from local elections to national elections and intergovernmental elections. 
The problem with SADC is that there is a transferred responsibility based on the national 
election; yet, if regional representation was also subject to an election, there could be different 
choices and different representation. Political parties that might get fewer votes in local and 
national elections might actually be the preferred choice for intergovernmental representation, 
perhaps because their views do not identify with local or national needs, but would be seen 
as the best choice by the people for representation at the international level. This strengthens 
the case for the recognition and transformation of the SADC PF as an elected parliament with 
legislative powers. Possibly, that is the basis for SADC’s realisation that there is a need for 
extra consultative avenues beyond elected representatives to enhance the voice of other 
stakeholders in the decision-making processes of the organisation. It would be one way of 
ensuring that there is accountability of the organisation to citizens by providing avenues for 
direct interaction and engagement with the institution. The problem with SADC is that 
institutions which are well-provided for in the statutes and institutional framework of the 
organisation are not only in a state of comatose. 
The SNCs as the actual engagement institutions of SADC were found to be totally derelict in 
11 of the 12 countries that were studied. Evidence from complementary research by Nzewi 
and Zwake (2009) reflects that, in other countries that were not studied, only one country had 
an operational SNC. The situation at hand means that the only countries that have functional 
SNCs are Angola and Mozambique. This researcher concludes that, by providing spaces for 
the participation of citizens in decision-making through the SNCs, SADC recognises the 
limitations of representative democracy. SADC would not have put in place extra-legal 
instruments to allow such participation if representative democracy was capable of catering 
for all interests.  
A conclusion is therefore that, in the framework of the SNCs, SADC seems in search of a 
democratic model to enhance participative decision-making to promote accountability to 
citizens and accelerate development. The statutory and institutional provisions for the 
establishment of the SNCs speak of a preference for the deliberative democracy framework, 
as they seek to ensure that there is representation and respect of the voice of minorities, a 
clear framework for communication and decisions that are mutually acceptable to all parties. 
However, there seem to be operational limitations in that while the framework exists for 
enhancement of citizen participation, there is little being done in actual practice. 
I am of the strong view that using the four tenets of deliberative democracy, namely 
accountability, reciprocity, communication and equality of voice, SADC could be able to meet 
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its desired statutory and institutional provisions, and its aspirations of enhancing the 
participation of its citizens in decision-making, and thus accelerate regional development. The 
views are based on the following: 
✓ Accountability 
The statutory provisions in Article 23, which speak of a desire by SADC to include citizens in 
decision-making, are clearly aimed at ensuring the accountability of the organisation to 
citizens, as political accountability is crucial for development. The results of the findings from 
the SADC countries that were the subject of this research revealed glaring shortcomings in 
the organisation in providing for a space for participation through the SNCs and defining the 
operational framework, yet at the same time leaving them dysfunctional.  
The deliberative democracy tenet of accountability seeks to make the accountability of the 
elected public officials to the citizens such that the decisions made reflect the will of the people. 
It also provides for the necessary safeguards that provide checks and balance in governance. 
This can well be achieved if there is a deliberate policy of enhancing structured and regular 
as well as interactive meetings between the elected representatives and those who elect them. 
The call by the SADC statutes to have SNCs that meet regularly and that provide a platform 
for the interaction of the citizens and their governments is a formula for achieving greater 
accountability. Therefore, the absence of these regular and structured meetings as provided 
for in the SADC Treaty is one of the key causes for lack of participative decision-making. The 
drafters and the founding fathers of the SADC had good intentions in allowing for spaces for 
decision-making in the form of the SNCs; they had realised this could be a way of improving 
accountability. In the absence of the functionality of these structures, this accountability is 
compromised. 
The absence of regular meetings as provided for in the SADC statutes is self-defeating, as it 
works against the provisions of the organisation’s founding statutes. This also makes it difficult 
for the organisation to achieve its goals of accelerated regional development, as it fails to 
operationalise its own provisions which are capable of enhancing its own accountability to 
citizens and, therefore, achieving the desired accelerated development and achievement of 
regional integration. 
The deliberative democracy tenet of accountability which is expressed in SADC’s founding 
statutes needs to be operationalised by strengthening and activating the functions of the SNCs 
as a platform for engagement between the organisation and its citizens. This could be done 
by creating a monitoring mechanism in the SADC Secretariat or creating a portfolio for 
engagement between civil society and the SADC Secretariat. This would be a way of ensuring 
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accountability, a key tenet of deliberative democracy, and would ensure the organisation 
achieves its goals of regional integration. 
✓ Reciprocity 
My conclusion with regards to reciprocity is that in making structural provisions for the SNCs, 
SADC recognises the importance of making decisions that are mutually acceptable and 
justifiable to all stakeholders. However, in failing to operationalise the avenues for deliberative 
engagement, SADC is missing out on the opportunity to fulfil its undertakings as stipulated in 
Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. It is my view that an inculcation of a culture of regular meetings 
would allow for the extensive deliberation of issues by different stakeholders and could be a 
good prescription for accelerated development within the region. This deliberation would 
ensure that the policies that are implemented have buy-in and are mutually acceptable; 
citizens and their elected representatives would be more likely to identify with these policies 
and thus work as a collective to implement them.  
The deliberative democracy tenet of reciprocity could inject new life into SADC, as it would be 
the catalyst for decisions that are mutually acceptable and justifiable to all concerned parties. 
The current set-up, which is characterised by decision-making that does not necessarily take 
on board the views of affected people, challenges the mutual justification of these decisions. 
My conclusion is that reciprocity would assist in moving the wagons of the region’s 
development faster. 
This leads me conclude that the sluggish pace of development of the region is indicative of its 
exclusive nature of decision-making. But, with the deliberative democracy tenet of reciprocity, 
there are greater chances that decision-making would be made by measurable standards that 
are acceptable and justifiable to the citizenry in a manner that would make the policy 
processes people-centred and, therefore, acceptable to all stakeholders. 
This means is that SADC, through its Secretariat, has to effectively follow up in each member 
state to ensure that the SNCs are rejuvenated, that they meet regularly and that their decisions 
are transmitted to the regional body as agreed. It also has to expedite the process of resource 
mobilisation, especially within SADC member states, to enable regular discursive engagement 
at the national level between elected officials and their people, so that the whole process 
measures up to acceptable standards and norms. 
✓ Communication 
Communication and information-sharing are vital tools for accelerating development. 
Communication within institutions like SADC has to be carried out effectively within the various 
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levels of its operations. There should be communication machinery that is well-oiled from the 
Secretariat so that information is disseminated timeously to all stakeholders. The information 
mechanism should allow for continuous feedback between the Secretariat and stakeholders.  
Communication should also be conducted regularly at the country level between elected 
representatives and civil society so that they share ideas on policy positions and the 
operations of SADC. Communication is a tool that is important for human development, but is 
found lacking in SADC. It is a vital tenet of deliberative democracy and its application in SADC 
could help to galvanise the views of all stakeholders for accelerated development of the region.  
The current set-up, while nominally assuming that the organisation adheres to information and 
communication dissemination mechanisms, assumes that this could just be done without an 
operation framework. The deliberative democracy tenet of communication would ensure that 
this becomes a key and compulsory aspect of the operation of the organisation and, thus, put 
in place mechanisms for effective communication. Such mechanisms should take into 
consideration the new and modern communication tools to supplement the traditional word of 
mouth and meetings. 
I conclude if communication is entrenched in SADC as enunciated by the deliberative 
democracy tenet of communication, SADC would achieve more in terms of ensuring citizen 
participation in its decision-making processes and, thus, be able to fulfil its own desires as 
expressed in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. 
✓ Equality of voice 
Expanding the operations of SADC to include institutions that enable the voice of ordinary 
citizens in decision-making could assist in encouraging the respectful acceptance of diversity 
of views of all people from the region. The SNCs could thus operate as institutions for the 
equalisation of debate and a space in which decisions are made by consensus, such that the 
input of each member state to SADC fairly represents an acceptable and reasonable 
consensus by citizens and their elected representatives.  
This is an important tenet of deliberative democracy which is recognised by Article 23 of the 
SADC Treaty which, in my view, aims to bring on board different stakeholders’ views in order 
to buffer state domination of citizens. The importance of the principle of equality of voice is 
that while respecting elected authorities as the official bodies that ultimately determine the 
legal positions on policy matters, these positions should emanate from discussion with the 
citizenry and, in making decisions, these authorities integrate views from the minority. 
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This is specifically important because electing officials does not translate directly into policy 
choices. Officials who are elected have authority to make policy decisions, but in electing them 
one is not making a policy choice. This means that in order to have policies that are 
acceptable, there is a need to ensure that the elected representatives and other stakeholders 
converge to make deliberations when it comes to important policy positions. Decision-making 
cannot be a function of the elected representative only at the exclusion of other views, even if 
they are from the minority. The SADC set-up, in its current form, has moved to construct 
structures that aim to facilitate interface between citizens and their elected representatives, 
but the problem is that they remain in limbo.  
SADC needs to empower contact persons to vigorously pursue the SNCs’ provisions for 
meetings that enable elected representatives to make decisions that reflect the collective view 
of citizens . 
8.9 Contributions to the theoretical and empirical knowledge of SADC, civil 
society and deliberative decision-making 
The research helped give some important insights in understanding some of the problems that 
contribute to the sluggish process in SADC regional integration. The SADC region has been 
working tirelessly, but slowly, to ensure regional integration that is characterised by 
improvements in many things: a visa-free region, a common currency, reduced duty, 
accelerated development and uplifting of standards of living of citizens.  
One of the key reasons for a SADC legislative and organisational framework that speaks to 
enhancing participative decision-making has been to ensure that each of the stakeholders 
could make their own individual contribution to the regional debate. It is premised on the 
understanding that a multiplicity of voices and ideas could enhance accelerated development. 
It is further premised on the assumption that a governance system that is characterised by 
increased stakeholder participation in decision-making has greater potential of promoting 
accountability within the regional body. The research findings are very important in as far as 
they clearly outline that participative governance in the absence of a legislative framework for 
the enforcement of decisions is not adequate for achieving statutory obligations.  
SADC as an institution is institutionally weak, as decision-making systems are separated from 
its statutory provisions. It also presents a picture of an organisation that suffers from an internal 
governance crisis, in that it has many organs of decision-making that it provides for in its 
statutes, but remains unable to utilise them, much to its detriment. It is my conclusion that the 
organisation is far from meeting the basic tenets of democratic accountability in that it seems 
to be working within a centralised system of administration. Consequently, this has painted an 
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unhealthy public picture in some quarters, where the organisation is not seen as people-
centred, contrary to what it desires to achieve. Inevitably, such a relationship between the 
institution and its citizens has eroded the much-needed human capital for harnessing ideas 
and energies together for accelerated development.  
There is an urgent need for organisational transformation of SADC to an actively people-
centred institution, not just in legislation or organisational promise, but in actual practice too. 
This might call for the enactment of more rigorous reforms regarding the enforcement 
mechanisms for decisions made. The current set-up, where the implementation of decisions 
is by mere gentleman’s agreements without proper legislative mechanisms, is retrogressive 
for an institution that intends to harness all stakeholder voices in its decision-making 
structures. The implementation mechanism might call for a rigorous re-examination of the 
operational framework and legislative functions of the SADC PF with a view of giving it more 
power for enforcement of decisions. 
There is also a dire need for the transformation of civil-society organisations themselves to be 
well capacitated internally to be able to deal with such a complex institution like SADC. Most 
of the civil-society organisations lack experience and are too structurally weak to be able to 
make meaningful impact in dealing with SADC. Further to that, there should be internal 
assessment aimed at improving the organisational strength of civil-society organisations, as 
they are currently weak and too poorly organised to provide organisational impetus against 
SADC. This transformation should come with improved engagement strategies. The structural 
composition of civil-society organisations needs serious attention as they are weak and poorly 
organised. 
I further conclude that civil-society organisations need to revisit their funding models. While 
this might be very difficult, it will have long-term positive advantages. As a result, the adage 
which says, “ he who pays the piper, calls the tune” becomes evident, in that some civil-society 
organisations due to desperation in funding accept any conditions which at times places them 
in conflict with national interests. It could also be important for civil-society organisations to 
reinvent their engagement strategies because the militancy approach has not helped the 
situation in most cases. If anything, it has only contributed to alienation with government and 
thus created problems with participative decision making. While differences are inevitable, 
approaches to solving problems between different stakeholders should not be a barrier to 
meaningful debate. Civil-society organisations need to segment their advocacy issues and 
see if the ones they choose could have convergence with the government. In most cases, they 
have blown opportunities for progressive engagement by lumping together issues and thus 
failing to find a point of convergence when they could have achieved results on some of the 
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issues if they had separated them. While the SADC itself does get substantial funding from 
donors, it has a mechanism for annual contributions by members for its administration and 
some programmes. 
The findings give indications of how the deliberative democracy policy-making model could be 
of great assistance in improving participative decision-making in SADC. This stems from 
considerable evidence that speaks to an available legislative framework for participation as 
provided for in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty, as well as the institutional provisions of the 
SNCs. These indicate a desire for the enhancement of stakeholder participation in the SADC 
decision-making process beyond just representative democracy. The findings indicate a 
serious need to develop further knowledge of spaces for deliberative democracy which are 
reinforced by statutory provisions, yet are not utilised due to problems of cohesion between 
governments and civil-society players. The problems that SADC faces could be solved much 
faster if there was collaborative decision-making, and that should stem from the utilisation of 
opportunities provided for by deliberative democracy. Enhancement of the application of the 
deliberative democracy principles as a modus operandi in tSADC is important in that it could 
help bridge the chasm that exists between the government and civil-society organisations. 
The deliberative democracy model would assist in promoting a culture of structures having to 
meet to enable collaborative decision-making, and thus help harmonise the diverse views that 
are currently diverging, and therefore are not helpful for the advancement of the region and 
livelihoods of its people.  
8.10 Suggestions for further research  
The research exposes the limited functionality of participative decision-making in SADC’s 
decision-making process, despite the strictures of the legislative and institutional provisions. 
In this regard, it is a serious discovery that hindrances to participative decision-making in 
SADC are not related to the statutory provisions or organisational construction; rather, they 
are embedded in the enforcement mechanisms. 
Because of this contribution, one area of research that could add value in addition to this one 
is how SADC could create a legislative parliament so that it enforces the statutory 
responsibilities of each member state. There are already some moves in that direction through 
the establishment of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, but in its current form it lacks teeth for 
enforcement. The forum remains just a platform for discussion as it is not even an organ of 
SADC. I am of the view that if the SADC PF was elevated from just being a network for 
discussion to a legislative parliament, it could enhance the implementation of decisions and 
statutory provisions of SADC. If adopted, the SADC parliament should not be composed of 
representatives seconded from parliamentarians elected at national level. It should rather be 
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composed of parliamentarians who are directly elected for that purpose, so that they are 
empowered to make serious decisions derived from the confidence of direct elections, rather 
than a delegated status.  
Such research could broaden the literature on the enhancement of stakeholders’ roles in 
SADC decision-making processes. Other research could focus on the creation of the SADC 
regional court of justice to deal with cases that are brought by individuals who feel their rights 
have been violated – as provided for in the SADC statues – but have failed to get recourse at 
the national level. Such research could focus on how this kind of court could effect relevant 
sanctions and measures beyond that which the current SADC Tribunal provides. The SADC 
Tribunal in its current form only provides for the hearing of cases brought in by member states, 
which excludes individuals who feel violations of their interest as provided for in SADC 
statutes. Such research could be useful in elucidating how there could be enhancement of 
participative decision making within SADC. 
8.11 Conclusion 
The importance of the proper application of the deliberative democracy conceptual framework 
in enhancing participative decision-making in SADC cannot be over emphasised. The 
research revealed a serious need for the organisational reform of SADC to allow for practical 
engagement between civil-society players and the institution. This could easily be put into 
practice through the proper application of deliberative democracy and its tenets that allow for 
accountability, publicity, reciprocity and equality of voice. 
Proper application and adherence to these principles of deliberative democracy provide 
greater chances for the enhancement of participative decision-making, which could help in the 
acceleration of regional development. This, however, calls for a more rigorous approach in 
legislative reforms and the organisational reconstruction of SADC to ensure that there are 
practical enforcement mechanisms for the achievement of the goals set out in Article 23 of the 
SADC founding treaty. The best and most practical way is to capacitate the SNCs to be 
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Annexure A: Interview schedule for the SADC Council of NGOs 
My name is Qhubani Moyo, a PhD Candidate in Public and Development Management at the 
University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. I am doing research on civil-society participation 
in the SADC policy formulation processes. I would be most grateful if you would assist me by 
answering the following questions. 
1. How is the SADC Council of NGOs (CNGO) constructed? (indicate membership, legal 
status) 
2. What is the nature of the relationship between the SADC-CGNO and civil society at a 
national level?  
3. What is the nature of relationship between the SADC-CNGO and the SADC Secretariat? 
4. Does SADC-CNGO participate in the policy-making processes of the regional body? 
Indicate the specific policy initiative and the stages in which you have been involved. 
5. What form does that participation take and how effective is it? 
6. If there are policy debates with the SADC Secretariat or related bodies, is there respect of 
equality of the SADC-CNGO and the SADC Secretariat? 
7. Does the SADC-CNGO make any policy representations to the Council of Ministers or any 
other formal institution of SADC? (indicate how, which one and what happened to that 
position)  
8. Is the SADC-CNGO well-furnished with information for discussion on any policy initiatives 
before the deliberations by the formal organs of SADC? 
9. How is the SADC-CNGO accountable to its membership in decision-making processes? 
10. How consistent is SADC-CNGO in the holding of annual general meetings and how do 
they come up with decisions in those meetings? 
11. What are the other decision-making mechanisms of the SADC-CNGO? 
12. How does the SADC-CNGO deal with minority views in its decision-making processes? 
13. How does SADC-CNGO facilitate state–civil society interaction at the national level? 
14. What is the SADC-CNGO doing to facilitate proper functioning of the SADC national 
committees? 
15. How is the SADC-CNGO funded? 
16. How does the funding model affect or influence its programming activities?  
17. Is the SADC-CNGO well-resourced, and how does its human resources component affect 
its ability to effectively participate in the SADC policy formulation process? 
18. Are there staff capacity development activities and how effective are they? 
19. Would you say SADC is living to its commitment of promotion of citizens in policy making? 
Explain. 
20. How do you think SADC should improve in that regard? 
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a) Indicate factors to do with the civil society organisations themselves. 
b) Indicate factors to do with SADC as an organisation. 
21. Do you have anything else to say about the subject at hand? 
Thank you very much. 
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Annexure B: Interview schedule for senior SADC Secretariat 
My name is Qhubani Moyo, a PhD candidate in the University of Witwatersrand in South 
Africa. I am doing research on civil-society participation in the SADC policy formulation 
processes. I would be most grateful if you would assist me by answering the following 
questions. 
1. What are the decision-making structures of SADC? 
2. How inclusive of civil society are these decision-making structures? 
3. How are decisions made and how does SADC deal with minority views? 
4. Would you say there is equality of voice in the discussion and decision-making processes? 
5. Are there any policy decisions that have been settled by voting? 
6. Do you get any contributions from any of the SADC national committees (SNCs)? 
7. What value and weighting is given to these positions in the final decision-making 
processes?  
8. Do you think the views that are given from the SNCs reflect broader consensus by 
government and non-state actors at a national level?  
9. What communication mechanisms does SADC use, and how wide-reaching and effective 
are they? 
10. What would you state as landmark contributions by civil society in the SADC policy-making 
processes? 
11. Do you see SADC’s decision-making processes as promoting accountability of the 
organisation to the citizens? 
12. Do you see SADC as living up to its founding statutes of making a commitment to inclusive 
and participative decision-making? 
13. What initiatives have been undertaken in fulfilment of the civil-society participation and 
how effective have they been? 
14. What do you think should be done to enhance greater participation of civil society in 
decision-making processes of SADC? 
15. State factors that relate to SADC as an organisation. 
16. State factors that relate to civil-society organisations themselves. 
17. Do you have anything else to say about this issue? 
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Annexure C: Interview guide for civil-society organisations at country level 
My name is Qhubani Moyo, a PhD candidate in Public and Development Management at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. I am doing research on civil-society participation in the SADC 
policy formulation processes. I would be most grateful if you would assist me by answering 
the following questions. 
1. Has your organisation participated in any SADC policy-making initiative? 
2. Who were the other participants in the policy-making initiative? 
3. Was there involvement of any government officials in the facilitation process? 
4. Were you and other participants treated with equality in the process of discussions? 
5. Were the views of each participant given equal weight without bias of their status and 
position in society? 
6. Was the quality of discussions mature and based on substantial maturity and reasoning? 
7. How were the discussions and outcomes communicated, and how accessible and effective 
were the communications mechanisms? 
8. Was there feedback from the stakeholders and how was it handled in the discussion 
process? 
9. Would you describe the discussions on the policy formulation as calling for accountability 
of the implementers? 
10. In what ways would you define the discussion process as adhering to the principle of 
accountability? 
11. How were the conclusions on the policy discussions reached? 
12. Was there consensus at the end of the discussion? 
13. If not, were the minority views taken on board or only those of the majority won the day? 
14. Was there voting at the end of the discussion, and if so, how were the views of those on 
the minority treated? 
15. Would you define the policy output as reflecting the diverse interests of all the stakeholders 
involved? 
16. How would you define its effectiveness as civil society voice in SADC? 
17. Are you aware of existence of any SADC structures for discussion of in your country? 
18. If yes, what are the structures and how active are they? 
19. Is there a SADC national committee in your country? 
20. If yes, how is it constituted (who are the people involved)? 
I. How often does it meet? 
II. Does it have a secretariat? 
III. How is it funded?  
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21. Indicate some SADC-related policy discussions carried by the country committee which 
you still recall. 
22. How many meetings were held to discuss the policy position? 
23. Would you define the composition of the participants as representing the majority of the 
SADC committee members?  
24. Would you define the discussions at the SADC national committee as respecting the 
diversity of views? 
25. Would you define the deliberations as treating all the submissions with equality? 
26. Is the SADC committee well-advertised in a media accessible to most stakeholders? 
27. How are decisions made in the committees? 
28. Would you define the ultimate policy position as encompassing the views of all including 
the minority views? 
29. When the country position was finally represented at the SADC Council of Ministers, was 
it reflecting the outcomes of the conclusions of the SADC country committee? 
30. How would you describe relations between the government and civil society in your 
country, and how do they affect your ability to engage on SADC policy-making processes? 
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Annexure D: Interview schedule for senior SADC government officials 
My name is Qhubani Moyo, a PhD candidate in the University of Witwatersrand in South 
Africa. I am doing research on civil society participation in the SADC policy formulation 
processes. I would be most grateful if you would assist me by answering the following 
questions. 
1. What are the decision-making structures of the SADC? 
2. How inclusive of civil society are these decision-making structures? 
3. How are decisions made and how does your government deal with minority views? 
4. Would you say there is equality of voice in the discussion and decision-making processes? 
5. Are there any policy decisions that have been settled by voting? 
6. Do you have any of the SADC national committees (SNCs)? 
7. How often do they meet and how are they constituted? 
8. What value and weighting is given to these positions in the final decision-making 
processes?  
9. Do you think the views that are given from the SNCs reflect broader consensus by 
government and non-state actors at national level?  
10. What communication mechanism does the SADC use, and how wide-reaching and 
effective are they? 
11. What would you state as landmark contributions by the civil society in the SADC policy-
making processes? 
12. Do you see SADC’s decision-making processes as promoting accountability of the 
organisation to the citizens? 
13. Do you see SADC as living up to its founding statutes of making a commitment to inclusive 
and participative decision-making? 
14. What initiatives have been undertaken by your government in fulfilment of civil-society 
participation and how effective have they been? 
15. What do you think should be done to enhance greater participation of civil society in the 
decision-making processes of SADC? 
• State factors that relate to the SADC as an organisation. 
• State factors that relate to your government. 
• State factors that relate to civil-society organisations themselves. 
Thank you very much. 
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Annexure E: List of individuals and organisations interviewed 
Name of 
organisation 
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WIMSA Namibia Moses Ngoma Project 
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Zambia Judith Mulenga  Harare 31/07/14 
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Law in Southern 
Africa (Zambia) 
Zambia Matrine Bbuku 
Chuku 






Director  Harare 22/07/14 





Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe Thabani Nyoni Spokesman  Bulawayo 20/03/14 
COSATU South Africa  Bongani 
Masuku 
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